

**THE KENNEDY INITIATIVES  
IN INDONESIA, 1962-1963**

**A Thesis**

**Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School  
of Cornell University for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy**

**by**

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**September 1969**

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