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**STRATEGIES OF RULE,
STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE :**

**WOMEN AND THE
WEST PAPUAN NATIONALIST STRUGGLE**

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at any other higher education system. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

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INTRODUCTION

In researching an essay on West Papua and human rights last year for an Indonesian language unit, I found myself becoming overwhelmed by the horror and injustice of the rape and torture being perpetrated by members of the Indonesian military against West Papuan women and children. These were graphically documented in a report by the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, which was released in May 1999. This is partly what has led to my research topic towards an Honours thesis, on militarised gender violence, and the intersection between gender power relations and nationalist movements, with a particular focus on West Papua.

My background is in Asia Pacific Studies, including Indonesian language. I make no apology for an obvious sympathy with the independence movement in West Papua, and for this reason I use the names West Papua and Papua, the names preferred by the nationalist movement. My interest in human rights, in particular women's rights advocacy, is what motivates my research, as well as the wish to further my understanding of the relationships between nationalist struggles and struggles for gender equality.

This thesis examines strategies of rule and strategies of resistance within West Papuan nationalist struggles. It looks at the techniques of rule, particularly those involving control through gender relations, and strategies of resistance, particularly those engaged in by women. It argues that without an understanding of the gender dimensions of both repression-resistance situations and nationalist movements, the new state which is won, will most likely replicate the power structures of the old regime.

The thesis uses documentary research, which includes a wide range of data approached from various angles. Firstly, the material covering West Papuan nationalist struggles is drawn from monographs, journal articles, conference papers, and newspaper reports from both the English and Indonesian language press. By subscribing to the electronic news service KABAR-IRIAN (Irian News), I receive almost daily reports which has enabled me to follow contemporary developments. The material on militarism, gender violence and resistance contains feminist theoretical approaches which I utilise in analysing the data on West Papua. This includes monographs, dissertations, conference papers, journal and newspaper articles, supplemented by a semi-structured interview with Beatrix Koibur, a West Papuan women's

independence leader who visited Australia in August-September 2000. The interview was conducted in Indonesian, and translated by the writer.

Several limitations of the study need to be appreciated. Firstly, I have not visited West Papua, and, thus, have not had the opportunity to get to know women and talk with them face to face. My initial plan was to draw upon correspondence with several West Papuan women activists. However, because of the politically sensitive nature of the issues, and the written rather than oral-based nature of the project, to have expected responses from women who don't know me, was evidently unrealistic. Finally, there is very little written by West Papuan women that I have managed to access. However I have been able to use material from similar situations, in particular Aceh, East Timor and The Philippines.

Introducing West Papua

The western half of the island of New Guinea (see map on p.60) was officially part of the Dutch East Indies, which in 1949 became the Republic of Indonesia. Netherlands New Guinea remained under Dutch administration until 1962. Until the 1950s however, the Dutch presence in West Papua had been minimal, consisting mainly of small missionary settlements which provided basic schooling and health care. In the highland areas, where the majority of the population live, the Dutch did not establish a presence until the 1950s (Castles, 2000:11).

The indigenous population of West Papua consists of 244 different tribal language groups (Pigay, 2000:371). Many of these live in isolated highland communities, whose links to other parts of West Papua can only be made by foot, or by small aircraft. In contrast, some coastal communities such as the Biak people have a long history of contact with outsiders. Through their tributary status with the Moluccan Sultanate of Tidore, Biak seafarers had regular contact with Europeans. By the 1930s, Dutch Protestant missionaries were well established in Biak, where most people had converted to Christianity. By the late 1940s, due to these missionary efforts, the great majority of young Biak men were literate (Rutherford, 1999:45), and growing numbers of girls were receiving a formal education (personal communication with Beatrix Koibur, 2000).

During the Dutch administration, Malay was used as a lingua franca (as well as Dutch amongst the elite), and Indonesian (based on Malay) has continued that function under Indonesian rule. The vast majority of West Papuans are Christian, although there is a small

number of indigenous Muslims in Fak Fak (King, 2000:2). As in East Timor, the church has provided one of the few avenues through which West Papuans have felt able to voice their grievances, where they can ‘feel recognised and respected as real human beings’ (van den Broek, 2000:11).

With a total population of approximately 2.3 million (Maniagasi, 2000:1), estimates of non-Papuans vary between half and one million people¹ (Elmslie, 2000:21). These include government-sponsored transmigrants from Java, traders from Sulawesi, government and military officials, as well as Indonesian and foreign managers and workers in large projects, particularly Freeport (McDonald, 2000:2).

With forest covering 85% of its land mass, West Papua is home to huge biodiversity (in the Lorentz National Park alone, there are 350 bird species, and 101 types of mammals), and enormous mineral wealth (Pigay, 2000:361-2). However, West Papuans themselves have derived few benefits from this natural wealth, and have become disempowered in their own land. Their sense of being disempowered and marginalised has created strong yearnings for recognition of identity, dignity, and self-rule amongst West Papuans.

The Thesis in Outline

Following is a brief outline of each chapter. Chapter 1 examines the literature, and comprises two sections. The first, is an overview of the literature on West Papuan struggle, including recent developments since Suharto’s downfall in May 1998. It looks at the resistance of millenarian movements, the armed opposition to Indonesian rule by the OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* or Free Papua Movement), and the current political movement to gain national independence. The second, examines the literature on militarised gender violence in West Papua, Aceh and The Philippines. It explores gendered approaches to nationalism and militarism, including the ways in which women are constructed in counter-insurgency and nationalist discourses.

¹ Establishing accurate population figures is problematic. According to Dr. Chris Ballard (personal communication 16.9.2000) from the ANU, the 1995 figures give 1,560,000 Christians (mainly Papuans), 405,000 Muslims and about 6000 Buddhists and Hindus (predominantly non-Papuans). According to Iwan Hermanto (personal communication 26.9.2000) from Statistics Indonesia, the preliminary figure from the 2000 population census is 2, 081,124, with no breakdown for Papuans and non-Papuans.

Chapter 2 examines the conflicting Dutch and Indonesian claims over West Papua, and the process of incorporation into Indonesia in the 1960s. Interpretation of this process is fundamental to West Papuans' claims to sovereignty, and constitutes the basis of the current political mobilisation. The chapter looks at the legacy of Indonesian rule, which has created a marginalised, impoverished indigenous population who resent the political and economic dominance by non-Papuans. Human rights violations by the Indonesian military, resource exploitation by non-Papuans, and loss of customary land, all combine to drive nationalist sentiment.

Chapter 3 explores the relationship between militarism and gender violence, and the ways in which women in Aceh, East Timor and The Philippines have resisted this violence. It examines theoretical positions on gender violence and militarism, including how these relate to nationalist struggles, - with a view to asking what relevance these have for the West Papua situation.

Chapter 4 focuses on Yosepha Alomang, the Amungme woman who has been an outspoken critic of the Freeport Gold and Copper mine in the Grasberg mountains, - by far the largest of all extractive operations in West Papua. It outlines the struggle against Freeport by the local people whose land was appropriated for the mine, and the way in which the area has become militarised as a result of resistance to the mine. It looks at the strategies employed by Yosepha Alomang in subverting repressive structures, and in publicising the struggle in which the Amungme and other peoples are engaged.

In late August 2000, I had the good fortune to meet three members of the West Papuan Presidium, the executive body of the recently formed West Papuan Council. One of these was Beatrix Koibur, who agreed to a long interview with me. This interview forms the basis of the final chapter, and conveys the views and hopes of one of the few women independence leaders in the current political structure.

CHAPTER 1: EXAMINING THE LITERATURE:

- ◆ **West Papuan Nationalist Struggles**
- ◆ **Militarism and Gender Violence**

Introduction

This review comprises two main sections. The first section, is an historical overview of the literature on West Papua, focusing on material which covers political developments since the 1950s. This includes various forms of resistance to Dutch colonial rule and the Indonesian occupation. Both armed opposition to Indonesian rule by the OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* or Free Papua Movement), and uprisings in the form of millenarian movements, are indicative of intermittent waves of repression and subsequent resistance on the part of West Papuans. Recent political moves to gain national independence by West Papuans are discussed in light of the changes in the Indonesian political landscape. As the focus of my research is on how women relate to nationalist movements, I was particularly interested in how West Papuan women have been portrayed in the literature. However, with a few exceptions, women are rarely the focus in this body of literature.

The second section explores the literature on the issue of women and nationalism, including women in other resistance movements. The issues of militarism and gender violence, and how these impact upon women's lives are examined, as well as the relationship between nationalism, militarisation and gender power relations. Most of the literature covered pertains to other resistance struggles. However, these are useful and relevant in understanding the West Papuan situation, about which, as I have discovered, very little written has been written.

Histories of West Papuan Struggle

Nonie Sharp's 1977 publication of *The Rule of the Sword, the Story of West Irian*, was one of the early books to consider what happened following Indonesia's annexation of West Papua, and as she says, sought to 'break through the silence surrounding Papua Barat' (Sharp, 1994:xiv). Robin Osborne's *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla War in Irian Jaya* was published in 1985. It comprises an in-depth account of the war between the Indonesian military and the OPM, giving a graphic picture of the atrocities perpetrated by the military upon the civilian population in its attempts to wipe out organised opposition to its control. *West Papua - Obliteration of a People*, by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, was

published in 1988. With a strong human rights focus, this text discusses the killings, dispossession, alienation and human rights violations of West Papuans associated with the Indonesian occupation, as well as organised resistance to it. It describes the plundering of natural resources including timber, and minerals, relating in particular, to the largely American owned Freeport McMoran Gold and Copper mine in the Grasberg Mountains; and the impact of transmigration of people from other parts of Indonesia to West Papua.

In my search for mention of West Papuan women's resistance to occupation, I found evidence of women's involvement in the West Papuan struggle, both illustrated in photographs, and referred to in Budiardjo and Liem's text (1988). Women OPM guerrillas are shown in that text (p.99), and reference is made to a group of women who raised the Morning Star flag outside the provincial governor's office in Jayapura in 1980, with 'enthusiastic support' from onlookers (p.83). These women, whose photograph appears on page 82, were all jailed without trial in August 1980 (p.83). Shortly after this incident, three women, who according to an OPM situation report, were members of the underground Papuan Women's Intelligence Group, met the same fate (Osborne, 1985:84).

In February 1984, an OPM led uprising in Jayapura, and the subsequent military reprisals, led to a mass exodus of around 12,000 West Papuans across the border into PNG. This included hundreds of people from the Jayapura area, amongst them deserting military personnel, civil servants and academics. This was the beginning of a larger exodus of rural people, a flow which 'came to include over half the population of the communities near the border...' (Bell, Feith, Hatley, 1986:6). This led to much media attention in both Australia and PNG, the deportation of OPM leaders to third countries, and the involvement of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in the border camps (MacQueen, 1989:532-533). This period is well covered in Robin Osborne's 1985 text, and in Ron May's 1986 edited text, *Between Two Nations: The Indonesia Papua New Guinea Border and West Papua Nationalism*. Also, the issues are addressed in the ACFOA (Australian Council for Overseas Aid) collation of published *Irian Jaya Australian News Clippings February - May, 1984*.

In April 1984, the prominent anthropologist Arnold Ap was murdered by Indonesian authorities (Sharp 1994:xv), and became a martyr to the cause of West Papuan cultural and political identity. Nonie Sharp's 1994 book *The Morning Star in Papua Barat* is dedicated to Arnold Ap amongst others, and is important in its recognition of oral history in indigenous

cultures, in this case that of Biak. The second part of the book is the life story of Markus Wonggor Kaisiepo, who according to Rex Rumakiek (Sharp 1994:xii), was 'the last remaining authority on Koreri', a Biak word meaning renewal or transformation (Sharp, 1994:5).

The significance of Koreri and other millenarian movements is explored in Sharp (1994) and other publications (Giay, and Godschalk, 1993). These texts develop links between antipathy towards the status quo, nationalist sentiment, and millenarian movements. In a substantial piece entitled 'Waiting for the End in Biak: Violence, Order, and a Flag Raising', Danilyn Rutherford (1999) draws some interesting parallels between the Koreri Movement of the World War II period, led by the traditional singer and healer Angganeta Menufandu, in which the Morning Star flag first flew in 1942, and the July 1998 flag-raising event in Biak, led by Philip Karma.

