

Chapter Four:

Application

Introduction

Indonesia's occupation of West Papua is extremely vulnerable on two counts. Firstly, Jakarta cannot maintain its rule without repression on a near continual basis. Yet each act of repression only stokes the fires of dissent and deepens feelings of alienation towards Jakarta amongst West Papuans. Secondly, Jakarta depends on diplomatic, military and economic support from international elites to maintain the occupation. In turn, these elites depend on key social groups to carry out elite policies in support of the occupation. In many cases the cooperation of these social groups is tenuous and could be withdrawn. As a result, despite the illusion of Indonesia's monolithic invincibility, in reality, Indonesia's rule in West Papua is fragile and subject to removal.

This chapter identifies and examines the domains of the struggle where campaigns of nonviolent action take place. These domains encompass the struggle inside West Papua, engaging the TNI inside West Papua, engaging Indonesia's domestic constituencies and engaging constituencies within the societies of Indonesia's elite allies that support the occupation. Campaigns of nonviolent action in the societies of Indonesia's elite allies intended to alter the will of key social groups within these societies who support Indonesia's occupation of West Papua have the potential to have a major bearing on the outcome of the struggle for self-determination in West Papua. As civil society increasingly realises their power and coordinates nonviolent action, campaigns for social change will become even more powerful. The last section focuses on Australia as a case study. I discuss how three solidarity campaigns may significantly help alter the will and undermine the power of Australian elite support for Indonesia's occupation of West Papua.

Introducing the domains of the struggle

'The domains of the struggle' refer to the broad arenas of the opponent's power where campaigns of nonviolent action take place. Robert Burrowes identifies three distinct domains of nonviolent action: the opponent elite's troops, the society of the opponent elite's domestic constituency and the domestic constituencies of allied elites.¹ These domains are not definitive and the relative importance of each domain will vary depending on a continual political and strategic assessment of the conflict. Each domain is guided by its own strategic plan (based on the twelve interlocking and reinforcing components of the strategic framework) and intermediate strategic goals. For the purpose of this thesis I have divided the domains of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua into four distinct arenas: West Papuan society; the TNI; Indonesian society; and the societies of Indonesia's elite allies.

¹ Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, pp. 256-268.

I will briefly discuss campaigns inside West Papua before demonstrating the importance of strategic international solidarity with reference to Australia.

Campaigns of nonviolent action inside West Papua

To be effective the leadership of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua needs to identify the sources of support within West Papua for the occupation, and design campaigns to alter the will and undermine the power of those constituencies which passively or actively support the occupation. The resistance then needs to work out a set of intermediate strategic goals in relation to each group identified. Each intermediate strategic goal should be specific: to alter the will and undermine the power of a particular social group that supports the occupation. Action may be taken by the group themselves (in the case of a strike, for instance) or by West Papuan activists who wish to induce or compel a particular social group to take action. To maximise effectiveness, each campaign should be based on a modified version of the strategic framework outlined previously.

There is great potential for strategic nonviolent campaigns inside West Papua. Each arena of action will require its own campaign of strategic nonviolent action coordinated by an organisational process that assumes overall responsibility for the grand (national) strategy.² The provincial administration and educational facilities, for example, are arenas of cooperation with Jakarta that provide powerful opportunities for nonviolent action. Nonviolent campaigns could also be designed to engage the TNI (and to address the related militarisation of West Papuan society). Another crucial but often neglected component of any nonviolent struggle is a constructive program designed to empower and meet the needs of West Papuans.³ This will help strengthen the identity of West Papuans and is a practical way of developing self-reliance and reducing dependency on global capital and the Indonesian state.⁴ Indonesian, transnational and multinational corporations also depend on West Papuan cooperation to carry out resource extraction. However, because corporations do not significantly depend on the consent and cooperation of West Papuans to extract their resources it is vitally important that contact is made with international groups in the societies of Indonesia's elite allies. In consultation

² For a discussion on organisational processes to coordinate a grand strategy see Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, pp. 184-189. It may also be necessary to have separate strategies in different parts of West Papua coordinated by a national strategy. This is because of the distinct conditions in different parts of West Papua. For example, although West Papuans are repressed by the TNI all over the province in areas surrounding Freeport, for instance, a specific nonviolent strategy would be need to be developed for that unique situation.

³ ELS-HAM is leading West Papuan NGO addressing militarism in West Papua and working to empower the people.

⁴ According to Nonie Sharp cooperatives have long been part of West Papuan cultural continuity and resistance (Sharp, *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*, 41).

with West Papuans these groups can design campaigns of international solidarity directed at those groups that corporations *do* depend on.

Jakarta certainly depends on West Papuans to maintain the fiction of the legitimacy of Indonesia's sovereignty over West Papua and to reinforce an Indonesian identity in the province. As a result, one of the key West Papuan demands has been for a process of 'rectifying the history' of West Papua's fraudulent incorporation into the Indonesian state. This has enormous potential to be further developed into an ongoing campaign. West Papuans have also drawn on their unique cultural identity as Melanesians and significant cultural heritage and identity to resist Indonesian rule.⁵ Continued Papuanisation of West Papuan society will not only withdraw consent from Indonesian rule it will also lay the foundations for a 'New Papua'.

Campaigns to engage the TNI inside West Papua

Altering the will and undermining the power of the TNI to carry out acts of aggression is an important strategic goal. This will also seriously undermine the power of Jakarta to maintain the occupation. Although this will be extremely difficult,⁶ there are several historical examples where dialogue and nonviolent action has been successful in altering the will and undermining the power of an aggressive military force. Nonviolent resistance to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the dramatic Philippine people's power overthrow of Marcos in 1986 and the defeat of the Soviet coup in 1991 are all examples where dialogue and nonviolent action to convince soldiers to disobey orders and support the resistance has been a decisive factor in creating change.⁷ 'In each of these cases,' argues Burrowes, 'the outcome was a direct result of an intuitively understood or clearly defined strategic goal.'⁸

This strategic goal can be achieved through a combination of dialogue and carefully selected nonviolent tactics that evoke sympathy and support for the resistance through moral persuasion. According to one West Papuan activist, efforts to humanise and 'soften' the TNI is a key strategic aim of the nonviolent action. Women, in particular, have a 'special ability' in this regard. 'They bring flowers and give them to the police and military before the demonstration. This makes it hard for the

⁵ See for instance Sharp, *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*; Kamma, *Koreri*.

⁶ The entire *raison d'être* of the TNI is defend the unitary nature of the republic of Indonesia. See Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*. Consequently, movements for independence or self-determination are seen as a threat to the very purpose of the TNI. Moreover, the TNI's lucrative involvement in business is also a disincentive to resist orders. Despite the difficulties of trying to alter the TNIs will it remains an important strategic goal. See Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 257 for comments on the points of leverage for nonviolent action.

⁷ Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 257.

