

#### 4. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

As noted in chapter 1, Indonesia will not allow Irian Jaya to become independent. To do so would be to invite the disintegration of the Republic.<sup>1</sup> Realistically, the best that can be hoped for is a realisation on the part of the national and provincial authorities that the scope and pace of development programs in Irian Jaya should take greater account of the wishes of the Irianese people. Further, security incidents should be seen by the military as a manifestation of dissatisfaction with government policy and the implementation of policy. If more attention was given to resolving the underlying causes of dissatisfaction rather than to heavy-handed retribution, the likelihood of prolonged dissatisfaction in the province would be lessened considerably.

Warnings on the negative aspects of development programs are clear enough. In 1983, for example, the then Kodam commander advised the government to reduce transmigration because it had made the Irianese 'feel like strangers in their own land'.<sup>2</sup> Transmigration has since slowed considerably, but this is probably due more to the low soil fertility, lack of suitable sites, and the high cost of the program<sup>3</sup> than to a desire to take account of the sensitivities of the Irianese people. Another former commander warned against encouraging Irianese to eat rice

and the danger of immigrants from Makasar (Sulawesi) establishing economic and trade monopolies.<sup>4</sup> He noted that the lack of employment and educational opportunities for the indigenous Irianese, together with their treatment as second-class citizens, were contributing factors to public support for the OPM.<sup>5</sup> Provincial development reports make the point that the Irianese people should be given more say in the formulation and implementation of development programs.<sup>6</sup> Until the aspirations of the Irianese are given full attention, many of the indigenous inhabitants of Irian Jaya will remain reluctant to accept the authority of the Indonesian government.

The powerful influence of the media, the widespread use of the Indonesian language<sup>7</sup> and the strong ideological focus in education are all reasons for the gradual but coerced integration of the province into the larger Indonesian society. On the other hand, the arrival of large numbers of migrants from outside the province, the alienation of traditional land, the harshness of the military, the treatment of the Irianese as culturally backward and efforts to effect a cultural transformation provide reasons for the continuance of dissatisfaction.

The military's support for development programs is a further reason for continued dissatisfaction. For the military, development has both a physical and a mental dimension. It encompasses not only economic measures to improve the welfare of the people, but also cultural assimilation, transmigration and programs to develop an awareness of Indonesia's national philosophy and system of total people's defence. Some of these

programs are the root cause of the dissatisfaction. Nonetheless, they are likely to be supported vigorously by the military because development is perceived to be the remedy for security problems and lack of development the cause of the problems.<sup>8</sup> In the absence of a dramatic change to the military's role in social and political affairs, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the dissatisfaction of many Irianese with the Indonesian system will continue for some time yet.

On a broader level, the dissatisfaction of many Irianese with government policies will continue to have an irritating effect on regional security and international relations. Dissident activity in Irian Jaya periodically spills over the border through the use by OPM separatists of Papua New Guinea as a safe haven, the pursuit of rebels across the border by Indonesian troops, and the crossing of Irianese into Papua New Guinea to seek refuge. From the Indonesian perspective, the Papua New Guinea government was considered to have tacitly sympathised with the OPM cause<sup>9</sup> and to be half-hearted in fulfilling its agreement not to allow its territory to be used for hostile acts against Indonesia.<sup>10</sup> Despite successful efforts by both governments to increase communication, cooperation and mutual understanding over the past years,<sup>11</sup> continued dissatisfaction in Irian Jaya is likely to give rise to occasional tension between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea which, inevitably, will have a negative effect on the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

## Notes to Chapter 4:

1. R.J. May (ed.), *Between Two Nations*, Robert Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1986, p.69.
2. David Jenkins, 'The trickle that threatens to become a flood', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 December 1985, p.12. Cautionary voices were heard well before this. See George Aditjondro, 'Marthin Indey, Pilar Perjuangan Pembesaran Irian Barat di Jayapura', (Marthin Indey: A Pillar of Support in Jayapura of West Irian's Struggle for Freedom), *Prisma*, 2, 1987, p.126.
3. Arndt in R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.172; George Monbiot, *Poisoned Arrows*, Michael Joseph, London, 1989, pp.38-9; Lavalin International and Hasfarm Dian Konsultan, *Regional Development Planning for Irian Jaya*, September 1988, pp.20, 28.
4. Kahpi Suriadireja, 'Pengembangan Irian Jaya ditinjau dari segi ketahanan nasional', (Development in Irian Jaya from the viewpoint of national resilience), Manuel Kasiepo et al. (eds), *Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedalaman Irian Jaya*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1987, pp.54, 58.
5. *ibid.*, pp.54, 64.
6. Lavalin International, *op. cit.*, pp.20, 28.
7. Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: The Transformation of a Melanesian Economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, p.91.
8. E.P. Wolfers, *Beyond the Border*, UPNG and USP, Waigani and Suva, 1988, p.89.
9. Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, Malmsbury, pp.50-4, 59; R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.105.
10. Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Republic of Indonesia, 27 October 1986, Article 9.
11. See, for example, *Post Courier*, Port Moresby, 11 December 1990, p.2 and 13 December 1990, p.2; *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, (Armed Forces Daily), 4 August 1990, p.1, 3 September 1990, p.V1, 4 October 1990, p.V11 and 13 December 1990, p.1; *Indonesian Observer*, 24 July 1990, p.1, and 28 July 1990, p.1; and *Indonesia Times*, 28 September 1990, p.3.