One of these parallels is the fact that both coincided with 'the fall of a seemingly permanent regime' (Rutherford, 1999:55). Another is the dancing, singing and praying engaged in by the participants during the flag-raising of both periods. A third parallel is the importance placed on outside recognition of their demands. In the earlier uprising, there was an expectation that the Japanese would recognise Papuan political parties. In the 1998 scenario, there was a belief that 'powerful outsiders' would support them. This was in part a response to a letter, widely circulated in Biak (p.56) from several US Congress members to President Habibie, in which they called for political dialogue on the status of both East Timor and Irian Jaya (p.42). In October 1943, the Japanese navy massacred hundreds of followers, and in 1998, the Indonesian military opened fire on some two hundred demonstrators, resulting in deaths as well as torture and disappearances (p.40).

This harsh reaction was not uncommon until the fall of Suharto in May 1998. Since then flag raising and demonstrations have been met with a degree of government toleration. It is only very recently that West Papuans have been able to openly organise politically and demand independence. There was an important breakthrough when 100 of them met President Habibie in February 1999 to make such a demand (Chauvel, 2000:5, King, 2000:2, Rutherford, 1999:42-43).

The literature suggests that amongst the emerging West Papuan leadership we are yet to hear women's voices. However, one of the leading spokespersons in the struggle against the Freeport mine, is Yosepha Alomang (Mote, 2000). This Amungme traditional healer and member of LEMASA, the Amungme Tribal Council, has consistently spoken out against human rights abuses by the security forces in the Freeport concession, as well as the environmental devastation caused by the mine (Survival International, 1998, n.p.). In December 1999, a group of human rights organisations in Jakarta awarded her the Yap Thiam Hien Human Rights Award, and in January 2000, she and Rev. Isak Ondawame led a group of people from Timika to the regional assembly in Jayapura, to demand the withdrawal of security forces from the mine area (Imran, 2000, n.p.).

Militarism, Gender Violence and Nationalist Movements

Military violence against West Papuan women, in particular rape, has been well documented by various groups investigating human rights violations, including the Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) Memorial Centre For Human Rights, and the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy (IHRSTAD) in their May 1999 report, 'Incidents of Military Violence Against Indigenous Women in Irian Jaya (West Papua), Indonesia'. Prior to this, human rights reports had been released by the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura in 1995, and in May 1998 by the Catholic church, and two Protestant churches based in the subdistrict of Mimika (RFK Centre and IHRSTAD, 1999:2).

According to Joy Balazo (2000), the Secretary for International Human Rights with the Uniting Church in Australia, who recently visited the area, the Amungme women who have been displaced from their land as a result of the Freeport copper and gold mine, are under continual surveillance by the military.

One mother has three children out of constant rapes, whilst another two had been raped whilst working in their gardens. Their pain as they shared their stories was deep and is constantly exacerbated by the awareness that there is nothing they can do to protect their children, who are also abused by the military (Balazo, 2000:24).

The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy in her 1999 report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, concluded that rape was used by the Indonesian security forces 'as an instrument of torture and intimidation' in Irian Jaya, Aceh

and East Timor, and ‘torture of women detained by the security forces was widespread’. She found that no perpetrators had been brought to justice, nor had any compensation been given to victims (Coomaraswamy, 1999:1).

From the literature I have surveyed, it appears that gender violence is a significant aspect of Indonesian rule. How then are women responding to and resisting this violence? To start looking at these issues, I have concentrated on writers who have dealt with women of the South, including women in other liberation struggles against oppressive regimes.

Whilst women have played important roles in many nationalist movements, in her text *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, Kumari Jayawardena’s (1986), discussion of such movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, concludes that these roles were ‘contributive’. Men organised and set the agendas of nationalist movements, and ‘were the main movers of history’ (p.260-261).

In discussing the tendency amongst men in nationalist movements to tell women to ‘hold their tongues until after the revolution’, Anne McClintock (1995) argues that historically women who have been disempowered during nationalist struggles, will continue to be disempowered after the struggle. She says: ‘If nationalism is not transformed by an analysis of gender power, the nation-state will remain a repository of male hopes, male aspirations and male privilege’ (p.385). Even in cases where women have been actively involved and valued in resistance struggles, once the ‘state is won’, a common occurrence is the ‘forgetting’ of women’s contribution, and their return to a subordinate status in society (Pettman, cited in Wilford, 1998:3). A recent example of this is the case of around 20,000 women who fought in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, which achieved its goal of independent statehood in 1991. Lamenting this regression, one of these women made the rather ironic comment: ‘It was better when we were in the field - we were equal with the men and we got good treatment’ (cited in Wilford, 1998:4).

McClintock (1995:360) applauds Frantz Fanon’s early recognition of gender as a ‘formative dimension of nationalism’, and the inherent link between military violence and gender power in the family. As Fanon (1967:141-142) writes in *Black Skin White Masks* ‘Militarization and the centralization of authority in a country automatically entail a resurgence of the authority of the father’. According to Cynthia Enloe (2000), ‘Even leaders of movements opposed to

militaristic regimes can become militarized, making decisions that militarize their movements in ways that privilege masculinity and thereby marginalize some men and most women' (p.292). When this occurs, Enloe argues that women tend to be relegated to the roles of 'supporters' and 'admirers' of the 'men in the front lines' (p.292).

Jacklyn Cock's analysis of militarism (based on her work in South Africa) is relevant to the case of Indonesia, particularly the highly militarised areas of Aceh, West Papua and till recently East Timor. She says that militarism and militarisation comprise three distinct social phenomena: the military as a social institution, militarism as an ideology which legitimates state violence, and 'militarism as a social process that involves the penetration of the military into more and more social areas until the military have a primacy in state and society' (cited in Waylen, 1996:97-98). This is an accurate description of what occurred in Indonesia under the Suharto regime (Siapno, 1997:28-29), and what the new President and some of his colleagues are attempting to change. However, according to Herb Feith¹, controlling the actions of the military, particularly in areas like West Papua and Aceh where they have acted with impunity for so long, is proving problematic (Personal Communication, May 2000).

Anne-Marie Hilsdon's, '*Madonnas and Martyrs Militarism and Violence in the Philippines*' (1995), contains extensive analysis of the processes of gender violence, in the context of the armed conflict between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the New People's Army. It examines the ways in which military training builds on the social constructions of masculinity, and notions of sexual conquest are combined with military conquest in military discourses (p.93). Hilsdon concludes that in the Philippines, the violation of women's bodies is consistently 'sex(ualis)ed and gendered, and is powerfully interwoven with discourses of shame and honour' (p.82).

In her fascinating dissertation 'The Politics of Gender, Islam and Nation-State in Aceh, Indonesia: A Historical Analysis of Power, Co-optation and Resistance', Jacqueline Siapno (1997), asserts that some of the worst cases of military abuse have occurred in *kampung janda* (widow villages), where rape, mass rape and torture have been reported (p.29). In discussing the way in which the Suharto regime criminalised political dissent and the independence movement, she writes: 'military terror and surveillance strategies have

¹ Herb Feith, scholar of Indonesian affairs.

succeeded in the demonization of widows of so-called “GPK² terrorists”...’(p.34). Siapno met many women in Aceh who told her they were fearful of picking up the dead bodies of their husband or brothers, as they would then be accused of being ‘GPK terrorists’(p.34).

It is clear from the above mentioned published reports, that gender violence is a critical aspect of the pattern of human rights abuses perpetrated in West Papua, so far with impunity, on the part of the Indonesian military. In his speech ‘Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future’ given in March 1999, Ben Anderson argued that the ‘pervasive practices of sadistic brutality’, have over the past thirty years become ‘normal’ activities of the state apparatus, which has come to view people in remote regions like Aceh and West Papua, not as Indonesians, but as ‘objects’, ‘possessions’, ‘servants’, and ‘obstacles’ for the state. For the West Papuans, it was logical that they would feel they were being colonised and respond (Anderson, 1999:5). As one woman delegate said at the February 2000 Consultation in Jayapura:

We are victims of Indonesia, and others are too. But our feelings are like a needle penetrating our bodies - only a good medical operation [merdeka, of course--PK] can take out the needle (cited in King, 2000:2). (Peter King notes that this implies independence)

The literature clearly illustrates that militarisation and militarism impact violently upon women, and that women suffer extraordinarily because they are viewed as the ‘symbolic bearers of the collectivity, identity and honour, both personally and collectively’ (Yuval-Davis, 1998:29). Thus, Yuval-Davis argues that ‘systematic rapes in war are aimed not just - and often not primarily - at the tortured women, but at the enemy collectively’ (1998:29). Similarly Fanon, (cited in McClintock, 1995:364) wrote of colonial thinking as indicating that ‘if we want to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the women’.

To conclude, the literature I have reviewed, suggests that there is an ongoing nationalist movement in West Papua in which women’s voices and perspectives have yet to be heard. The growing literature on the relationship between gender and militarism, and gender and nationalist discourses, suggest that these interconnections must be recognised, if genuine respect and human dignity is to be achieved along with the goal of national independence.

² *Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan*, or Gang of Security Disturbers, is an Indonesian government term used to denote terrorists. In Aceh, it refers to the Free Aceh Movement (Siapno, 1997:4).

CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF WEST PAPUAN POLITICS.

Introduction

This chapter will give an historical overview of the West Papuan struggle for independence, and examine the critical factors driving the current nationalist movement. Indonesian military abuse, political and economic marginalisation as a result of non-Papuan dominance, and a sense of betrayal by the international community, with regard to the UN decolonisation process, are all fundamental issues motivating the West Papuan nationalist movement. The chapter will discuss political moves towards an independent West Papuan state during the Dutch period, and the outcome of the conflict between Indonesia and Holland over the territory, which ignored the wishes of the indigenous people (Eluay and Beanal, 2000:2, Pigay, 2000:28).

The chapter will also look at opposition to Indonesian rule, and will then focus on the period since the recent political changes in Indonesia, which began with the demise of the Suharto regime in May 1998. The open emergence of the West Papuan nationalist movement in the last two years, has seen the creation of a structure, through which people's aspirations and perspectives can be given a voice. Whilst the OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, or Free Papua Movement) has operated underground and in exile for decades, the new face of West Papuan nationalism claims to reject armed struggle as an effective strategy. Rather it is based upon open political organisation, and is committed to a process of dialogue to achieve its aims. Central to the movement's strategy is to lobby for a review by the international community, of West Papua's incorporation into Indonesia. According to the Presidium Chairman Theys Eluay, 'We want to succeed through dialogue and negotiation....We are determined not to resort to violence' (cited in Aglionby, 2000:2).

Early Anti-Colonial Movements

Before World War Two, there had been significant West Papuan anti-colonial movements such as *konor* (prophet) movements, which the Dutch colonial authorities regarded as a 'disturbance of peace and order and the deliberate circulation of alarming rumours' (Kamma, cited in Sharp, 1994:48). One of the most famous of these was the Great Korero Movement, led by the woman *konor* Angganitha Menufandu between 1938 and 1943 in the Biak-Numfor region. This poet and prophet preached non-violence and renewal in order to 'bring about the Kingdom of heaven on earth – Korero – where the Korero flag in blue, white and red,

signifying faith, peace and courage, would fly out over all West Irian-Papua Barat' (Kamma cited in Sharp, 1994:49).

This flag, which was first flown in 1942 (Rutherford, 1999:55), holds great significance, and is imbued with spiritual as well as political potency. The Morning Star is connected to Manarmakeri meaning both 'the Old Man of the Star', and 'scabious Old man' (Sharp, 1994:46). A mythical-historical figure, he is believed to have miraculously cured Angganitha and named her *Bin Damai* (Woman of Peace). She then became a *konor* and was received as a great leader (Sharp, 1994:48-49). As with previous uprisings and millenarian movements in West Papua (Pigay, 2000:25), this was in part a response to an increasing burden of forced labour under the Dutch administration, and the suppression of Papuan political organisations (Sharp, 1977:12).