⁸ Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 257.

military – their heart is confused’.⁹ ‘When the police or military is strong’, says one West Papuan, ‘we sit down and sing songs – traditional songs and church songs. Sometimes the people also do traditional dances so that the police and military don’t want to fight with us because we use nonviolence.’¹⁰

One important element of communication with the TNI would be for West Papuans committed to nonviolence to insist that they do not want to physically hurt individual soldiers in any way and to demonstrate respect to members of the TNI. ‘Given the inherent needs for recognition and self-respect’ writes Burrowes, ‘interactions that affirm the dignity and worth of the individual are most likely to induce soldiers to consider alternative information, to question their orders, and ultimately, to challenge the legitimacy of their military role.’¹¹ Such an approach can be aided by differentiating between the person performing a role as a soldier and the TNI culture and structure they operate in.

Dialogue might also ‘involve “deliberate and carefully calculated attempts” to make the troops realise the degree of suffering their actions are causing’.¹² This would involve communicating the way the TNI’s actions tarnish the international reputation of Indonesia. Because of the way religious traditions permeate the culture of Indonesia, appeals to TNI personnel on the basis of religion can also persuade soldiers to act more humanely. Jacob Rumbiak knows this from his experience in Indonesian jails, where he was sentenced to 17 years for advocating nonviolent struggle. Tom Hyland, foreign editor for *The Age*, narrates what happened.

Twice he was told he would be killed. Once he was trussed up in a military Hercules aircraft. The rear ramp was lowered in mid-flight and he was told he would be thrown out. He sang a spiritual song and the soldiers relented. Another time he was told he would be shot.

Rumbiak tells the story: “I said give me time to pray to my Lord. If you kill my body, you won’t kill my soul. I will move from my body and I will wait for you. My soul will pray for you. Jesus loves you and I love you too, because you don’t know what you are doing, because you are following the command of your leaders. But one time the Lord will ask what did you do in the world for human rights.”

He laughs. “And you know, they’re confused when I talk like this. And they lowered their guns and two soldiers, they cried.”¹³

Nonetheless, despite Jacob Rumbiak’s example of what is possible, because the social distance between ordinary West Papuans and Indonesian soldiers is great, to maximise the effectiveness of nonviolent action, West Papuan and solidarity activists should draw on the insights of ‘the great chain

⁹ Interview, July 2001.

¹⁰ Interview, July 2001.

¹¹ Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 221.

¹² Nonviolence and civil defence theorist Adam Roberts cited in Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 220.

Examples are also given about how dialogue helped encourage Soviet soldiers to withdraw their support for the 1991 coup.

¹³ Tom Hyland, ‘A Guerrilla’s Story’, *The Age*, Thursday 7th September 2000.

of nonviolence' and work with Indonesian solidarity activists to systematically achieve this strategic goal. This is critical because soldiers in Indonesia are regularly rotated and because in crisis situations regimes often bring in troops from other provinces who have not had prior contact with the people.¹⁴ In addition to utilising 'the great chain of nonviolence', communication could also take advantage of written materials and the use of specially trained unarmed peacekeepers during demonstrations. The strategic effectiveness and communicative potential of such tactics will be dramatically enhanced by making both disciplined nonviolent action and any repression from the TNI or police visible to an audience that can mobilise in support of the resistance.¹⁵ Undermining the power of the TNI also has an international dimension which will be discussed below, in the section on international solidarity campaigns.

As in East Timor, the TNI is actively organising militias. Recently, the militant Islamic group, *Laskar Jihad* (*jihad* – guerrilla-fighters) arrived in West Papua from the Maluku's and *Barisan Merah Putih* (the ranks of the Red and White – the colours of the Indonesian flag) was established in Wamena. In these difficult situations West Papuans have been working to defuse the situation. In particular, Thaha Al Hamid, General-Secretary and Islamic representative of the PDP, has been collaborating with Church leaders and ELS-HAM to initiate a dialogue with *Laskar Jihad* and undertake a community education process alongside alerting international networks about the situation.¹⁶

Despite the strategic utility of widening spaces for dissent within the TNI, there are some situations where there are good tactical and strategic reasons for not engaging the military. In particularly isolated West Papuan communities where the TNI is involved in acts of repression, or at certain volatile times or when the resistance is overwhelmingly outnumbered by the TNI and militia, it may not always be wise to engage soldiers at the site.¹⁷

¹⁴ This was a factor in ending the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. The Biak massacre was also carried out by a battalion of soldiers brought in from outside the territory, in this case from the Maluku's. See for instance Andrew Kilvert, 'Human Rights: Behind the Biak Massacre', *Asia Pacific Network*, 11th October 1998.

¹⁵ Martin and Varney, *Nonviolence and Communication* (forthcoming).

¹⁶ Interview with participant 03, 13th December 2001.

¹⁷ A great deal of discernment, calm and courage is needed to know when it is possible to confront the military during potentially volatile demonstrations. At a demonstration of several thousand people in Rangoon in 1989, where the army was deliberately trying to provoke the people, Burmese democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi 'used carefully chosen words' to maintain the discipline of the crowd and facilitate a withdrawal of the army (Daniel Benjamin, 'Under the Boot', *Time*, 14th August 1989).

Engaging key social groups inside Indonesia

The nonviolent resistance will need to identify the key social groups in Indonesian society that Jakarta depends upon to maintain the occupation. The resistance then needs to work out a set of intermediate strategic goals in relation to each group identified. Each intermediate strategic goal should be specific: to alter the will and undermine the power of a particular social group that supports the occupation. The most appropriate nonviolent action to achieve these strategic goals may be taken by West Papuans themselves living inside Indonesia or by Indonesian solidarity groups on behalf of West Papuans or by a combination of both.¹⁸

To maximise the insights of the 'great chain of nonviolence', nonviolent activists in West Papua will need to identify the social groups in Indonesia that are particularly likely to act in solidarity with West Papuans.¹⁹ These may well include women,²⁰ students and the pro-democracy movement,²¹ the Acehnese self-determination movement,²² religious leaders²³ and those in the Non-Government Organisation (NGO) movement.²⁴ Solidarity action by these groups, on behalf of, and with, West Papuan activists will help close the social distance between the oppressed and the oppressor.²⁵ Consequently, it would be valuable for nonviolent activists in West Papua to continue to cultivate and

¹⁸ During East Timor's campaign for independence, particularly after the Dili massacre, solidarity groups in Indonesia were formed or became much more active. *Solidamor* was one example of a group that helped lobby Indonesian political elites, hold dialogues with the TNI and disseminate information about East Timor to the Indonesian public. (Indonesian solidarity activist Bonar Tigor Naipospos cited in Fukuda, 'Peace through Nonviolent Action', 24).

¹⁹ These alliances were of great significance to the East Timorese in their struggle for Independence. See Fukuda, 'Peace through Nonviolent Action', pp. 20, 22, 24.

²⁰ Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, pp. 261-263.

²¹ Students play a big role in Indonesian politics. The action of students was decisive in bringing about the fall of Suharto. See Martin, Varney and Vickers., 'Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression'; Ed Aspinall, 'The Indonesian student uprising of 1988', in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds.), *Reformasi: Crisis and change in Indonesia*, Monash University Clayton, Monash Asia Institute, 1999. The pro-democracy movement, (many members of which were students) also significantly aided the East Timorese struggle for independence. See Fukuda, 'Peace through Nonviolent Action'.

²² Because both West Papuans and Acehnese share the same problem of Indonesian military aggression and are both pursuing self-determination there are natural opportunities to work together.

²³ For example the former president of Indonesia and chairperson of the large and powerful religious Muslim organisation in Indonesia, Nahdatul Ulama, Abdurrahman Wahid, supported the emergence of the Papuan Council and *Presidium Dewan Papua* and helped advocate for greater recognition of West Papuan identity. Although he does not support independence he is very committed to nonviolence and is one of many religious leaders whose support could help legitimise the nonviolent struggle in the eyes of ordinary Indonesians and help them understand the cause of their grievances. For an interesting article where Abdurrahman Wahid discusses nonviolence see Abdurrahman Wahid, 'Islam, Nonviolence and National Transformation', Glenn D. Paige, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, and Sarah Gilliat (eds). *Islam and Nonviolence*, Honolulu, Centre for Global Nonviolence Planning Project, Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii, 1993: pp. 53-57. Because of the relationship between the Christian Church (protestant and catholic) in West Papua and the Church in Indonesia here is also potential for solidarity action by the Church in Indonesia.

²⁴ The NGO movement has proliferated in Indonesia over the last few years and there are a number of Legal Aid, Human Rights, Advocacy and development agencies that support West Papua. Unfortunately some parts of the Independence movement apparently broke off contact with many Indonesian NGO's precisely because they were Indonesian. Personal communication with Emmy Halfid, coordinator of *WALHI* - Friends of the Earth Indonesia, October 2001.

²⁵ Galtung, *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine*, pp. 19-27.

strengthen relationships with these social groups inside Indonesia. One important strategic goal of such activity is to sensitise ordinary Indonesians to the active nonviolent struggle inside West Papua as well as the history of colonisation and repression.

As I have discussed in the section on the TNI, an important strategic goal of the nonviolent resistance is to alter the will of the TNI to conduct acts of aggression. Nonviolent action in this regard can also be taken within Indonesia, the principle aim of which should be to create disquiet and widen space for dissent within the TNI itself.²⁶ Although soldiers resistance movements have been veiled in secrecy and subject to intense media censorship they have significantly aided progressive social movements in the past.²⁷

Solidarity actions inside Indonesia by West Papuans and Indonesian solidarity activists could involve the full spectrum of tactics from the three classes of nonviolent action.²⁸ However, West Papuans coordinating campaigns of nonviolent action, will need to make an astute political and strategic assessment of appropriate timeframes for action and stage campaigns ‘to gradually encourage participation, awareness, commitment, discipline and courage’.²⁹

Engaging key social groups in the societies of Indonesia’s international elite allies

Indonesia depends on significant international diplomatic, military and corporate support to maintain the occupation. In turn, these elites depend on the passive and active support of key constituencies within the societies of these allied elites. Therefore, campaigns of nonviolent action should be designed to alter the will of these groups to support the occupation. Guided by the strategic plan and framework, each intermediate strategic goal of campaigns within the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies should be clear and specific: to alter the will of a particular social group whose support or ‘neutrality’ is necessary for Indonesia to continue to maintain the occupation. This will undermine Indonesia’s international elite’s ally support of the occupation. In some circumstances such as undermining the ability of Indonesia’s elite allies to continue to train and arm the TNI, it will help undermine Indonesia’s power directly.

Although factors can coalesce to produce change quickly, as the events of 1998 and 1999 demonstrated for East Timor, it is unlikely that solidarity campaigns will be successful in the short

²⁶ For a discussion on this dynamic in relation to East Timor see Fukada, ‘Peace through Nonviolent Action’, pp. 24-25.

²⁷ For an overview of soldier resistance movements within the society of the opponent elite see Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, pp. 259-261. See also David Cortright, and Max Watts, *Left Face: Soldiers Unions and Resistance Movements in Modern Armies*, New York, Greenwood Press, 1991.

²⁸ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*.

²⁹ Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 264.

term. Therefore, it is wise to prepare for protracted struggle and identify short-term changes that demonstrate growing support for self-determination in West Papua and less support for the occupation. These changes can assist first world nonviolent activists to resist the temptations of despair, urgency and powerlessness. They are indications that solidarity campaigns are gradually but surely undermining the legitimacy of Indonesia's neo-colonial rule and building a popular consensus for change.

The power of international solidarity campaigns: Australia as a case study

To demonstrate how international solidarity campaigns could functionally support a nonviolent strategy in West Papua I will focus on the example of Australia as a case study (see Figure 4.1). I have chosen Australia for three reasons. Firstly, Australia provides significant support to the occupation. Secondly, Australia is the major power in the region, and is seen as such by people in West Papua.³⁰ For better or worse, the Australian government's policy and the attitude of government representatives, civil servants and civil society, will have a major bearing on conflict in the region. In the period following the events in East Timor in 1999, Australia's international standing was increased, particularly in the eyes of the United States, which was happy to let Australia assume the leadership role. In our geo-political region, 'Australia has become', as academic Peter King astutely observed, 'the tail that wags the American dog.'³¹ Finally, Australia is the society in which I am located. Rather than focus on trying to change Indonesian policy, I argue that solidarity activists should focus on changing those groups within their own society which support the occupation. This is consistent with the theory and strategy argued previously. It is also, I believe, the best way to undermine the power of Indonesia to maintain the occupation. Nonetheless, to maximise the effectiveness of solidarity action, the reader should remember that those who coordinate the nonviolent struggle in West Papua and other places (like Australia) will also need to make contact with solidarity groups committed to nonviolent action in the societies of Indonesia's other elite allies. As these networks expand and develop a coordinated strategy and undertake cooperative action (made increasingly possible by global communication technologies) the potential for the struggle to bring about change will increase.

I will discuss three campaigns (one existing and two potential) that are representative of the ways strategic solidarity action in Australia could maximise the effectiveness of a nonviolent strategy in West Papua. To act coherently, and to maximise their effectiveness, these campaigns would need to

³⁰ Interviews with participant 01, January 2001, participant 04, December 2001 and participant 02, November 2001.