In 1949, when Indonesia finally gained independence from the Dutch, the western half of the island of New Guinea remained under the Dutch, who argued that it was preparing Papuans for self-rule (Rutherford, 1999:41). The aspiration of West Papuans for independence emerged in an explicitly political form in the early 1950s, with initial support from the Dutch administration for a gradual decolonisation process leading to an independent state. Initially some nationalists within the West Papuan elite were pro-Indonesian, for example Silas Papare sat in the Indonesian Parliament from 1950, but leaders such as Eliezer Bonay later became disillusioned with the Indonesians.¹ According to Wim Zonggonau² who gave a presentation at a conference in Sydney on April 19th 2000, in the period between 1957 and 1961, a democratic process of political representation was initiated. He was a member of a committee of 100 members, which not only endorsed a national flag and anthem, but also was involved in local government initiatives, primary schools and health care services.

This early nationalist movement was limited to a relatively small, Dutch-educated mostly male elite, who like the early Indonesian nationalist leaders, had a vision of a post-colonial nation which they would lead and represent. They were motivated by idealism, and a sense of needing to control their own destiny, in a world in which new nations were emerging from European colonial rule. As Justus M. van der Kroef (cited in Sharp, 1977:14) wrote in 1961, '...one senses the momentum of a new Papuan consciousness...it seems probable that the

¹ Personal communication with Herb Feith, scholar of Indonesian affairs.

² Presidium member. 'A Conference on the Prospects for Peace and Conflict Resolution in West Papua'.

whole question will be determined primarily by the development of this new spirit of self-awareness’.

Conflicting Claims Over West Papua

For the Indonesian nationalists of the 1950s, the idea that the indigenous population of West Papua could or should have a voice in determining their future political status was not appreciated. For nationalist leaders like Sukarno, the issue was one of ensuring that the Dutch colonial authorities withdrew from all of Indonesia, meaning all the territories they had governed from Batavia or Jakarta. The fact that the Dutch had not withdrawn from what they called Netherlands New Guinea in 1949, was humiliating, and seen in terms of a lingering colonial presence which must be driven out (Legge, 1972:248). There was also a sub-text, namely that talking about the struggle for the liberation of West Irian was an approach to the problem of building unity in the rest of the country. As Herb Feith (1962) points out, Irian

was something on which nearly everyone agreed (indeed, more so than on unification). It enabled issues to be focused in terms of Indonesians versus enemies of Indonesia, thus rallying all-Indonesian solidarity’(p.158).

The nationalism Sukarno and his fellow nationalists espoused was an ideology inspired by a western education, in which the elite, western educated leaders, mostly male, spoke for ‘the nation’, which encompassed everyone who happened to live in the islands of the former Dutch East Indies. Ben Anderson (1991:176) points out that because West New Guinea was a place of exile for nationalist heroes, banished there by the Dutch authorities, it became a ‘sacred site in the national imagining’. Hence the nationalist slogan and famous song was developed: *Dari Sabang sampai Merauke*, From Sabang (on the northwestern tip of Sumatra) to Merauke (on the southeastern coast of West Papua). This notion implied the unification of all of the Dutch East Indies, as Indonesia. In his famous *Trikora*³ speech in December 1961, Sukarno commanded his armed forces to ‘destroy the Dutch-created puppet state of West Papua’ (Chauvel, 2000:7).

The New York Agreement and the Act of Free Choice

In 1962, with the threat of armed conflict from Indonesia, the Dutch government, under pressure from the United States, agreed to withdraw from Netherlands New Guinea. It was to hand the territory over to the UN, who would administer the territory between October 1962

³ Trihora, Tri Komando Rakyat, or Three Commands of the People.

and May 1963, after which Indonesia would formally take control. Under the terms of the New York Agreement of August 1962, an Act of Free Choice (AFC) to be conducted by the end of 1969, would be carried out in accordance with international practice, and would guarantee the eligibility of all adult indigenous inhabitants to participate. Indonesia agreed to guarantee the human rights of West Papuans, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and assembly (Blay, 2000:14, Rutherford, 1999:41, Saltford, 2000:74, 77, Whittaker, 1990:29). However, this exercise, known by West Papuans as ‘act of no choice’, did not allow the 800, 000 West Papuans to vote on their future status. Rather, the Indonesian authorities conducted ‘consultations’ with 1025 selected delegates, all of whom voted for integration with Indonesia (Rumakiek, 2000:10).

The Cold War aspect of these dynamics needs to be appreciated in order to understand how it was that the international community betrayed the West Papuans in this period. In 1961, the Kennedy administration was concerned about Jakarta’s enormous Soviet-backed increase in military spending (Saltford, 2000:72). Intent on avoiding an armed conflict between Indonesia and Holland over the issue, US pressure was brought to bear on the Dutch to accept a compromise. According to Saltford, the New York Agreement was in effect a ‘face-saving measure for the Dutch’ (p.72). This is illustrated by a US official’s comments in February 1962.

I can’t blame Dutch for doubting that Indos have any intention of allowing genuine plebiscite five years or so from now. But the important thing is that some such Indo promise is the essential face-saving device Dutch have been seeking. We must get them to take it as best they can accept (cited in Saltford, 2000:72).

In fact, according to Saltford (2000), as early as 1963, senior Dutch and UN officials had agreed with Jakarta that the method used in the Act of Free Choice would ‘not involve any direct voting by the population’ (p.77). He argues that the UN merely provided a ‘vener of respectability’ for the transfer of the territory from the Dutch to the Indonesians (p.79). The UN, in carrying out this dishonest role for the US, allowed the Papuans to be robbed of their right to decide their own future. As Saltford so forcefully states: ‘It was Cold War politics and the rights of the Papuans counted for nothing (p.91).

Resistance to Indonesian Rule

Opposition to Indonesian rule, and subsequent political repression by Indonesia began in 1962, with the banning of political parties, and of any expressions of West Papuan nationalism such as the Morning Star flag, and the anthem 'My Land of Papua'. These had both been ceremonially adopted on December 1st 1961, when the name Netherlands Nieuw Guinea was replaced with West Papua, and the Morning Star flag was flown next to the Dutch flag. In April 1961, the New Guinea Council (Volksraad), a partially elected 28 member body, including one woman, was officially inaugurated. This inauguration was attended by representatives from all the colonial governments in the Pacific apart from the USA (Rumakiek, 2000:4-5, Whittaker, 1990:23).

In December 1962, the Regional Council of Biak-Numfor, having circulated a resolution throughout the territory, passed it on to the UN Administrator. It called for a 'Free Plebiscite' to be held in 1964, and concluded that the UN had replaced western colonialism with 'an Eastern Republic which is even more ruthless a colonial power' (Sharp, 1977:39). As it turned out, their statement would be proved correct. Uprisings against Indonesian control began in 1963, and in 1965, the year in which the OPM was established, the Indonesian army launched a counter-insurgency operation in Manokwari against the Arfak people. This was the first of many such military operations which met with sustained resistance, and resulted in heavy loss of life on the part of West Papuans (Whittaker, 1990:32, Saltford, 2000:83-84).

In early 1968, a US Consular official from Jakarta, Reynders, visited the territory, and on his return reported on his visit to British embassy staff. In relation to the Indonesian approach to the OPM, he stated:

The Indonesians have tried everything from bombing them with B-26s, to shelling and mortaring them, but a continuous state of semi-rebellion persists. Brutalities are undoubtedly perpetrated from time to time in a fruitless attempt at repression (cited in Saltford, 2000:73).

Indonesian Cultural Chauvinism

The way in which the Indonesian authorities attempted to 'Indonesianise' West Papuan people, lacked sensitivity, and contained notions of cultural superiority. This resulted in great resentment and resistance. Starting in 1962, in the period officially under UN administration, a program in schools was launched, in which children were taught that the Indonesian

language, anthem and flag were theirs, and that they should support the following points: Indonesia was one country, with one people and one language; the August 1945 Constitution formed the basis of the Indonesian state; the UN must leave by January 1963; and a referendum was unnecessary (van der Veur, cited in Sharp, 1977:39).

According to Djopari (cited in van Klinken 1996:31), attempts ‘to socialise the notion of Indonesian-ness failed dismally in West Papua, because the standard line that Dutch colonialism impoverished the people just did not ring true’. This was because the Dutch had allocated substantial funds to the territory in the late 1950s and early 1960s, whereas the Indonesians ‘stripped the place bare, even taking to Java the aircraft steps from the Biak International Airport’ (p.31).

The attempt by the Indonesian authorities to ‘Indonesianise’ the highland Dani people, illustrates a particular insensitivity towards indigenous Papuan cultures. In 1970, under military supervision, 6000 kits were distributed amongst school students. The kits contained ‘clothing, writing materials, a picture of the President and an Indonesian flag’ (Sharp, 1977:25). Dani men wear penis sheaths, and they did not take kindly to this kind of arrogance. They, like other West Papuans resented the military presence, with its associated destruction of gardens and forests, and enforced labour. Clearly, the notion of being ‘Indonesian’ was rejected, as was the intrusive behaviour of the military.

No one knows how many West Papuans have been killed by the Indonesian military, or have died from disease and starvation, as a direct result of dispossession, and forced removal from their traditional lands. We do know however, that resistance to Indonesian occupation has been ongoing, and that military reprisals have been fierce and brutal (Rumakiek, 2000:11-12). The Swiss pilot, Theodore Fray, who worked with Associated Mission Aviation in West Papua, said in 1988: ‘During my whole stay in West Irian/West Papua, I never met a single family which had not lost at least one member because of torture or other acts of violence by the Indonesians’ (Rumakiek, 2000:12, Whittaker, 1990:78).

Expropriation of Land and Economic Marginalisation

As well as suffering under a brutal military occupation, the fear of becoming an alienated minority in their own land, is a major driving force behind West Papuan nationalism. Elmslie (2000) estimates that the non-Papuan population to be between 750,000 and 1 million, with

Papuans numbering at the most, 1.5 million (p.21). Elmslie asserts that: ‘The Papuan fear is that they will be marginalised and dispossessed by the newcomers - and that their future will be in question if this trend continues’ (p.21).

Forced removal from their traditional lands has been an ongoing source of resentment and resistance by West Papuans. Whether this is to make way for large projects, or transmigration sites, the end result is that indigenous Papuans feel marginalised (Rutherford, 1999:46). This is also true in the urban sector, where non-Papuans dominate the economy, ‘owning everything from the taxis villagers ride to town to the shops where they buy sugar and rice’ (Rutherford, 1999:46). Non-Papuans also dominate the civil service, and ‘often win jobs and scholarships reserved for the locally born’ (Rutherford, 1999:47). Non-Papuans in West Papua comprise various groups including military personnel, civil servants, Indonesian and foreign business people, Javanese farmers and urban poor who were brought in under the government sponsored transmigration program, and spontaneous migrants from Sulawesi, who work mainly as petty traders and laborers (King, 2000:15).

The Nationalist Movement Seeks Dialogue with the Indonesian Government

The West Papuan nationalist movement entered a new phase, with the end of the Suharto regime, and especially after the decision of President Habibie to allow a UN administered referendum in East Timor. With these momentous changes, West Papuans sensed a great new hope that the situation might change, and that their aspirations might be fulfilled (Elmslie, 2000:20). As one West Papuan commentator put it (Sanggenefa, cited in Chauvel, 2000:7), if East Timor could ‘free itself from the idea of Unity in Diversity and become a sovereign nation (*bangsa yang berdaulat*) rather than an ethnic group (*suku bangsa*), why not West Papua?’

A significant event which brought West Papuan nationalism out into the open, occurred in February 1999, when a team of one hundred West Papuans went to Jakarta to meet and talk with President Habibie. The team included community and church leaders, for whom the process of ‘National Dialogue’ with the central government meant discussing independence.⁴ For Habibie and his government however, this was out of the question. After being presented

⁴ The one woman on this team was Beatrix Koibur, whose involvement in the nationalist movement is discussed in detail in chapter 5.

with a signed declaration demanding immediate independence, Habibie broke down in tears, and told the team to return home and reconsider the matter (Elmslie, 2000:21).

In February 2000 (Zonggonau⁵, 2000), at the *Musyawarah* (Consultation) in Jayapura attended by 2000 people, elections were held to form a panel with representatives amongst tribal chiefs, churches, political parties, women, youth, students, *ex-tapols* (ex-political prisoners), prominent leaders, and professionals. From this panel, 200 people were elected to form the *Dewan Papua* (Papuan Council), in which each region, two major towns, as well as exiles in the Pacific and Europe are represented. A Presidium of 22 people was elected from this Council, one of whose roles was to organise the Congress, held between May 29th and June 4th, 2000.