³¹ *West Papua Project*, Second Workshop, 13th December 2001.

be guided by a modified version of the strategic framework. Because popular consciousness about West Papua is not high, any solidarity effort needs to begin with a period of awareness raising, focused on securing the support of groups who are most likely to act in solidarity with the people of West Papua. However, this is often a diffuse and unclear strategic goal. Therefore, as people are drawn into the struggle it is important to design creative and disciplined campaigns of nonviolent action, with specific strategic goals. Campaigns should generate opportunities for people to participate in nonviolent action that assists them to act powerfully whilst systematically undermining the way Australian elites in government, the corporate sector and the military support the problem. Guided by a thorough political and strategic assessment of the conflict, clear strategic goals, and campaigns to achieve them, it should be possible to lessen the time taken to achieve the strategic aims of the resistance.



Of course, these campaigns are not definitive examples of the way solidarity action could support the struggle in West Papua.³² There are countless practical ways people can act in solidarity. Nonetheless, to maximise effectiveness, nonviolent action should be well organised, strategically focused and undertaken by trained and disciplined activists. As a core part of any strategy it is also particularly important that solidarity activists build relationships with, and devise ways to coordinate and cooperate closely with West Papuans inside West Papua; solidarity activists inside Indonesia and in the societies of Indonesia's other elite allies; and the Australian West Papuan community in exile.

³² See for example, a discussion on cross-border third-party nonviolent intervention in Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber, *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders*.

Figure 4.1 The political purpose and strategic aims applied to solidarity campaigns inside Australia

(Adapted from Burrowes, *The strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 209)

The political purpose: self-determination for West Papuans



Undermining Australian diplomatic support for the occupation:³³ The Act of Free Choice Campaign. One long-term strategic goal of the nonviolent struggle is for there to be some sort of third-party mediated dialogue between Jakarta and West Papua that leads to an internationally acceptable act of self-determination. In order for this to happen the fraudulent process by which West Papua was incorporated into Indonesia, the 1969 Act of Free Choice, needs to be reviewed. Consequently, the intermediate strategic goal of the international Act of Free Choice Campaign is to encourage U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to personally intervene to investigate the conduct of the United Nations during the Act of Free Choice before the UNGA can initiate a review of the results of the Act of Free Choice. The aim of which is to help create the conditions for both dialogue and an internationally acceptable act of self-determination. Action by the U.N. will also help resurrect the U.N.s reputation as a defender of political and human rights. To achieve this, an international letter writing campaign has been initiated. A sample letter from the campaign is included in the appendix. There is also an online petition to Kofi Annan.³⁴ These initiatives support an international legal challenge to the Act of Free Choice.

The Dutch government has already agreed to review their role in the West Papua handover.³⁵ Moreover, there are international precedents for the U.N. Secretary-General to conduct an investigation into the role of the U.N. in a particular event. Investigations were conducted into the role of the U.N. in the cases of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the massacre of Muslims in Srebrenica in 1997. There is even a U.N. 'Lessons Learned Unit' in place to investigate past events and help facilitate the integration of these lessons.

If Jakarta was satisfied that the 1969 Act of Free Choice was free and fair then they would not oppose an investigation. In fact, an independent and international investigation supported by Jakarta, even one that revealed that the human and political rights of West Papuan's were violated, would help resolve the conflict because it would be a recognition of legitimate West Papuan grievances and a

³³ Another extremely significant source of support for the occupation comes from Papua New Guinea. The dynamic between Papua New Guinea, Australia and Indonesia will not be explored here. For a good but somewhat dated article see Peter King, 'Breaking Deadlocks: Peace-making opportunities for Australia in East Timor, West Papua and Papua New Guinea', Michael Salla et al (eds), *Essays on Peace*, Central Queensland University Press, Rockhampton, 1995: pp. 126-138.

³⁴ The petition demands that the U.N Secretary-General review the role of the U.N in the Act of Free Choice. This petition has also been signed by many West Papuans who have been greatly encouraged by the initiative. One West Papuan activist even travelled on foot throughout the highlands of West Papua explaining the petition to people in person and collecting signatures which he then sent to the moderator of the petition twenty at a time. The petition can be found at www.petitiononline.com/westpap/petition.html.

³⁵ Pacific News Bulletin, *Dutch Government Agrees to Review West Papua Handover*, December 1999.

tangible response to core West Papuan demands to ‘rectify history’.³⁶ Importantly, it would also help restore Indonesia’s founding identity as a nation that struggles valiantly against colonialism.

The international campaign was launched globally on the 19th March 2002.³⁷ In Australia a press conference with Dirk Ajamiseba, the most senior surviving Papuan leader at the time of the Act of Free Choice, West Papuan Independence leader Jacob Rumbiak, and Senators Andrew Bartlett and Vikki Bourne from the Australian Democrats, was held in Canberra.³⁸ The Australian Government (and the Australian Labor Party) supports the territorial integrity of Indonesia, including Indonesian sovereignty of West Papua. Not surprisingly therefore, the Australian and Indonesian Governments’ reaction were swift. The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard affirmed his Governments support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity and a representative of the Indonesian Government in Canberra, Mr. Lutfi Rauf, asserted that the event was ‘a provocative step ... which is clearly interference in Indonesian domestic affairs’.³⁹ These are all signs that even a small press conference severely threatens elite attempts to hold together a consensus that the Act of Free Choice was legitimate. Further nonviolent actions will continue to undermine Indonesian and international elite support for the historical basis of the occupation. In this regard, letter writing by NGOs is critical, because of the collective power of NGOs and the position many NGOs occupy at the U.N.

Undermining Australian military support for the occupation: a campaign to resist Australia’s arming and training of the TNI. Since West Papua was occupied by the Indonesian military in the early 1960s, they have terrorised the population. The TNI continue to routinely abuse the human rights of West Papuans. The assassination of PDP leader, Theys Eluay by the TNI, for example, is part of a campaign to systematically eliminate the West Papuan independence movement.⁴⁰ Human rights violations are a clear indication that the TNI intends to protect Indonesia’s territorial integrity at all costs, even if that means killing a leader who loved Indonesia and was committed to nonviolence. Justification for human rights abuses such as these are reinforced at the highest level and supported by a political, territorial and ideological structure designed for this purpose. Indonesian

³⁶ Papuan People’s Congress, ‘Papuan Congress Resolution’, 4th June 2000.

³⁷ West Papua Action – Ireland, <http://westpapuaaction.buz/unreview/march26.htm>

³⁸ Australian Democrats, *Australian Government implicated in UN’s West Papua sham (Media Release)*, 19th March 2002; Australian West Papua Association., *West Papua’s Old Man of the Act of Free Choice Challenges Ortiz Sanz to Come Clean (Media Release)*, 19th March 2002.

³⁹ Rowan Callick, ‘Indonesia Ties Tested Again’, *Australian Financial Review*, March 21st 2002.

⁴⁰ Personal communication with ELS-HAM, December 2001.

President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, for example, recently addressed the TNI saying, ‘you must do your duty without having to worry about human rights.’⁴¹

The capacity of the TNI to maintain the occupation and perpetuate human rights violations, is sustained and supported by training, arms and diplomatic support; willingly provided by a number of states, particularly the United States of America,⁴² the European Union⁴³ and Australia. This support helps re-legitimise the TNI and makes them more effective, efficient and professional human rights abusers. An important strategic goal of solidarity groups, therefore, is to initiate campaigns designed to alter the will and undermine the power of key social groups that help governments support the TNI, an organisation described by Scott Burchill, an expert in international relations at Deakin University, as a ‘terrorist outfit’⁴⁴ and referred to by Andrew McNaughton, veteran East Timor campaigner, as ‘a cross between the SS and the Mafia’.⁴⁵

Recently the Australian and Indonesian Governments signed a memorandum of understanding on bi-lateral defence cooperation, widely viewed as a precursor for a full restoration of military ties with Indonesia. The Australian government supports military relations with the TNI for three reasons: Indonesia is a ‘strategic shield’ for Australia,⁴⁶ a belief that the training provided by Australia helps develop a modern, professional and disciplined Defence Force, and finally, that re-engaging the TNI helps create stability in Indonesia and security in the region. Unfortunately, there is not the space to adequately refute the government’s spurious claims here. Nonetheless, it is instructive to remember that years of training the Indonesian military may have limited military engagements between the Australian and Indonesian Defence Forces in East Timor in 1999 and reduce the casualties of Australian soldiers; but it did nothing to reduce violence against the East Timorese by the TNI. Nor did years of defence cooperation with the TNI prevent the torching of East Timor during the orgy of

⁴¹ Dateline, *Martyrdom of Theys Eluay*, 16th January 2002.

⁴² For further on U.S support for the TNI see Frida Berrigan, *Indonesia at the crossroads: U.S Weapons Sales and Military Training*, Arms Trade Resource Centre, September 2001, www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/indo092001.html, accessed 1^{7th} January 2002.

⁴³ For a report on arms exports to Indonesia put out by the U.K group, Campaign Against the Arms Trade, see Nicholas Gilby, *Arms Exports to Indonesia*, CAAT, October 1999. More recently, according to Indonesian newspaper reports Indonesia is seeking to reduce its military dependency on the United States by sourcing defence equipment from Eastern Europe. See for example Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, ‘Czech Republic Offers Indonesia Wide-range Defense Equipment’, *The Jakarta Post*, 5th February 2002. This makes the work of nonviolent activists more challenging and heightens the need for global campaigns.

⁴⁴ 7:30 Report, ABC TV, 7th February 2002.

⁴⁵ Personal communication, December 13th 2002.

⁴⁶ A thinly veiled euphemism. Rather than fulfilling our international responsibility to protect refugees, the Australian Government is effectively sub-contracting Indonesian security forces to act as bouncers, using the Australian Navy and S.A.S to oversee the operations.

post-ballot destruction in September 1999. In the end, ADF personnel were sent to East Timor to protect ordinary East Timorese from the very people Australia had armed and trained.⁴⁷

Whilst an end to the use of military violence to solve conflict (and an end to militarism itself) is a long-term vision of any revolutionary nonviolent activist, it will require many intermediate steps: fundamental structural change; a profound values shift in our commitment to violence; and a long protracted struggle to achieve this goal. As a way of systematically working towards this vision, a realistic medium-term strategic goal would be to work to stop the training and arming of all military forces from repressive regimes. In the shorter-term, independent monitoring and evaluation of the ADFs arming and training of military forces from repressive regimes is needed. Currently, this does not happen. Independent monitoring and evaluation of the ADFs training of defence forces like the TNI, is a necessary precursor to legislation and policy to hold human rights violators accountable and substantiate government claims that training the TNI helps create a more disciplined and professional army that respects human rights.

Although the support the Australian government provides to the TNI is extremely small when compared with that of the United States or Britain, it is an extremely significant part of a policy framework that helps re-legitimise the TNI as professional and disciplined army that respects human rights. Campaigns to alter the will and undermine the power of those who support Australia's military relationship with the TNI will help strengthen the hand of those in Indonesia and West Papua working to reform the role of the military in Indonesia.

Australia arms the TNI. In 1999/2000 Australia sent 14 shipments of defence related goods and 207 shipments of dual-use goods (goods that can be used for both military and civilian purposes) to Indonesia.⁴⁸ In 2000/2001 Australia sent 11 shipments of defence related goods and 143 shipments of dual-use goods to Indonesia.⁴⁹ In addition the Australian government agency, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC), also provides loans to the Indonesian government for military equipment.⁵⁰ Whilst 'commercial in confidence' agreements maintain the veil of secrecy surrounding

⁴⁷ For evidence about the centrality of the TNIs involvement in the violence in East Timor during September 1999 see Desmond Ball, 'Silent Witness: Australian intelligence and East Timor', *The Pacifica Review*, Vol. 14 No. 1 2001: pp. 35-62. See also Hamish McDonald et al (eds), *Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 145, Canberra, Australian National University, 2002.

⁴⁸ Department of Defence, Defence Material, Industry Division, *Annual Report: Exports of Defence and Strategic Goods from Australia 1999/2000*, May 2001, www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/export/ar2000.pdf, accessed 2nd July 2001.

⁴⁹ Department of Defence, Defence Material, Industry Division, *Annual Report: Exports of Defence and Strategic Goods from Australia 2000/2001*, February 2002, www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/export/ar2001.pdf, accessed 5th April 2002.

⁵⁰ For example, during the 1998-1999 financial year the EFIC loaned the Indonesian government US \$5.1 million to help buy equipment and services for military transport aircraft (Oxfam Community Aid Abroad., *The Globalisation Challenge: Australia's role in a rapidly changing world*, Fitzroy (Victoria, Australia), Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, August 2001: 32).

arms deals, major Australian and Australian based arms companies include Australian Defence Industries (ADI), Tennix and SMA (Scientific Management Associates). These arms companies depend on workers and union members who could be persuaded to withdraw their support. Ironically, weapons, ammunition and military equipment made by workers in Australia could well be used to repress workers in Indonesia, where the TNI and Indonesian police systematically use violence and intimidation against labour organisers and people resisting the social and environmental impacts of local and multinational corporations.

Union action within arms companies is a meaningful and tangible way of expressing global solidarity with working people everywhere, especially in places where military repression is an everyday occurrence. The principal union for workers at ADI plants around the country is the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU). The MUA (Maritime Union of Australia) is also responsible for loading many of the shipments destined for export. All shipments that contain explosive material go through one port (at least in Victoria); the MUA staffed finger wharf at Point Wilson in Victoria, making Australian supply of munitions to the TNI quite vulnerable to nonviolent blockades.⁵¹

It is not unrealistic to expect that strategic nonviolent action could persuade union labour to withdraw their support from arming the TNI. The AMWU was one of eleven unions which signed a memorandum of understanding with West Papuan independence leader Jacob Rumbiak on the 24th of October, 2000.⁵² ‘The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to express solidarity with the aspirations of the West Papuan people...’ The first point of the memorandum expresses union concern about human rights abuses committed by the TNI. Key questions include: how the solidarity movement could assist and support union members working for arms companies to find ways to express their concerns about *who* defence-related goods are sold to and *how* they might be used.