The two women on the Presidium are Beatrix Koibur and Rev. Ketty Yabansabra. Women are considered one of the nine ‘pillars’ or ‘components’ of the Presidium, the others being: the churches, customary or tribal leaders, professionals, students, youth, ex-political prisoners, historical figures (including OPM exiles), and the political dialogue group (which has up until now been FORERI⁶ and the Team 100) (King, 2000:6-9). The purpose of this Congress was to discuss future political strategies. The stated theme was to ‘Re-write⁷ the History of West Papua’, with the sub-theme: ‘The West Papuan People Vow to Uphold Democracy and Human Rights Based on the Principles of Truth and Justice Leading to a New Papua’ (Beanal, Giay, Awom, Joku, 2000).

It is a very recent development that West Papuans have been able to organise politically and demand independence in such an open way. This is a result of the changes of government in Indonesia both in May 1998 when Suharto stepped down, and October 1999 when Abdurrahman Wahid was elected. Prior to October 1999, the act of raising the West Papuan Morning Star flag could be met with bullets, arrests and death, as it did as recently as July 1998 in Biak City on Biak Island (Rutherford, 1999:39).

The Morning Star flag has frequently been raised in ceremonies throughout West Papua, particularly on significant anniversaries related to historical events in the nationalist struggle.

⁵ In 1969, after the Act of Free Choice, Zonggonau and two others attempted to travel to the UN to explain what had actually taken place. They were prevented by Australian officials from leaving Port Moresby (conference presentation, Sydney, April 2000).

⁶ Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society, was formed by the three main churches following the July 1998 Biak massacres.

This was able to be done with a degree of government toleration on December 1st 1999, when tens of thousands of people took part in flag raising ceremonies to mark the 38th anniversary of the declaration of independence from the Netherlands (Kilvert, Ondawame, 1999:4). In Jayapura, the Morning Star flag as well as the Indonesian flag were raised outside the building that housed the New Guinea Council, in the same place as the historic 1961 flag raising had occurred (Chauvel, 2000:4). Whilst President Wahid has been prepared to tolerate political debate and the flying of the West Papuan flag, he has made it abundantly clear that breaking away from Indonesia is not acceptable (Garran, 2000:8).

The discourse surrounding the current nationalist movement is dominated by the principles of self-determination and human rights as entrenched in international law. The leaders claim that the 1969 UN supervised ‘Act of Free Choice’ was fraudulent, and, therefore, the West Papuan people have the right to a new and genuine expression of self-determination as did the East Timorese. Their position is clearly stated in the communique released at the conclusion of the ‘2000 Extraordinary Consultative Meeting of West Papuans’ in February, and signed by the then two presidents of the Papuan Council, Theys Eluay and Tom Beanal. It stated:

We condemn outright the illegal transfer of the sovereignty of the Papuan people from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia via the United Nations concluded on 1 May 1963. The transfer is deemed illegal as we, the very people directly affected by the decision, have never been consulted nor given opportunity to have any say whatsoever through our elected national legislature, the Papuan National Council, the mandated body in existence at the time that should have been ultimately responsible for determining the future political destiny of the Papuan people (Eluay and Beanal, 2000:2).

The calling of the Papuan People’s Congress was a momentous occasion, as it was the first time such a large gathering was politically possible, and it was attended by some three thousand delegates from all over West Papua. Also in attendance were delegates from other parts of Indonesia, journalists, as well as international observers, including a diplomat from the US embassy (Erari, 2000:4). The outcome of the six-day Congress was an overwhelming desire that West Papua be recognised as an independent state. As stated in the ‘Report by the Special Envoys of the State Secretary for (West) Papua Problem’ (Erari, 2000), the Congress agreed that the Presidium should report to the Indonesian President that ‘the People of

⁷ The word used is *meluruskan* which implies rectify, so ‘re-write’ could also mean ‘re-right’.

(West) Papua desires to attain the recognition of their right to be independent as a sovereign nation, which they had acquired from the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the 1st of December 1961' (p.4). Peter King (2000) points out however, that there was no actual declaration of independence on that day. What is referred to in the Congress's final resolution, is a Political Manifesto issued by the Papuan National Committee on December 19th 1961, which presages independence (p.10).

International Recognition Sought

A central aspect of the proposed strategy by the West Papuan leadership is to lobby the international community to agree to review the 1969 Act of Free Choice. The Congress rejected this UN - sponsored process, on the grounds that it was 'conducted to the accompaniment of threats, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and amoral deeds that gravely violated humanitarian principles' (cited in Aglionby, 2000:2).

The manner in which self-determination was denied to West Papuans is one of the longest standing 'blots' on the United Nations record on decolonisation. In 1985, the Melanesian Council of Churches submitted in their Statement of Concern to the UN Decolonisation Committee, that the West Papua issue 'is a matter of grave international concern [which] if not rectified would throw doubt on the integrity of the United Nations and its Committee on decolonisation especially in its dealings with the remaining list of colonised territories' (cited in Blay, 2000:14).

In assessing the strategy of pushing for this act of self-determination to be rectified, Chauvel (2000) suggests that the 1969 Act of Free Choice 'was such an obvious facade and travesty of justice that it can be the base of a strong moral argument and one in which the UN's own responsibility can be invoked' (p.8). Furthermore, according to Professor of Law, Dr. Sam Blay (2000), under international law, it could be argued that by using the *musyawarah* (consultation) system, Indonesia 'breached one of its obligations under the New York Agreement' (p.16). Blay also argues that by failing to monitor the Act of Free Choice, and ensuring that the terms of the New York Agreement were met, The Netherlands breached its obligations under the United Nations Charter (p.18). Blay is unequivocal in his condemnation of the way in which West Papuans were betrayed. He states: 'The evidence available today indicates that Australia, The Netherlands, United States and the United Nations itself assisted

Indonesia to secure its control over West Papua, even where it was clear that there were serious defects with the procedure for integration (p.17).

How successful the West Papuan leadership will be in their quest for international support, remains to be seen. In Holland, there is some interest in investigating the 1969 Act of Free Choice. Foreign Minister J.J. Van Aartsen told Parliament on December 10 1999, that he would 'initiate a historical re-examination of the circumstances surrounding the Act' (Saltford, 2000:92), following its proposal by MP Van Middelkoop from the *Gereformeerde Politiek Verbond* Party in November 1999. Van Middelkoop, who was in Netherlands New Guinea as a young man, said the way the Act of Free Choice was carried out, represents 'one of the blackest pages from the history of decolonisation' (cited in 'Dutch Government agrees to review West Papua handover', 1999:3).

Within the region, the governments of Vanuatu and Nauru have expressed their support for West Papuan independence, and plan to formally raise the issue at the UN General Assembly in September 2000. Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Barak Sope, said at a meeting with West Papuan leaders in Port Vila on 30th July 2000, that as Chair of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, Vanuatu would also seek the support of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Fiji (Worth, 2000:8).

Following Indonesia's humiliating 'loss' of East Timor, letting go of West Papua or Aceh is perceived as a step towards national disintegration (Aglionby, 2000:2-3). In a move to prevent this occurring in West Papua and elsewhere across the archipelago, the Indonesian Parliament passed legislation just prior to the June 1999 elections, which gives greater regional autonomy, and a larger share of resource revenue for the provinces (Chauvel, 2000:5). This legislation is due to be implemented in 2001. However, it is not a proposition widely accepted in West Papua. According to Yohanes Bonay, the Director of the Jayapura office of the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy:

The basic problem here is not one of money or development. It is all about the sovereignty of the Papuan people over their own land. If the people think they have to separate from Indonesia in order to achieve that, then they will continue their struggle until they do (cited in Aglionby, 2000:3).

Crackdown on Nationalist Movement

In August 2000, the Wahid government came under criticism from the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) for making too many concessions to 'separatists' (ELS-HAM, 2000, n.p.). In a spirit of compromise, Wahid ordered that the Morning Star flag be flown only in certain places, alongside and lower than, the Indonesian flag (Yates, 2000, n.p.). Yet, despite the President's stated commitment to dialogue, the reality on the ground points to the period of tolerance as having been short-lived. Since August 2000, there has been a huge military build-up in West Papua, with thousands of extra troops deployed, and in October, the launching of Indonesian Air Force operations using British-made Hawk 100 and Hawk 200 fighter-bombers (Rumbiak, 2000, n.p.).

Human rights violations have substantially increased since August 2000, with torture, arrests and imprisonments, disappearances and killings, particularly associated with the flying of the Morning Star flag (Rumbiak, 2000, n.p.). The worst violence to date, occurred in Wamena, the district capital of the Baliem Valley on October 6-7, when police pulled down the flag, and two people were shot dead by security forces. This provoked fury amongst locals who then vented their rage on non-Papuan, resulting in 30 deaths, 45 wounded and 59 arrests (Yates, 2000, n.p.).

Analysts at the Indonesia Update conference on October 6-7 at the ANU, have suggested that these sorts of provocative actions (in Aceh, Maluku, West Timor as well as West Papua) are part of a strategy by elements within the Indonesian military to undermine the Wahid government, and justify their continuing presence (Powell, 2000:6). On October 6th, regional Police Chief Wenas with the backing of the national police chief, banned the flying of the Morning star flag, and vowed to curb this and other separatist activities throughout West Papua (Kapolda Irja, 2000, n.p.).

Conclusion

Nationalism in West Papua has a long history, and in the late 1950s and early 1960s, received active support from the Dutch colonial administration. Largely because of Cold War dynamics, West Papuans were denied their right to self-determination, and the resulting sense of betrayal continues to drive the movement. The current West Papuan leadership is committed both to dialogue with the Indonesian government, and to lobbying the international community, in its quest for a review of the way in which decolonisation

occurred in the 1960s. The recent crackdown against the West Papuan nationalist movement, suggests that President Wahid's commitment to dialogue has been set back by hawkish elements within the Indonesian government.

This historical overview provides a context for the discussion which takes place in the following chapters. These look at the gender dimensions of repression-resistance situations and nationalist movements. Chapter 3 examines theoretical perspectives, whilst chapters 4 and 5 comprise case studies of two West Papuan women.

CHAPTER 3 : MILITARISM, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND RESISTANCE.

Introduction

This chapter examines the processes of gender violence, the means by which they are legitimated in situations of war and insurgency, and the forms of resistance to it engaged in by women. By looking at the gender dimensions of counter-insurgency and repression-resistance situations, it is clear that the relationship between women and nationalist movements need to be understood in greater depth. The strategies deployed against communities, particularly women, such as intimidation and rape, and the ways these are institutionalised in military training, are explored. The chapter then focuses on the various forms of resistance engaged in by women, including speaking out, refusing to be intimidated, negotiating with military officials, and organising meetings. Women's attitudes toward male-dominated resistance movements, suggest that the leadership of such movements need to be challenged if real change is to be achieved.

Following on from an initial examination of these issues in Chapter 1, this chapter attempts to ground some of the points made in that literature. By focusing on the theoretical insights of Cynthia Enloe, Anne-Marie Hilsdon, whose work is on the Philippines, and Jacqueline Siapno who carried out research in Aceh, this chapter will explore in greater detail, how these insights inform the West Papua situation.

Rape as an Element of Military Strategy

Conquering a people through its women has been an ongoing part of warfare, and has in part to do with the notion held in many societies, of women both being the property of men, and representing the collective honour of the community. According to Nira Yuval-Davis (1997), the 1949 Geneva Convention has defined rape as a 'crime against honour' rather than a form of torture, and she suggests that 'the "honour" is that of the men and the community, rather than necessarily that of the women themselves' (p.110).

It is only very recently that rape as a war crime has been given proper recognition within international courts. The most recent international pronouncements were in 1996 (Enloe, 2000), when for the first time, rape in itself was treated as a war crime. The International War Crimes Tribunal indicted eight Bosnian Serb military and police officers on charges of raping Bosnian Muslim women (p.135). Then in 1998, the Arusha Tribunal in Tanzania, found a

Rwandan civilian major guilty of 'overseeing the systematic rapes of Tutsi women'. Significantly, this was 'the very first guilty verdict by an international court that included rape as a genocidal crime' (p.137).