Nonviolent solidarity action against an international elite ally which was arming an oppressor ally has also been successful in the past. During West Pakistan’s bloody repression of East Pakistan, a small group of activists and Bengalis nonviolently blockaded ships laden with U.S military and economic aid to West Pakistan. Working strategically, the activists secured the support of the International Longshoremen’s Association (the U.S equivalent of the MUA) whose labour was necessary to load the ships. The International Longshoremen’s Association then agreed to institute

⁵¹ Confidential source.

⁵² *Memorandum of Understanding*, 24th October 2000.

bans. This campaign successfully helped undermine the legitimacy of U.S foreign policy towards Pakistan at the time.⁵³

Nonviolent action intended to persuade key social groups, particularly workers, to withdraw their support from the Australian government's and Australian-based arms companies' support for arming the TNI, will assist efforts to undermine the legitimacy of Australian support for Indonesia's occupation of West Papua. Unions may not necessarily be persuaded to take action themselves, but nonviolent action that shares the cost of struggle with workers, can induce and compel unions and workers to stand in solidarity.⁵⁴

Although the United States is the principal provider of military training to the TNI, the ADF is also an important provider of training to the Indonesian military. Despite the popular impression that Australia ceased to arm and train the Indonesian military after the Indonesian military and militia orchestrated violence in East Timor in September 1999, 'Australia maintained defence relations with TNI. At no time was the relationship severed. ADF and TNI personnel remained in each other's country throughout the crisis period.'⁵⁵

In the 1999 to 2000 financial year Australia trained 56 members of the Indonesian military. During the last financial year (2000/2001) this figure increased to 72. These soldiers were trained at bases around Australia and at Australian universities.⁵⁶ For the last two years the total cost to the Australian taxpayer is over \$10 million dollars.⁵⁷ At this stage the training includes non-combat training with all sectors of the TNI, including the notorious Indonesian special forces, KOPASSUS. However, combat training is expected to resume in due course. Any arming and training of the Indonesian military by Australia not only supports the organisational capacity and effectiveness of the Indonesian military to maintain their occupation in West Papua, it also helps legitimise the TNI's role in society, politics and business and is a clear indication that the international community will not try too hard to hold the TNI accountable for past human rights violations.

Since serving in East Timor and witnessing the devastation and suffering caused by the TNI, ADF personnel have become increasingly politicised about Australia's defence relationship with Indonesia.⁵⁸ As a result, not only could the ADF be influenced by external public dissent about

⁵³ Taylor, *Blockade*.

⁵⁴ Robert Burrowes, 'Jupiter Island Blockaded in the Yarra River', *Nonviolence Today* No. 8 June/July 1989: pp. 8-9.

⁵⁵ Commonwealth, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Representatives, June 22nd 2001, Question No. 3642, Senator Minchin representing the Minister for Defence.

⁵⁶ Commonwealth, *Parliamentary Debates*.

⁵⁷ Commonwealth, *Parliamentary Debates*.

⁵⁸ Conversations with former and serving soldiers. The leaks from the DSD, I believe, are also an indication of the ADF's politicisation over East Timor.

defence-related activities with the TNI, the ADF is also subject to internal dissent within the military and defence department. One strategic goal of nonviolent action should therefore be to help create and widen spaces for internal dissent within the ADF and Defence Department. This will help undermine the power of the ADF and the Australian government to support TNI repression, not just in West Papua but throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

As Cortright and Watts have shown, dissent within the armed forces is more widespread than is popularly believed.⁵⁹ Top secret intelligence information was leaked to sympathetic supporters when it became clear the government was not taking into consideration information that clearly showed the TNI were responsible for militia violence in East Timor but was instead pursuing its own agenda and interests.⁶⁰ This dissent has continued. Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) staff, deeply disappointed that this information has still not been shared with UN staff investigating serious crimes in East Timor, recently exposed the cover-up by leaking documents to *The Age*.⁶¹ Amongst many ADF personnel, one officer says half-jokingly, TNI stands for 'Trust No Indonesian'.⁶² The previously staunch apologist for Suharto, former minister for foreign affairs, Gareth Evans, who once claimed that the invasion of East Timor was 'irreversible' now admits (to his credit) that 'many of our earlier training efforts helped only to produce more professional human rights abusers.'⁶³ As the TNI continues its campaign of repression throughout Indonesia, and support for independence gains momentum, both dissent within and without the ADF will grow.

Undermining Australian-based corporate support for the occupation: corporate campaigns.

As we saw in Chapter One, West Papua is a lucrative source of wealth for the TNI who operate hand-in-glove with global capital. Chapter three demonstrated that in some situations oppressors do not want the people of a territory they occupy, they want the land. Tom Beanal, an Amungme tribal leader and chairperson of the PDP asks: 'Could it be that the Indonesian government is drawn to Irian Jaya not by its people but by its natural resources?'⁶⁴ To continue to extract these resources, multinational companies do not significantly depend on the people whose land they exploit, but on the support of

⁵⁹ Cortright and Watts, *Left Face*.

⁶⁰ Ball, 'Silent Witness'.

⁶¹ Hamish McDonald, 'Defence finds Indonesian Commanders linked to Timor Violence', *The Age*, 14th March 2001. See also the article by Andrew West quoting defence leaks over Australian government cover-ups of the Biak massacre

⁶² 'Under the Scar Tissue', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21st March 2001. This attitude has been confirmed to me in personal conversations with ADF soldiers who served in East Timor (April 2002).

⁶³ Gareth Evans, 'Indonesia's Military Culture has to be Reformed': comment by Gareth Evans first published in the *International Herald Tribune*, 24th July 2001, posted on the *International Crisis Group* website, <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=368>, accessed 27th February 2002.

⁶⁴ Abrash and Kennedy, 'Repressive Mining in West Papua', 71.

employees, contractors, unions, shareholders, investment fund managers, international financial institutions and export credit, finance and insurance agencies as well as governments and public opinion. This relationship has transnational dimensions. This section will examine the vulnerability of Freeport to potential solidarity campaigns as a result of the company's dependency on the support of social groups in societies like Australia.

The Freeport mine, is significantly dependent on Australia. Freeport McMoRan is a United States based transnational company with its head office in New Orleans. However, its supply base is located in Australia. Coordinated by the Cairns-based 100% owned Australian purveying company, International Purveying Incorporated (IPI), 'some 740 Australian companies supply the gargantuan gold and copper mine, including 296 in Cairns'.⁶⁵ According to the chair of the Cairns Chamber of Commerce, Freeport (through IPI) is the largest purchaser of goods in Cairns generating at least AUS \$50-70 million dollars worth of business for local companies each year. Fruit and vegetables for Freeport employees are supplied by Tong Sing, a Cairns based supplier.⁶⁶ Beef is supplied from cattle stations in the Northern Territory, some of which are believed to be owned by the Bakrie Brothers, an Indonesian conglomerate which has 10% shares in PT Freeport Indonesia.⁶⁷ The vast bulk of these goods, along with a range of materials necessary for maintaining the infrastructure of the mine and the three townships that supply the mine, are transported to West Papua every ten days by Freeport's supply ship, the *Java Sea*. Freight is also supplied by air from Darwin⁶⁸ and Cairns.⁶⁹ In addition, most of the expatriate employees, including several hundred contractors, regularly fly into either Darwin or Cairns on recreational leave.⁷⁰

Freeport is also heavily supported by the Australian British mining giant Rio Tinto, a company whose name is 'synonymous with abuse of social, labour, environmental and human rights wherever

⁶⁵ Confidential source and George J. Aditjondro, 'Remembering Ok Tedi, and Forgetting Panguna and Tembagapura: Lessons learned from contrasting the publicity in Australia about the three most disastrous mining cases in Melanesia', Donald Denoon et al (eds), *Mining and Mineral Resource Policy Issues in Asia-Pacific: Prospects for the 21st Century: Proceedings of the Conference at the Australian National University*, Canberra, A.N.U, 1-3 November 1995: pp.191-195.

⁶⁶ Confidential source, December 2001. 'Ten years ago, Freeport dismissed the right of the Amungme people to supply fruit and vegetables to the company and decided to support them from Australia and Java' (see Inside Indonesia., 'Goldman winner', Inside Indonesia – West Papua: Towards a new Papua, July No. 67 September 2001: 14).

⁶⁷ Aditjondro, 'Remembering Ok Tedi, and Forgetting Panguna and Tembagapura', 192. For updates on the Northern Territory Governments intention to secure a greater share of Freeport's business see the Office of Resource Development, www.dme.nt.gov/ord/supply/pm_supply.htm accessed 23rd November 2001.

⁶⁸ Phillip Game, 'Gold in them thar hills', *The Age*, June 27th 2000. Qantas Airlink and Northern Gateway flies direct from Darwin to Timika every week.

⁶⁹ Confidential source, December 2001.

⁷⁰ Confidential source, December 2001.

they operate.⁷¹ Rio Tinto, holds an effective 20% stake in Freeport's West Papua operations through its 13% equity stake in Freeport McMoRan.⁷² In addition, Rio Tinto hold a 40% of the Grasberg deposit.

As we also saw in Chapter One, Freeport is locked into an uneasy alliance with the TNI who provide security and operate legal and illegal businesses around the mine. According to Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), human rights violations 'are directly connected to [the TNI] ... acting as protection for the mining business of PT Freeport Indonesia.'⁷³ Because the TNI is so intimately involved with Freeport, the Amungme people have concluded that 'the root cause of the human rights violations is Freeport'.⁷⁴ Consequently, it is important to link campaigns to alter the will and undermine the power of both the Australian military and corporations based in Australia.

International campaigns of nonviolent action in solidarity with nonviolent action in West Papua will strengthen Amungme and Kamoro demands to Freeport.⁷⁵ As well as directing campaigns at the directors of Freeport itself, campaigns should be directed at the key social groups that support Freeport: employees, contractors, unions, shareholders, investment fund managers, international financial institutions, insurance and export credit agencies, governments and public opinion. These campaigns should be designed to alter the will of these groups to support Freeport and undermine their power to do so until the company respects Amungme and Kamoro wishes.

The two major Australian unions associated with Freeport are the MUA, who handle freight to and from the mine and the CFMEU, whose members work at the mine. Every ten days or so, MUA stevedores at the Cairns dock load and unload freight from the *Java Sea*. Freeport is extremely vulnerable to nonviolent blockades at both Cairns and also in Darwin, the company's other supply base. Although it is increasingly costly for unions like the MUA to take solidarity action due to new

⁷¹ Project Underground, *Risky Business*, 2. Environmental destruction, social dislocation and exploitation at Rio Tinto's Panguna copper mine in Bougainville precipitated a civil war whose embers are still smoldering. The mine remains closed. Rio Tinto is also the current owner of the Jabiluka uranium mine, the scene of blockade during 1997 and a national and international campaign of nonviolent action in solidarity with the Mirrar. Currently there is a moratorium on mining. The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) is also currently embroiled in an industrial dispute with the Rio Tinto over the company's attempt to de-unionise the workforce.

⁷² Abrash, 'The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport'.

⁷³ Komnas HAM cited in Abrash, 'The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport'. Although it is widely known that the TNI have used Freeport equipment to detain and transport West Papuans and to carry the TNI on military operations, Freeport's involvement in human rights violations has never been investigated (Abrash, 'The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport').

⁷⁴ Abrash, 'The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport'.

⁷⁵ See Abrash, 'The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport' and Abrash and Kennedy, 'Repressive Mining in West Papua', 62.

industrial relations laws, unions may be induced or compelled to take action or to remain neutral by a campaign of nonviolent action.⁷⁶

Mining companies such as Freeport are heavily dependent on large injections of capital and support from insurance agencies and export credit agencies to begin, expand and continue resource extraction.⁷⁷ Increasingly this finance is being politicised. For example, in 1994, as a result of widespread environmental and human rights concerns, the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) cancelled Freeport's political risk insurance.⁷⁸

There are also opportunities for people to engage a company, (for example through shareholder resolutions),⁷⁹ or for individuals (and organisations), such as ethical fund managers, to be induced to take action themselves or be compelled to take action by others.⁸⁰ Freeport's shareholders have already raised concerns at shareholder meetings in the past.⁸¹ Aware of the politicisation of their activities that results from such public action, Freeport and the TNI blocked Amungme leader, Yosepha Alomang from attending Rio Tinto's 1998 AGM in London.⁸² Directing campaigns at organisations and individuals and organisations that finance companies like Freeport are sources of leverages. According to Hugh Morgan, the CEO of the Australian-based mining transnational, WMC (Western Mining Corporation), financial restraints caused by the increasing requirement to be culturally and environmentally sensitive coupled with the increasing difficulty of securing capital, 'are effectively "starving" the mining industry of funds'.⁸³

Despite the company's arrogant and cavalier style, Freeport is significantly dependent on the consent and cooperation of key social groups to continue exploitation and repression in West Papua. A mosaic of nonviolent actions are possible ranging from reform to fundamental change. A nonviolent strategy could help coordinate and guide these actions and help de-legitimise and politicise the activity

⁷⁶ See for instance Burrowes, 'Jupiter Island Blockaded in the Yarra River'.