In situations of war and insurgency, in which military personnel are unchecked in their behaviour, violence against women is a common way of humiliating and terrorising the civilian population perceived as being the enemy. As Susan Brownmiller suggests, the effect of rape in warfare is 'indubitably one of intimidation and demoralization for the victims' side' (1976:37). Anne-Marie Hilsdon (1995) in her study of militarism and violence in the Philippines, discusses perceptions of women as men's property, and says that women are 'the victims of sexual violence as the 'property' of men whom the military want to punish' (p.120). Galuh Wandita (1998), who works with an NGO concerned with women's health and human rights in Eastern Indonesia, suggests that in times of conflict, existing assumptions about masculine power to conquer and destroy are exacerbated. As she says 'Women are seen as property of the enemy, justifying acts of plunder, forced possession, and destruction' (p.1).

However, rather than being a side effect of warfare, part of what she terms 'lootpillagelandrape', Cynthia Enloe (2000) argues convincingly that rape has been militarised and used strategically in various ways which require deeper understanding by feminists (p.134). Rape is often part of military strategy, particularly if military strategists and their civilian allies view women as sustaining the enemy's culture, and as the breeders of more potential enemies. Rape is also likely to be used as a strategy when women are seen as being both the property of men and symbols of men's honour, or as being crucial in performing work upon which their communities depend (p.134).

In her discussion of how militarised rape is used in the name of 'national security', Enloe (2000) suggests this is most likely to occur under a regime for which national security is paramount, and understood by the civilian population to be a military problem. It is also more likely when national security policy is determined by a masculinised elite, and when men perceived as security threats are considered most vulnerable in their roles as fathers and husbands. Finally and most critically, this scenario is more probable when some women are publicly organised in their opposition to the regime (p.124).

Enloe states that this scenario was very much in force in the Philippines by the late 1970s (p.124). Given that both the Philippines and Indonesia have been engaged in anti-insurgency operations, and both are beneficiaries of US military education and training, Enloe's analysis is also very relevant to Indonesian military strategies. The anti-insurgency doctrine taught in US military academies and labelled 'Low Intensity Conflict' (LIC), has a number of characteristics including an official denial of open warfare, yet civilians are deemed to be possibly as dangerous as armed guerillas. Government critics are labelled 'communist', and psychological pressure is used against the civilian population. LIC also implies 'selective removal of population', the use of 'sophisticated methods of surveillance and interrogation', and the 'organisation of local militias' (p.125). The adoption of this doctrine by Philippine officials was intended to build on pre-existing patriarchal cultural ideas and practices, such as what it is to be a respectable woman. Thus when women activists were labelled 'communists' or 'subversives', those officials were 'wrapping a local form of patriarchy in the flag of national security' (p.127).

Gender Violence in Indonesia

In Indonesia, gender violence became part of public discourse as a result of the 1998 May riots, which culminated in the resignation of Suharto, and the beginnings of political reform. The gang rapes of Chinese Indonesian girls and women during the riots, led to the formation of Volunteers for Humanity, which documented incidents, gave support to survivors of rape, and initiated public education on gender violence and racism (Wandita, 1998:2-3). In July 1998, the Society for the Elimination of Violence against Women (*Masyarakat Anti-Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan*) presented its findings to President Habibie, who agreed that the National Commission on Human Rights in conjunction with various NGOs would investigate the May rapes, and that a National Commission on Violence against Women would be established (Wandita, 1998:2-3).

Enloe (2000) argues that it is only through women's activism, that the political use of rape by soldiers during this period was uncovered (p.109). A month after the riots, women activists had gathered sufficient evidence to substantiate the rapes of ethnic Chinese girls and women. According to Ita F.Nadia from the Kayam Women's Aid Centre in Jakarta, 'not only were rapes systematically committed by men in groups, but they were perpetrated by men in the Indonesian army wearing civilian clothes' (cited in Enloe, 2000:330).

Since then, stories of human rights violations by the Indonesian military, including gender violence, continue to surface, and are being documented by NGOs, particularly in Aceh, East Timor and West Papua. It is in these areas, the so called *Daerah Operasi Militer* (Military Operations Areas) that the military has had unrestricted power, and where indigenous women have been tortured, raped and used as mistresses by military personnel. For example, in August 1998, one East Timorese woman told a group of women how she was forced to work as a domestic in a military complex, where she was often hit. If she refused to have sex, she would be tied and raped. She gave birth to five children.

So these are children of war. Before the war I had no children, since the war, I am carrying these children - children of war, children of Indonesia' (cited in Wandita, 1998:4).

Gender Dimensions of Military Discourse

Hilsdon's (1995) analysis of military discourses in which civilians are perceived as being weak and feminine, in contrast to soldiers who are strong and masculine, is useful in understanding militarised gender violence. Whilst her study focuses on the Philippines, strong parallels can be drawn with the Indonesian military, particularly as they are both benefactors of U.S military training and aid. In the case of the Philippines, the 'enemy' of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) that Hilsdon identifies is the NPA (New People's Army). In Indonesia, the 'enemy' in West Papua is the OPM (Free Papua Movement), in Aceh it is *Aceh Merdeka* or Free Aceh Movement, and in East Timor, it was Fretilin.

The way soldiers are taught to view themselves in relation to the 'enemy' and to civilians, is instructive in appreciating military violence. In many armies, soldiers are taught that 'weakness' is 'feminine', and must be overcome, while 'strength' is required to conquer a 'weak' enemy.

Hence the enemy/victim is feminised and the conqueror masculinised. The strong-weak dichotomy may be linked with male control over women; with military force directed against weaker cultures or nations....(Hilsdon, 1995:91-92).

Thus Hilsdon (1995:93) argues that military and sexual notions of conquest come together, and the military-instilled abhorrence of the 'feminine' weakness in the self, supports the sexual exploitation of women in war.

Whilst military training builds on social constructions of masculinity, there are situations where men have rejected this linking of militarism with masculinity. Cynthia Enloe (1993)

discusses one such case in South Africa, where, by the late 1980s, white men were not only questioning conscription, but organising against it. Some young men were so traumatised by their duties in the black townships that they were committing suicide.

Men who had gone through service began to question out loud whether their killing and beating of African women and children was indeed ‘manly’. Some men began to reconstruct their own ideas of masculinity, often drawing on their Christian beliefs (Enloe, 1993:54-55).

Militarism, Terror and Civilians

As well as being inculcated with notions of conquest through military masculinity, soldier recruits learn the importance of military hierarchy. Hilsdon (1995:108) suggests that civilians are deemed ‘irrelevant and peripheral to military life’, and are constructed as ‘“weak, poor and ignorant” people who “look up to us”’. Robin Morgan (1989:170) argues that both men of ‘the State-that-is’, meaning soldiers, and men of ‘the State-that-would-be’, meaning members of armed nationalist movements, practice terrorism of a similar kind. She says: ‘Such men suffer from a lack of ambivalence’. This lack of ambivalence, in which neither complexity nor compassion is tolerated, allows them to torture and rape civilians who are depicted either as suspected communists or terrorists, or of harbouring them (Hilsdon, 1995:92). In Aceh, because of the behaviour of the military toward the general population, young people who have witnessed incidents of intimidation and violence ‘have formed strong opinions that the role of the Indonesian military is not to protect civilians but to abuse them’ (Siapno, 1997:289).

In the case of Indonesia, as Jacqueline Siapno (1997:28) observes, the so called ‘dual function’ of the military which makes it responsible for both national security and social and political affairs, means that in areas like Aceh, West Papua and East Timor, ‘almost all aspects of civil society are controlled and occupied by the Indonesian military’. In the Philippines, Hilsdon (1995:183) observed situations where military apparatuses operate independently of their government. They create terror through surveillance and torture ‘with or without hierarchical orders’. Siapno (1997:288-289) similarly found that members of the Indonesian military in Aceh contemptuously disregarded legal restrictions on their behaviour.

One military commander in Aceh publicly told human rights lawyer who referred to the minimal guarantees provided in the Code of

Criminal Procedure: “You can eat your KUHAP¹. It doesn’t apply here.”

Strategies of Resistance to Militarism and Gender Violence

In militarised societies like Indonesia and the Philippines, where there is long term war or insurgency between the military and an internal ‘enemy’, terror and violence is something people learn to live with. It is therefore not surprising that the National Commission on Women in the Philippines has suggested that ‘women have been socialised into accepting the inevitability of male aggression and violence’ (Hilsdon,1995:114-115). But not all are just silent victims. Many act politically, both to protect themselves and their communities, and to resist and subvert military oppression.

The ways in which women resisted the Indonesian occupation in East Timor, is discussed in interviews with refugees in Australia conducted by Patsy Thatcher (1988). After the Indonesian invasion, women, particularly widows, combined together for economic purposes, and also ‘for protection from sexual harassment from Indonesian soldiers and officials’ (Tokodede woman, cited in Thatcher, p.92). Some East Timorese women fought as guerillas, and in Indonesian controlled areas, women were active in underground resistance groups. Widows and prisoner’s wives declined joining Indonesian women’s organisations.

Many women refuse to learn Bahasa Indonesia and insist on Timorese languages at home. Many have become Catholics as a symbolic act of defiance (Tokodede woman, cited in Thatcher, p.125).

In ‘post-modern wars’², where the warring parties exist within rather than between states, the burden carried by women of being widowed and supporting the family is the norm. Men do most of the fighting, while women ‘continue their fight for survival for themselves and their children’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997:114). Both in refugee camps, and in Aceh, in widow villages, women are vulnerable to rape. Yuval-Davis (1997:110) writes that because of notions of ‘honour and shame’, when pregnancies result from rape, women may ‘lose the respect and support of their surviving families and communities...’. She says that this explains why most reports of systematic rapes are of widowed or single women, - married women prefer to stay silent. On the issue of reporting and documenting rape, Shana Swiss and Joan Giller who

¹ Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana, Code of Criminal Procedure.

² A term used by Miriam Cooke, (cited in Yuval-Davis, 1997:94)

have interviewed women in war zones, warn activists not to let their own concern 'turn into the objectification of women as victims'. As they told Cynthia Enloe:

The very process of human rights documentation may conflict with the needs of the individual survivor. Recounting the details of a traumatic experience may trigger an intense reliving of the event and, along with it, feelings of extreme vulnerability, humiliation, and despair (cited in Enloe, 2000:133).

Jacqueline Siapno (1997) takes to task what she calls the 'narrative of victimization', which she claims characterises both human rights reports and the discourse of Jakarta women's organisations (p.321). Whilst acknowledging the concern motivating these groups, she rejects the all encompassing portrayal of women of the South as victims 'without any regard for the complex and distinct ways in which gender, ethnicity, class and religion intersect with each other'. In matrifocal Aceh, for example, she says many women are not easily intimidated by the military (p.323).

Siapno herself witnessed an example of this at a road checkpoint where bus passengers were asked to produce their identity cards. The usual pattern is that only the men are required to get out of the bus and be inspected. However on this occasion, a KOPASSUS (Special Forces Command) officer came on to the bus and said

Sorry ladies, we're going to have to check you too. We have to open your bags. You never know, all Acehnese are GPK.

One of the older women in the bus replied,

Look, don't be so obnoxious calling all Acehnese troublemakers. You are the ones who have been making trouble here all this time (p.332).

Siapno (p.333) suggests this was not an isolated incident, that older women are much more likely than men in these situations to question military authority. This is also the case when relatives have been killed, been imprisoned or disappeared. Female relatives were usually the ones who with great perseverance, approached human rights lawyers, and confronted the police and military to try to negotiate the release of their son, husband, brother or father (p.324).

In the Philippines, Hilsdon (1995) found that widows were more likely to be politically outspoken than other women, apparently empowered by their widowhood. In the words of one of them, 'We have nothing more to fear....nothing more to lose'. However they were

more vulnerable to surveillance, and when threatened with military violence, many 'either curtailed their activities or went into hiding' (p.73).

One of the tactics which the Acehnese women found to be successful in dealing with the military, was to use their 'feminine' charms to their advantage. One woman gave the following advice to Siapno:

If you need to go through any government bureaucracy which you find intimidating, make sure to put on a lot of make-up and look very attractive. These military men are so stupid, they forget their duties when they see an attractive woman. For example, when my brother was detained, several members of my family begged the guards see him. None of them were given permission. When I went in, with all my make-up and so on, they let me in to give him food and new clothes (pp.329-330).

Siapno herself found this tactic worked, and concluded that men in positions of authority were more responsive to women who dressed up and wore make-up, because they perceived them as fulfilling the proper roles of 'good daughters, good wives, good mothers' (p.330).