⁷⁷ The Australian government agency that assists Australian companies in the majority (developing) world is the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) (Oxfam Community Aid Abroad., *The Globalisation Challenge*, pp. 32-33).

⁷⁸ OPIC stated that the mine had "created and continues to pose unreasonable or major environmental, health or safety hazards with respect to the rivers that are being impacted by the tailings, the surrounding terrestrial ecosystem and the local inhabitants." Freeport's average daily deposition of the tailings has doubled since OPIC's 1994 assessment.' See Abrash, 'The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport'.

⁷⁹ James Rose, *Ethical and Active Shareholding*, Elsternwick, Victoria, Australia, Wrightbooks, 2001: pp. 92-101.

⁸⁰ For example Westpac Bank was a major target of Jabiluka protests because of its investment in North Limited who was mining Jabiluka uranium mine before they were bought out by Rio Tinto. For the time being Rio Tinto has placed a moratorium on mining Jabiluka.

⁸¹ See John Rumbiak's criticism of Freeport at Freeport's website, <http://www.fcx.com/news/051401.pdf>, accessed 16th May 2001.

⁸² Abrash, 'The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport'.

⁸³ Cited in Geoff Evans, James Goodman and Nina Lansbury, 'Politicising Finance', Geoff Evans, James Goodman and Nina Lansbury (eds.), *Moving Mountains: Communities confront mining and globalisation*, Otford (Sydney), Otford Press, 2001: pp. 61-81.

of TNCs such as Freeport. Importantly they will also help maximise the effectiveness of nonviolent action inside West Papua. Visible solidarity will also strengthen the morale of the resistance.

Conclusion

Nonviolent action for self-determination in West Papua is waged in a number of domains: the struggle inside West Papua; engaging the TNI inside West Papua; engaging Indonesia's domestic constituencies; and engaging constituencies within the societies of Indonesia's elite allies that support the occupation. Failure to identify the oppressors centre of gravity will inevitably result in serious strategic shortcomings of any nonviolent campaign. This chapter concluded by briefly examining some of the ways elites in Australia support the occupation, highlighting the focus of potential nonviolent campaigns of solidarity action.

The challenge for nonviolent activists in West Papua and the solidarity movement, are twofold. First, to analyse the key sources of power which Indonesia and Indonesia's key allies are dependent on to sustain the occupation, whilst also strengthening and expanding the network of groups that support the resistance. Second, to design a series of strategic nonviolent campaigns to alter the will of key constituencies that support the problem and undermine their power to do so. In addition to the importance of a strategy, because Indonesia depends on the support of key international allies, solidarity action in the societies of those allies is crucial if nonviolent struggle inside West Papua is to be effective. Nonviolent action by West Papuans will undermine the legitimacy of Indonesian rule while legitimising international solidarity. International solidarity action will amplify West Papuans demands and boost local morale. By revealing Australian diplomatic, military and corporate support for Indonesia's occupation of West Papua, I have highlighted the vulnerability of Indonesia's continued rule and demonstrated the potential of international nonviolent solidarity campaigns to maximise the effectiveness of a nonviolent strategy for self-determination in West Papua.

Conclusion

This thesis began with a question: how can the nonviolent struggle in West Papua maximise its effectiveness? In seeking to answer this question, I have examined the causes of the conflict, and the nonviolent struggle to date. I have argued that the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua will be dramatically enhanced by developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy of nonviolence. The strategy includes coordinated solidarity campaigns. Even without strategic guidance nonviolence is extremely powerful but a coordinated and comprehensive strategy will significantly focus and strengthen the struggle..

The purpose of a nonviolent strategy in West Papua is to create the policy, process, structural, and systemic conditions that will satisfy human needs. In West Papua, these needs include self-determination, the protection of human rights and an end to structural violence. Two strategic aims guide the strategy. The first strategic aim is to consolidate the power and will of the nonviolent resistance to resist the aggression. This requires developing networks of West Papuan, Indonesian and international groups to assist the struggle. The second strategic aim is to alter Indonesia's will to maintain the occupation of West Papua, and to undermine its power to do so. These strategic aims would be realised through campaigns guided by a modified version of Burrowes' strategic framework.

Campaigns should be designed to achieve clear and specific intermediate strategic goals. The objective of campaigns inside West Papua and solidarity campaigns outside West Papua, should be to re-create the conditions for dialogue in Indonesia and the international arena. It remains to be seen whether the Special Autonomy package can meet both West Papuan and Indonesian needs. To date, the signs are not promising, although there may be limited opportunities to discuss human rights and development issues. Given the collapse of dialogue and a return to repression beginning from August 2000 it is unlikely that further attempts at dialogue will convince Jakarta of West Papua's need for self-determination. If the will of Indonesian elites cannot be altered, then strategic campaigns of nonviolent action need to be directed at undermining Indonesia's power to avoid a problem-solving dialogue. Campaigns of nonviolent action need to be directed at inducing and compelling the key social groups inside Indonesia and Internationally to withdraw their support for the occupation.

Jakarta is indirectly dependent on key social groups that support its international allies. Therefore, solidarity campaigns need to be designed to alter the will and undermine the support of the social groups that support Indonesia's elite allies. I have demonstrated Indonesia's vulnerable indirect dependency on key social groups in Australia by examining three key ways Australian elites support

the occupation. Given the high levels of elite support for Indonesia's continued occupation of West Papua in Australia, a solidarity campaign intended to induce or compel key social groups to withdraw their consent and cooperation is imperative.

This thesis has also been a reflection on practice, and written with a specific purpose: to reflect on how Australian nonviolent activists can best support the nonviolent struggle in West Papua. Because Australia exports terror, ecological destruction and social dislocation to West Papua, Australians are ethically compelled to act in solidarity with people in West Papua. As Australians committed to doing justice, our task is to transform Australia. In doing so, the perennial hope is that we will not only make Australia a more just, peaceful and sustainable place, but that we will help make our region and even the world, a better place too. It is extremely naïve to expect that government, corporate and military elites will change their policy just because we ask. As can be seen in the case of West Papua, those policies protect powerful vested interests, secured and maintained by military violence.

Inspired by West Papuans themselves, this thesis has been written in the belief that ordinary people in Australia do not have to be resigned to playing out the role of passive observers of the world outside their window, but can be the subjects of history. It is a great privilege and joy to accompany those who struggle for freedom. Doing so is a small way we can share the cost of the struggle with our sisters and brothers in West Papua and throughout our region. Self-determination in West Papua will take time. There will be a cost. But it can be done.

Postscript

The Road to a New Papua

by Benny Giay¹

*The road to a New Papua,
free from fear, manipulation
and intimidation is a long one,
but it has to be trod.*

*Many thorn bushes litter the path.
That is why the journey must be
well planned, and Papuans
[accompanied by those who walk in solidarity]
must undertake it in a great spirit
of liberty. So may it be.*

¹ Giay, 'Towards a New Papua', 9 (slightly adapted).