Women and Militarised Resistance Movements

Whilst creating an atmosphere of terror amongst the civilian population may be effective in maintaining control, and is often resorted to in situations where the aim of winning hearts and minds has been abandoned as hopeless, it also usually leads some of the terrorised to look more actively for ways in which they can resist and help the other side (Hilsdon, 1995:16-17). However, when organised resistance to military repression itself becomes militarised, whilst needing women's support and at times participation, this process tends to privilege masculinity (Enloe, 1993:247-8).

Acehnese women not only show contempt towards the Indonesian military whom they view as their enemy, but also according to Siapno (1997) they are 'profoundly cynical if not contemptuous' towards the male leaders of Aceh Merdeka, who claim to represent them (p.331). After speaking with Acehnese women, Siapno gained the distinct impression that while the male leaders did all the talking, the women remained quiet and resentful that they were the ones who carried the burden. Women whose husbands had been killed were the ones who had to support the family, often in very difficult circumstances. Siapno suggests that Acehnese women appear to have been 'silenced' not only by the military and political

institutions, but also ‘by their own male elite leaders who tend to monopolize representation in the name of the struggle for “independence”’ (p.335).

The first Acehese Women’s Congress was held in Banda Aceh in February 2000. Attended by 358 participants and observers from all over Aceh, the congress aimed to ascertain Acehese women’s aspirations in finding solutions so that peace can be realised (‘Acehese Women’s Congress’ 2000:1). One of the stated aims of the congress was: ‘To create a situation in which women have political, economic and social power, which until now has been disregarded’ (‘Recommendations Resulting from the Acehese Women’s Congress’, 2000:3). Towards this end, the Congress recommended that as a first step, women be given 30% representation in all policy and decision making (‘Recommendations Resulting from the Acehese Women’s Congress’, 2000:4).

Significantly, a majority of women rejected the inclusion in the Congress resolutions of support for a referendum, the aim of Aceh Merdeka and other organisations. Those opposed to its inclusion felt that priority should be given to the issue of human rights, and that women should play a more active role in the search for a peaceful solution (‘Acehese Women’s Congress’, 2000:3-4). Politically, they clearly saw a neutral position on the issue of independence more effective, and had doubts about the *Aceh Merdeka* leadership.

Conclusion

The strategies of rule in counter-insurgency situations, exploit dominant notions of gender power relations, which are embedded in military discourse and military training. The strategies of resistance to military repression engaged in by women, are varied. Some women join armed nationalist movements, and some benefit from the militarisation process in the sense that they ‘gain new space in which to develop political skills’ (Enloe, 1993:247-8).

However, the outcome of the Acehese Women’s Congress suggests that most Acehese women, see no benefit in continuing violence. The Congress urged Acehese women to ‘remove feelings of revenge from all sides, in order to break the chains of violence and hatred’ (‘Recommendations Resulting from the Acehese Women’s Congress’, 2000:6).

The challenge for women in these militarised situations is to devise forms of opposition which are non-violent, and allow for their voices to be heard. In November 1998, East

Timorese women held a conference in Dili, at which for the first time they felt courageous enough to speak out about their experiences during 23 years of Indonesian repression.³ In West Papua, Beatrix Koibur, a member of the Presidium of the Papuan Peoples Council, and an experienced church leader, is involved in organising the first Papuan Women's Congress, to be held in Jayapura in November 2000. Clearly West Papuan women leaders view their involvement in the nationalist movement as crucial in charting its future direction.

³ This conference was attended by Rebecca Winters, who subsequently interviewed East Timorese women, and compiled : *BUIBERE Voice of East Timorese Women volume 1*, (1999), East Timor International Support Center, Darwin.

CHAPTER 4 : YOSEPHA ALOMANG, AN AMUNGME WOMAN'S FIGHT AGAINST FREEPORT AND MILITARISATION.

I don't know how many souls have been sacrificed in defending our right to live on our land. Their deaths have not ended the exploitation of Isorei - namely our sacred mountains, the home of our ancestors' spirits - to obtain gold, copper and nickel. The rivers which are a source of our livelihood have been polluted, the forest which is the home of fauna and part of Amungme and Kamoro culture, is being destroyed by the thousands of tons of waste dumped into the environment every day (Alomang, cited in Mote, 1999:12).

Introduction

This chapter will focus on Yosepha Alomang, and the varied strategies she has utilised in her long history of resistance to the Freeport mine, and the militarisation of the area in which she lives. The national and international publicity she has received, is testimony to the effectiveness of her activism in exposing and challenging the brutal impact of Freeport and military violence upon her community. Since November 1999, Yosepha's voice has joined the nationalist chorus, as she sees independence as the only way to achieve her goals.

Born in 1949, Yosepha Alomang is originally from Tsinga, Belakmakama, in the Puncak Jaya region. In the mid 1950s, her family along with the majority of Amungme from Tsinga, on the invitation of Catholic missionaries, moved to Akimuga on the south coast. Despite their fear of malaria in the coastal areas, these Amungme were persuaded that their prospects would be brighter in Akimuga, where the church provided health and educational facilities. Her schooling stopped in grade four following the death of her parents. Yosepha married Markus Kwalik in 1972, and in 1973 she moved to Timika (Mote, 1999:12).

Expropriation and Destruction of Land

An outspoken critic of the Freeport mine, and member of the Amungme Tribal Council LEMASA (*Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme*), Yosepha Alomang has initiated numerous actions in opposition to both the Freeport mine and the Indonesian military which provides security to the mine. In 1994, she along with several others, was detained for a month and tortured. However, far from being silenced, she has continued to organise and speak out in order to expose the environmental devastation caused by Freeport, and the ongoing human rights abuses by both Freeport personnel and the Indonesian military.

The appropriation of Amungme lands in the Western Highlands began in 1967 with the commencement of the Freeport mine, which is owned by New Orleans-based Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold Corporation. Other shareholders include the Indonesian Government owned PT Freeport Indonesia, and British owned Rio Tinto. Since then, the Amungme and Kamoro peoples have lost at least 10,000 hectares of their land without compensation (ACFOA, 1995:1-3). Freeport has concessions of 3.6 million hectares, and is Indonesia's largest tax payer (The Australia West Papua Association, 1995, n.p., Rubin cited in Marshall, 2000, n.p.). 220,000 tonnes of ore are mined daily, pouring 212,000 tons of tailings into the surrounding area ('Freeport Indonesia Sets Aside US\$150 MLN for Land Reclamation', 2000, n.p.).

Resistance to Freeport and Militarisation

In 1974, a year after Yosepha Alomang moved to Timika, Freeport began constructing Grasberg, the world's largest open-pit mine. Local people were evicted from their lands, including their gardens upon which they relied for subsistence ('Papuan housewife tells sufferings of her people', 2000, n.p.). Organised resistance to the mine in 1977 involved Amungme people and OPM guerillas, who blew up Freeport's pipeline to the coast. Indonesian military reprisal was fierce, - villages were bombed and strafed, and whole communities were forcibly resettled away from their traditional lands, near to the coast (ACFOA, 1995:1).

Since then, the Indonesian Government has justified a heavy military presence in the area, and a close relationship between Freeport and the military, as necessary for state security and vital national development (Rumbiak, 1996:19). This approach has been a source of resentment and conflict between the local people, and Freeport and the Indonesian security forces. According to John Rumbiak (1996) of the Jayapura-based human rights organisation IHRSTAD (Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy), large projects like Freeport with their 'security apparatus are a major threat to the ability of the local communities to stay in touch with one another or even with their gardens' (p.19).

In 1985, the Timika Indah company housing complex was built, causing much anger amongst local people. In protest at the loss of their vegetable gardens, a group of women confronted Freeport personnel, who according to Yosepha, responded:

‘This is state land. Do you reject development? What are you doing here? You’ll be eaten by guns’. We, the women answered, ‘We are always being shot dead, so we’re not afraid to die’ (Mote,1999:12).

Women’s Leader and LEMASA Member, Undeterred by Torture

In 1992, Yosepha led a protest group of women who built a large bonfire on the Timika Airport runway, temporarily stopping all flights. This was in response to the expropriation of their land to build the airport, the Sheraton Hotel and surrounding offices (Mote,1999:12). In 1994, Yosepha became a member of the newly formed LEMASA, and continued to be vocal in her opposition to the mine, and the activities of the security forces (Mote, 1999:12). In October 1994, along with Yuliana Magal, Mathius Kelanangame, Yakobus Alomang, and Nicolaus Magal, she was detained and tortured by security forces. This was because the security forces suspected them of helping the OPM leader Kelly Kwalik, a relation of Yosepha’s husband. An eye-witness account by one of those detained, was included in Bishop Munninghoff’s 1995 Report, on a series of human rights violations in the Timika area between 1994 and 1995 (Munninghof, 1995:4). The Report states that Freeport containers were used to hold prisoners who were tortured (Munninghof, 1995:13). According to this Report, in response to her interrogator Yosepha stated:

I didn’t do anything. I am just one of the common people. I have no job, I am a housewife. But we have a common activity, the women have a cooperative and I am the chairwoman of the cooperative. If the officer of the cooperative does things which are not good I am the one who tells them. I am the one who usually speaks out and criticises. I am also responsible for Timika and this community so that they can become good. But now you give me this prize for it, you put me in a cell, you torture me. I don’t want to speak now that I know you have all these notes, I don’t want to speak any more. I will be silent (p.13).

Yuliana Magal, a widow, was badly tortured, accused of being close to Kelly Kwalik. Yosepha’s account of Yuliana’s experience is also in the Report. Unable to speak Indonesian, she couldn’t understand what her interrogators were asking.

So to make Yuliana talk they prodded her with the muzzles of their weapons they pointed at her forehead and put a heavy iron weight on her head for an hour till she was exhausted. Then they took the weight and put it on her shoulder for another hour. Then she had to kneel and she had to cradle the weight for another hour. Then they put the gun against her breast to force her to talk. Then they fondled her breast to find out whether Yuliana was afraid or not and put a stethoscope there for about an hour. Then because they couldn’t do anything more to make her talk they brought her back to her cell.

We were held and tortured for one month (from 9 October to 10 November, 1994) at the police station in Timika (Alomang, cited in Munninghoff, 1995:13).

Militarisation and Resistance

For the local people who have not been forcibly relocated from their lands, the military presence in the area makes life very difficult, particularly for women who farm the land. During some periods they have had to report to a guard post when they go to and from their gardens, and contend with questioning, and accusations of communicating with the OPM. According to Pieter Yan Magal (1996), the supervisor at a boarding house, attached to a Freeport - provided high school in Timika, the impact of Freeport on the Amungme people has been devastating.

The main impact has been suffering, spiritual and physical suffering. Our sacred sites have been destroyed by their sophisticated technology, and they do not value us as human beings. Rather they see us as creatures in the process of becoming human (Magal, 1996:20).

Timika, the town built to serve the Freeport mine, illustrates Fanon's portrayal of colonial space which separates the well-fed from the hungry. 'This world...cut in two is inhabited by two different species' (Fanon, 1963:30). For the foreigners, it is a town of great wealth, a 'piece of Europe grafted onto West Papua where lots of Europeans, Canadians, some Filipinos and Americans wander in shorts, very relaxed' (Balazo, 2000:24). In stark contrast, the Amungme who work in the mine, live down the hill, in tiny houses built in rows along unpaved roads. Further down the hill are the Amungme hamlets, where the inhabitants, mainly women and children, are under constant surveillance (Balazo, 2000:24).

Local resistance against both Freeport and the military became more organised under LEMASA. In response to a large demonstration by local people against Freeport in March 1996, the CEO of Freeport McMoran Gold and Copper, James Moffet, met with forty representatives of Amungme and other tribes, under the gaze of high level army and government officers. Among those present was Brigadier General Prabowo, a long-time officer of Kopassus¹, and son-in-law of then President Suharto. At the meeting, LEMASA executive director Andreas Anggaibak, expressed the view of the indigenous people that Freeport should be closed down (Anggaibak, in 'Comments on Negotiation Process Between

¹ Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command.

the Irianese Tribes with James R. Moffet, CEO of Freeport McMoran Gold & Copper at Sheraton Hotel, Timika, March 14, 1996', 1996, n.p.).

Also at the meeting, Yosepha Alomang and other leaders presented a list of prerequisites to be met, before a meeting of the Amungme, Freeport and the government could be held, and a negotiation process could start. These included: the dismantling of Freeport's Security Department; the replacement of particular managers (names given); community development leaders to be replaced by indigenous people; scholarship priority for Amungme students; job recruitment priority for the Amungme; provision of Freeport capital and work contracts for indigenous people; all activities on Amungme land to be negotiated with LEMASA; and improved living conditions such as proper housing, and health facilities for the indigenous community (Anggaibak, in 'Comments on Negotiation Process Between the Irianese Tribes with James R. Moffet, CEO of Freeport McMoran Gold & Copper at Sheraton Hotel, Timika, March 14, 1996', 1996, n.p.).

Freeport's response to these demands was to offer a Trust Fund, whereby each year, 1% of gross annual revenues (US\$15 million) be provided for community development (Maclellan, 1997:28). Various attempts were made by the company, military and government officials to pressure and intimidate the local people into accepting this offer. These included a payment of Rp 500 million to Andreas Anggaibak from the government official Hussein Usman. People who refused to sign the agreement accepting the 1% Trust Fund, were told they would be considered supporters of Kelly Kwalik, the OPM leader. Tom Beanal, a LEMASA leader was threatened with imprisonment or death. LEMASA had already decided to reject the offer at a meeting on June 29th 1996. A demonstration in protest against the fund was held in Timika on July 18th, and attended by some 2000 Amungme, Dani, Mee/Ekari, Moni, and Nduga people. Some of these people associated themselves with a challenge in the New Orleans District Court, with the company being charged with environmental destruction and human rights abuse. At the demonstration, Yosepha Alomang asked that Mr. Hussein return the Rp 500 million to Freeport ('Again 2000 Local tribal people in Timika made a Protest', 1996, n.p.).

The militarisation of the area has been accompanied by involvement of the military in commercial activities which are socially harmful and disruptive. A member of the Regional Assembly, and himself from Timika, Anton Kelanangame told the online news service

Detikcom, that alcohol consumption was creating problems, and ‘women were being used as sex objects’. He suggested that these activities had backing from members of the armed forces. ‘Timika is like a military base and virtually every army unit is present there, the Marines, Kopassus, Brimob, Paskhas and Kavaleri’² (cited in Imran, 2000, n.p.).

In April 1999, in protest against the impact of the largely military-run bars and brothels in Timika, Amungme women held a demonstration. Singing hymns, they broke into warehouses and confiscated cases of alcohol. They broke down doors of bars and brothels, demanding they be closed down. Yosepha Alomang, one of the organisers of the protest, spoke scornfully of the military: ‘The military has treated us like dogs for years but now they will have to go’. She pointed to the 240 cases of confiscated beer, and jeered, ‘The weapons of ABRI’ (Murphy,1999:1).

Legal Action Against Freeport

By August 1996, 2000 people from six different tribal groups had associated themselves with a legal challenge started by Tom Beanal in April 1996, claiming environmental destruction and human rights abuse against Freeport. They were represented by the attorney Martin Regan, who filed the suit in the New Orleans District Court. Intimidation continued, with the confiscation of signed claim forms by a military intelligence agent, who took them to the district military commander. LEMASA staff and elders including Yosepha Alomang tried repeatedly to get the document back from both the military and the police. According to Yosepha, the new military commander said ‘he needs time to study the document whether or not it relates to any political activity such as GPK’ (LEMASA, 1996:1-2).

On March 5 1998, a State Appeals Court ruled that the New Orleans Court did have jurisdiction over Yosepha Alomang’s class action lawsuit, which claims personal injury and environmental damage on behalf of the Amungme people against Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold (1998, Untitled report, n.p.). In April 1998, accompanied by Rev. Isak Onowame, Yosepha went to New Orleans, and along with local human rights and environmental activists, held a demonstration outside the residence of the Executive Director of Freeport there (Mote, 1999:12).

² Mobile Police Brigade, Special Forces and Cavalry.

Yosepha was planning to leave Timika for a further overseas trip to attend the Annual General Meeting of Rio Tinto shareholders in London, held on May 13th 1998. However, following intimidation by security officials, she was finally prevented from boarding her plane (Survival International, 1998, n.p.). Although Yosepha herself was unable to address the shareholders at the meeting, Survival International circulated a leaflet giving information about Yosepha, her detention in 1994, her legal battle with Freeport, and the supportive relationship between the Indonesian military and the company (Survival International, 1998, n.p.).

Whilst Yosepha's lawsuit class action was eventually dismissed with prejudice in March 2000, following the dismissal of Tom Beanal's case in November 1999 ('State Court Dismisses With Prejudice Complaint Against Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold Inc', 2000, n.p.), the publicity gained from these cases, and the continuing scrutiny faced by Freeport, suggest that their efforts have not been in vain. In February 2000, the Indonesian Environment Minister, Soni Keraf, threatened Freeport with closure, in response to reports that the widely eaten molluscs in the rivers surrounding the Grasberg mine were contaminated, and mangrove forests destroyed (Elder, 2000, n.p.). Furthermore, following an accident at Freeport in May 2000 in which several people were killed, the Indonesian organisation Forum for the Environment, or Walhi, has decided to file a lawsuit against Freeport. It has called for a temporary halt to its operations, as well as a review of Freeport's contract ('Environmentalists demand Freeport's temporary closure', 2000, n.p.).

Independence Demands

By November 1999, the focus of the Timika protesters had broadened and become national, partly in response to the sense of a new opportunity which was created by the victory of the pro-independence cause in the UN organised referendum of August 30th in East Timor. Yosepha Alomang was one of the organisers of a demonstration held there in that month, in which more than 8000 people demanded the recognition of West Papuan independence, and the complete withdrawal of Indonesian troops (Ondawame, 1999:1-2). There was a crescendo of political activity in many parts of West Papua in advance of December 1st, the anniversary of December 1st 1961, when the Morning Star flag was raised alongside the Dutch flag outside the newly elected People's Council. On December 2nd, after the Morning Star flag had been flying for 22 days, Yosepha and three others were detained by police who opened

fire on protesters, injuring fifty-five people ('Police shoot at tribal protesters – 55 hospitalised, 3 critical', 1999, n.p. ; Imran, 2000, n.p.).

In December 1999, two months after the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesia's President, Yosepha Alomang was one of two women to receive the Yap Thiam Hien Human Rights Award. However, she declined to visit Jakarta to accept the award saying:

I refuse to accept the award in Jakarta because I am fighting for the rights of the Irianese. I believe it is natural that I receive it here so that the people in Irian Jaya know how important this award is ('Rights award winner remains true to homeland', 1999, n.p.).

She rejected suggestions that this was a political ploy, stating that in her long struggle she had been 'aided by her fellow Irianese who also deserved recognition' ('Rights award winner remains true to homeland', 1999, n.p.).

In June 2000, following the Congress in Jayapura at which overwhelming support was expressed for the goal of independence, Yosepha stated: 'It seems there is no other way to get back our rights except through independence' (cited in 'Papuan housewife tells sufferings of her people', 2000, n.p.). This appears to be the conclusion drawn by many West Papuans, who have suffered at the hands of a military regime.

Conclusion

Yosepha Alomang has been targeted by the Indonesian military because she is outspoken, and because of her family connection to the OPM leader Kelly Kwalik. However, detention and torture at the hands of the military has not succeeded in silencing her. Yosepha has been able to mobilise women over various issues, and articulate the Amungme peoples' struggle in ways which have gained publicity both nationally and internationally. Her efforts were recognised by the Indonesian NGO community when she received the Yap Thiam Hien Human Rights Award, thus giving further exposure to her peoples' plight. Her refusal to be intimidated by officials and military personnel, has provided a source of strength and inspiration to both her community, West Papuan nationalists, and the wider communities of environmentalists and human rights activists.

CHAPTER 5 : ‘MAMA PAPUA’-WOMEN’S LEADER AND INDEPENDENCE LEADER

We Papuan women also fight, so that there is a brighter future for our children (Koibur, 2000, Interview).

Introduction

This chapter is based upon an interview with Beatrix Koibur Rumbino conducted in late August 2000. The writer met her in Brisbane, where she and other members of the Presidium of the Papuan Council were on their way to New York, to the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September. Beatrix has wide experience as a women’s church leader, and is now one of two women on the *Presidium Dewan Papua*, the executive body of the West Papuan Council. She speaks for one important dimension of West Papuan women’s involvement in the struggle for independence.

The chapter discusses Beatrix’s early years during Dutch rule, her involvement in the Protestant church, and her politicisation within the nationalist movement. It examines her views on gender relations within the movement, and more broadly within society. Finally, the commentary on the interview, presents an analysis within the context of the theoretical perspectives outlined in chapter 3.

Formative Years

Beatrix Koibur Rumbino was born on July 10th 1939, on Miokbundi, a small island to the east of Biak, and her own background and outlook reflects the influence of Dutch Protestant missionaries. She began her schooling with three years at Primary school on her home island. She says it was difficult, for girls particularly, to receive an education. Beatrix told me: ‘I am very grateful to my parents who agreed to my education, and to the church who provided the opportunity for me to attend school’.

In 1950, at the age of eleven, having passed the grade 6 exam after completing only grade 5, Beatrix entered a Girls Domestic Science School as a boarder. The teachers there were Dutch missionaries, and she graduated in 1953. As one of the brightest girls to complete the three year course, she and her friend were chosen to go to a missionary teachers college in Serui. As the first woman graduate in 1956, Beatrix was qualified as a Primary teacher and Bible

Study leader. At that time, this was the highest level of education available to Papuan women.

In 1960, Beatrix married Koibur, a Protestant Minister, and when their first child was six weeks old, the family went to Holland for Koibur to further his theological studies. However, instead of staying the intended four years, their stay was cut short by the Dutch withdrawal from the territory. In response to a request by the Church Synod, they returned to West Papua in 1962, arriving there when it was under UN administration.

Women's Resistance

In May 1963, the UN Temporary Executive Authority came to the end of its period, and control passed to Indonesia. Beatrix says her involvement in the nationalist struggle began in 1963, but at that time she was not able to express her views candidly. However, she and other Papuan women often gathered together, and asked themselves: would the time come when they were no longer part of the Indonesian Republic? The reason they asked this question, was because Papuan women were not given many opportunities in society, for example to be leaders of women's organisations. It was only within the church that women had the confidence and courage to become leaders. Government positions were given to women from Java and other parts of Indonesia, despite the fact that many Papuan women were capable of filling them, particularly those who had graduated from the Domestic Science Girls Schools.

Many women joined the guerilla movement in the forest, the OPM. Also in 1980, several women raised the Morning Star flag in Jayapura and were subsequently jailed. As for women in the current movement, Beatrix says they are an integral part of the struggle.

Therefore, in the presence of God, women must work together with men in the movement. The Presidium emerged as a result of *reformasi*¹ and we are very thankful that one of the pillars or components of the Presidium is women.

In various parts of West Papua, women are beginning to speak out about military repression. In the past, if they spoke out they would be arrested. Since late 1998 with *reformasi*, Beatrix has been called 'Mama Papua'.

This is because in *reformasi* I emerged. I emerged and spoke strongly to the governor, the military commander, and all the parties in Papua. In Jayapura, also the central government in Jakarta. In

¹ Reformasi or reform, was the catch-cry of the student-led democracy movement which helped to bring down the Suharto regime in May 1998. It refers to the post-Suharto era.

front of the military commander, in front of the President, in front of the Vice-President, I have said: enough is enough! For 38 years we Papuan women have been crying. We have spilled our tears because our husbands have been killed, massacred and tortured. Many of our sons have been killed, massacred and tortured. Many of our daughters have been tortured, massacred and raped. And now we have shed enough tears from all the killings....Because of this, we will no longer sacrifice our children to Indonesia. Our children will be for our country, *Tanah Papua*.²

The Role of the Church

According to Beatrix, the churches give great strength and hope to West Papuans, because they have a duty to speak on their behalf. Church leaders play a pastoral role, and give comfort to those who are sad and in difficulty. In this way people's faith is strengthened. The churches can also tell the Indonesian government of Papuan people's freedom aspirations. So Papuans have great hope in the voice of the churches. As a result, Minister Herman Awom, as deputy head of the GKI³ Synod, has emerged and is on the Presidium. More than 99% of Papuans as Christians are pleased with this stance. They are thankful that as a moderator of the Presidium, he will be able to heed the aspirations for freedom of Papuans.

Beatrix Koibur is head of the Women's Christian Association of Indonesia in West Papua. In this position, since *reformasi* began in 1998, she has felt empowered to speak out. She has spoken to the head of this organisation, and told of her experiences as an older Papuan woman who has lived through the Dutch period, and through Indonesian rule. She has also felt empowered by her position as the wife of a Protestant Minister, who was secretary general of the GKI Synod for three terms, and the first Papuan to hold this position.

With regard to other women representatives and women's organisations, Beatrix says that there are three Papuan women in the provincial parliament, all of whom she trained in her organisation. She is pleased that they all speak out for Papuan independence. There is a GKI organisation called *Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Wanita* (Centre for Women's Education and Training), and an Women's NGO called *Kelompok Kerja Wanita* (Working Women's Group), both of which are concerned with women's empowerment. There are also women working in the Human Rights organisation ELSAM / IHRSTAD (Institute for Human Rights

² *Tanah Papua* or the Land of Papua, is the term Beatrix and others use when referring to her country.

³ *Gereja Kristen Injil*, or Evangelical Christian Church is the largest in West Papua, with 506,000 members (Balazo, 2000:24).

Study and Advocacy). Within the church, women leaders all want independence, but within government organisations, Beatrix says women leaders approach individual Papuan women, and invite them to join the movement. Now, through the Presidium, and through the Panel of the Papuan Council (consisting of 501 representatives, about 60 of whom are women), women are able to fight.

We want to fight so that we, like women in other countries, have self-esteem as Papuan women, who have also been created by God. We want to say that as Papuan women, we wish to live in peace...We want to live in peace, with love, in order to develop our country, *Tanah Papua*. And that is our hope.

In July 1998, following the Biak massacres, FORERI (Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society) was formed by the three main churches, with the aim of creating a 'national dialogue' to pursue political solutions for West Papua. From FORERI, came the Team 100, which met President Habibie in February 1999 to demand independence. Beatrix was the only woman on the team. She had been horrified by what she had witnessed whilst leading a church team to care for women and children survivors of the massacres. In villages all over Biak, there were many naked mutilated bodies which they wrapped, prayed over and buried. This experience further empowered her to speak out.

Implications of Satgas Papua

According to Beatrix, the emergence of the *Satgas Papua* (Papuan Taskforce) in early 1999, was in response to a need. The leadership of the movement, particularly Theys Eluay, decided that there should be such groups called *Satgas Papua*, to guarantee security. These groups, who are not armed, initially grew out of *Lembaga Adat* (Tribal Councils), in order to protect the safety of Papuans. Later on, *Satgas Papua* was seen to be important in ensuring security at the *Mubes* (Large Consultation) in February 2000, at which the Presidium was formed. Whilst *Satgas Papua* were accepted at the May-June Congress, it does not form a component of the Presidium. Beatrix believes there are positive aspects to the formation of *Satgas Papua*. She sees it as a chance for young unemployed men and women to receive training, and to provide security for Papuans.

Peter King (2000) writes that young men and women have joined *Satgas Papua* in their thousands. What is of concern to many observers, is that much of the funding for *Satgas Papua*, comes from Yorris Raweyai. A Chinese Papuan from Serui, Yorris has played

prominent roles in Jakarta politics as head of the *Pemuda Pancasila* (Golkar youth organisation involved in criminal activities), and a Suharto crony. Yorris is a close associate of Theys Eluay, and was eventually elevated to the position of Presidium member, though this was controversial (p.5-6). Apart from the source of funding for *Satgas Papua*, it is also of concern that the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) are involved in their training. The recent establishment of the TNI backed *Merah Putih* militia, which is explicitly anti-independence, suggests that elements within the TNI are fomenting horizontal conflict within West Papua by supporting both militias (p.12).

Future Plans, Aspirations and Strategies

Regarding the planned trip to the UN General Assembly in September, Beatrix stated:

My primary hope is that the UN will want to give some hope to Papuan people. I hope that God will open his heart and eyes, and also the UN representatives. Because as a result of the event which took place in 1969, the Act of Free Choice, - many Papuans were killed. We hope that the UN will take responsibility for this matter; that they will be courageous enough to say at the General Assembly that they were wrong. They made a mistake in 1969 in *Tanah Papua*. Because of that, - come Holland, come America, come Indonesia, we must all sit down together and talk about the Papuan people. That is my hope.

In November 2000, Beatrix is planning to organise the first Papuan Women's Congress in Jayapura. The aim of the congress will firstly be to discuss what women need to do to achieve independence. Once independent, according to Beatrix, it is clear what the role of women in development will be. Starting within the family, women will give birth to a new generation of sons and daughters. Also in society, it is hoped that women will become leaders of organisations and plan programs. But first and foremost, Papuan women must work out how to regain the sovereignty and independence obtained in 1961. According to Beatrix: 'I always say, we Papuan women also fight, so that there is a brighter future for our children'.

Gender Relations

Within the nationalist movement, Beatrix believes the issue of gender relations must be recognised, because men and women were created equal by God. Women in fact do more than men do. Once married, women are wives and mothers within the family. They also have roles in society, such as teachers, nursing sisters and doctors. But they should not forget that

their first duty is to their family. Therefore, men also must accept their wives as equal partners in life, and support them in their pursuit of new opportunities. It is evident that Papuan women want to advance. They must make use of the talents God gave them, and not be shy. For skilled and talented Papuan women are greatly needed, particularly in rural areas. Beatrix believes that village women are far more likely to listen to Papuan women leaders than to Javanese women who go to work in rural areas. Because of this, Papuan women leaders must be encouraged, and their husbands must support them.

In response to the question of women's input at the Congress in May-June 2000, Beatrix says that women delegates did not have a particular focus. What was discussed at the Congress came from materials that had been prepared by the Presidium. The women supported this prepared material, and contributed to the discussion, giving their thoughts. Finally, the resolutions were decided upon in the sessions and commissions. The four commissions were: future political strategies, consolidating the Presidium components, the straightening out of history (that is, dealing with the way Papuan's history went wrong in the 1960s), and the basic rights of the Papuan people. About the 1969 'Act of Free Choice', Beatrix stated the following:

With regard to my experiences and my thoughts about that process, I want to say I feel sad. I feel sad because the terms of the New York Agreement were not carried out. Papuans were forced at gunpoint to do what the Indonesians wanted. It should have been one person, one voice, but it wasn't. Only a small number of representatives were chosen, and then forced to choose integration with Indonesia. And until now that is what makes Papuans resentful. Holland, the UN, America, - their actions towards Papuans were not humane. Our self - respect, our identity as Papuans were disregarded.

Beatrix hopes that in the future, once Independence has been achieved, more opportunities will be made available to Papuan women in the fields of education, health, agriculture, and the economy, so that women are involved in many areas of development.

If we have the chance to achieve true independence, we Papuan women must stand up in order to accomplish development in many areas. Because women from other places cannot speak for me and say what I want. I must speak for myself.

Commentary on the Interview

The resentment felt towards non-Papuans leads Beatrix to be unequivocal about the right as West Papuan women, to be able to speak for themselves. It is clear that Beatrix's Christian

faith forms the basis of her belief in human dignity and gender equality. In her discussion of the ways in which Pacific women give voice to their aspirations, Martha Macintyre (2000:155) notes that these owe much to Christian missionary influence. She writes :

women's appeals to 'women's rights as human rights', their attention to the nurturant roles of women, and to the centrality of motherhood in defining the feminine, all stress equality in the sight of God and draw on the Christian ideals of liberty and of personal autonomy.

West Papuan women are represented amongst the Protestant clergy, and the other woman on the Presidium, Ketty Yabansabra, is a minister. Beatrix sees the churches as playing a central role in the nationalist movement.

With regard to gender power relations within the movement, Beatrix's comments indicate that West Papuan women are playing a supportive role, whilst the important political decisions are being made by the male majority leadership. As has been discussed in earlier chapters, this has been the usual pattern in nationalist movements, and is likely to result in women being marginalised in any future independent state. As Siapno says so succinctly:

Most independence movements once in power tend to reproduce the kinds of mechanisms of paternalism, fear of government, and normalisation of abuse of authority exercised by former colonialists, including hierarchical and patriarchal practices which maintain, justify, and legitimise existing structures of domination (2000:2).

Whilst it has been argued in chapter three that the militarisation of a nationalist movement tends to privilege masculinity to the detriment of women, Beatrix's support for the *Satgas Papua*, or Papuan Taskforce implies that she does not agree with this position. She pointed out that these groups were not armed, but suggested that they may need to become so in the future.

Conclusion

Beatrix's overall view is that women are an integral part of the struggle for independence, and must be given every opportunity to contribute to the future development of *Tanah Papua*. She believes that educated West Papuan women have a vital role to play in rural community development and education, and that West Papuan men have a responsibility to support them in their endeavours. Finally, she believes that West Papuan women and men must work together for a brighter future for their children and grand-children.

CONCLUSION

The West Papuan nationalist movement has been in a new phase since 1998. The defeat of the Suharto regime at the hands of the *reformasi* movement shook the whole edifice of power in Indonesia. And it enabled West Papuans to imagine new possibilities in their relations with the central government. The Biak massacres in July 1998, two months after Suharto stepped down, was yet another case of the Indonesian security forces shooting civilians attempting to demonstrate their Papuan identity with a flag-raising ceremony. This precipitated a new activism, one in which nationalists, at least until August 2000, were able to act with a higher degree of toleration.

This time, however, because of the new political openness, there was a sense that Papuan outrage and frustration must be focussed, and channelled into political dialogue with the authorities. So in February 1999, the Team 100 went to Jakarta and candidly told President Habibie of West Papuans desire for independence. Their confidence reflected the fact that Habibie had agreed to allow a UN sponsored referendum in East Timor, and subsequent freeing of the East Timorese from Indonesian control. Whilst the international status of East Timor was different from that of West Papua, the nationalist leadership argue that the UN sponsored process in 1969 was not legitimate, and therefore must be reviewed by the international community. There was also recognition that the OPM as a military force was no longer the means to achieve their nationalist goals.

In West Papua as in Aceh and East Timor, the Indonesian security forces have used rape and torture in their counter-insurgency operations. This is firstly because they view virtually all Papuans as potential enemies. Also they appear to have the mindset described by Cynthia Enloe in relation to soldiers in counter-insurgency situations, who view women as the property of men, the symbols of men's honour, and crucial to the sustainability of the 'enemy's culture and livelihood (Enloe, 2000:134). Furthermore, organised and outspoken women are targeted because by refusing to be intimidated, they challenge the gendered notions of power instilled in military training.


The resistance and activism of West Papuan women is a response to repression, and is reinforced by both the churches and *Lembaga Adat* (Tribal Councils) such as LEMASA. For Yosepha Alomang, her personal experience of torture and intimidation have only

strengthened her resolve to speak out on behalf of her community. She is a village woman, a grass-roots activist, who through LEMASA, has worked closely with Tom Beanal, the Amungme and independence leader. For Beatrix Koibur, her personal involvement in a church team who worked with survivors of the Biak massacre, as well as the opportunities presented with *reformasi*, catalysed a new commitment to work openly for a 'new Papua'. She is urban, formally educated, and part of the current political structure led by Theys Eluay.

Both women, whilst from vastly different backgrounds, are fighting for West Papuan women's dignity and empowerment. However, I have seen little evidence that either of them is critical of the dominant role of men in the leadership of the movement. Nor have I found evidence that either of them is attempting to fashion a distinctly women's agenda. The recently formed Papuan Council, whilst representing all regions and all segments of society, does not appear to have addressed the issue of gender power relations. Of the thirty-one member Presidium, the executive body of the Council, women are considered a component, and thus have two representatives. Political decisions about the direction of the movement, for example the prepared material discussed at the May-June Congress, and the formation of *Satgas Papua*, appear to have been made by the male leadership.

As has been previously argued, without recognition of the gender power relations inherent in a nationalist movement, any future nation will most likely be one in which male dominance is perpetuated. West Papuan women have been actively involved in the resistance throughout the period of Indonesian rule, and current women's leaders are very aware of the need to advocate gender equality. However, it appears that women's involvement in the current political mobilisation is contributive, and does not challenge the male dominated power structures.

APPENDIX - MAP OF WEST PAPUA



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