

CHAPTER SEVEN

WEST IRIAN 1968 Part 2

Ortiz Sanz's Arrival and First Tour of West Irian

In the second half of 1968, Antara reported uprisings in the southern border area around Merauke, with people fleeing over the border into Australian New Guinea.¹ In Bird's Head it was reported:

Near Sorong the death of fourteen soldiers in an OPM ambush was followed by shelling from the sea. Villages named Sausapor and Makbon suffered many casualties. Then marines were put ashore.²

There were also reports given by Papuans to UN officials of attacks on villages in Biak by Indonesian troops:

On 29 July 1968 the village Arwan in North Biak was burned down by troops; the village Manganjapur/Manbumbo in North Biak was burned down and the village Workrar in North Biak was burned down. North Biak was mortared 7 times.³

However, on 12 August, after a special cabinet meeting to discuss security, the Indonesian government announced that recent operations against the rebels had resulted in 162 being killed and 3,200 surrendering. Nonetheless, although the Arfak rebellion had been virtually crushed, some of the rebels remained active, including the two leaders, the Mandatjan brothers.⁴

The day of the government announcement was also the day that Ortiz Sanz arrived in Jakarta from New York. Three days later he was invited to attend an

address of State delivered by President Suharto who took the opportunity to express his views on West Irian. He described the new educational opportunities available in the territory and asserted that governmental positions were now open to the Irianese. On the subject of the Act, Suharto reaffirmed that Indonesia would implement the agreement, although he stated that the Papuans had already made clear their strong desire to remain with Indonesia.⁵

Referring to Ortiz Sanz, he added that the UNRWI's role would be to co-operate and help Indonesia in deciding how best to implement the final phase of the Agreement.⁶ In private, Suharto informed Ortiz Sanz that he could count on his personal support and co-operation in carrying out his responsibilities. In turn, Ortiz Sanz informed U Thant that he believed Indonesia intended to act in good faith in implementing the Act.⁷

Overall, Ortiz Sanz and his team found the Indonesian hospitality in Jakarta generous in marked contrast to what he was to experience in West Irian. This was in fact part of an Indonesian campaign to pressure the UN into basing itself in Jakarta, while limiting as far as possible its presence in West Irian, a tactic which Western diplomats were well aware of⁸ as was Ortiz Sanz.⁹

On 23 August, the UNRWI arrived in Sukarnapura to begin his first visit to West Irian. Three days later he and three of his staff left the capital on a ten-day, 3000-mile tour by air of the territory. Accompanying them throughout the trip were Sudjarwo, and around eight Indonesian officials. The whole journey was planned and directed by the Indonesians, for which Ortiz Sanz was grateful,

although he was aware that their presence ensured he was only shown “one side of the coin.”¹⁰ Nonetheless, he appeared to have been genuinely impressed with what he considered to be Indonesian achievements:

...if what we saw and heard could be indications of the success of Indonesian efforts in the Territory since its takeover, the Government must be given credit for progress in elementary education, the process of assimilation through use of a common language, school integration and apparent efforts at fraternization.¹¹

These observations were remarkable in that they demonstrate Ortiz Sanz’s apparent readiness to accept much of the Indonesian version of events, while ignoring evidence clandestinely passed to him by Papuans. Even Hastings did not attempt to defend Jakarta’s record, and writing in August 1968, declared that Indonesia’s administration of the territory had been “nothing short of calamitous.”¹²

It seems surprising that while Ortiz Sanz’s first report to U Thant referred to Papuan opposition to Indonesia, it made no mention of the rebellions and repression, or the economic and political stagnation described by other observers. While he was very unlikely to have witnessed any of this on his Indonesian-guided tour, he would have been aware of these allegations. In addition, although he had had little opportunity to talk to ordinary Papuans, he did receive various reports and petitions during his visit. If accurate, one in particular sheds some light on Indonesia’s orchestration of the visit:

[The petitioners] request the UN Representative to visit all prisons and free many Papuans who were...arrested on 23 August 1968 when they tried to demonstrate on the occasion of the arrival of the UN Representative in the territory.¹³

Any accurate report on the situation in the territory by such a senior UN official should have given at least some consideration of this evidence.

Nonetheless, Ortiz Sanz did report to the Secretary-General that the Papuans had not been given any information by Indonesia about the Act, and he stated that on his return to Jakarta, he would strongly recommend that an “enlightenment campaign” be initiated in the territory.¹⁴ On the central issue of the method to be adopted for the Act, Ortiz Sanz indicated that he was well aware of Indonesia’s intentions. His comments also reiterated the UN’s acceptance that a plebiscite was not an option for West Irian:

We know in advance that the ideal principle of ‘one-man-one-vote’ cannot be applied in all areas of the Territory, both on account of the terrain and the lack of sophistication of vast segments of the population. This being the case, we may have no choice but to try to consult, in a collective way, the largest possible number of inhabitants of the Territory. We also know that the Indonesian Government, which seems not to be very sure about the results of the consultation, will try, by all means at its disposal, to reduce the number of individuals, representatives and institutions to be consulted.¹⁵

On this issue, Ortiz Sanz accurately predicted that the main contention between the Indonesians and himself in the coming months would centre around this Indonesian objective:

...they will be trying to hold for the smallest and possibly the most hand-picked group of individuals or bodies to be involved in the process of consultation, while I will be asking all the time for the enlargement of the councils and other representative bodies in order to be able to prove, that we did indeed try to provide as democratic a basis as was possible to ascertain the real will of the population.¹⁶

Although the UNRWI appeared genuinely appreciative of Indonesian assistance during his first tour, he was aware that too close an association could leave him open to accusations that his presence simply bestowed credibility on the proceedings while failing to have any influence. With this in mind, he thanked Sudjarwo on 5 September for his invaluable help during the first tour and described it as a complete success.¹⁷ At the same time, he concluded by expressing his desire to conduct future tours of the territory without the benefit of an Indonesian escort.¹⁸

Papuan Opinion and Eye Witness Accounts.

The final matter to which Ortiz Sanz drew U Thant's attention in his report was the petitions and complaints that he had received from Papuans during his tour. He described these as expressing either opposition to the Indonesian Government, or the New York Agreement itself:

Regrettably, we, the United Nations, have not been given any executive authority by the Agreement to deal with these grievances under such circumstances. All that we can do is to communicate the complaints to the Government without mentioning, of course, the names of the authors, and suggesting to them to find sensible ways of dealing with this problem. As this is one of the major issues with which I am faced, I would like to have the benefit of your views.¹⁹

In fact, by the time he drafted his report to U Thant on 6 September, Ortiz Sanz had recorded receiving a total of 36 "political communications" from various local individuals or groups. Eight were from pro-Indonesian either tribal chiefs, or political parties or organisations. Their submissions were almost identical, referring to the unity of Indonesia "from Sabang to Merauke", as proclaimed in August

1945, and rejecting the need for the Act. The other 26 were anti-Indonesian, apart from which simply requested a meeting with Ortiz Sanz.

These anti-Indonesian petitions, reports, resolutions and statements were similar in many respects. Virtually all of them called for the Act to be conducted on a 'one man one vote' basis rather than through the Representative Councils. This they said, was because the councils were appointed by Indonesia and forbidden from criticising the administration. The point was also made that 'one man one vote' was the most democratic method to use. Another frequent appeal was for the replacement of the Indonesian administration by the UN until the Act had taken place. Most also wanted the Indonesian military to be replaced by a UN security force in order to ensure political freedom.

Many communications also called for the release of all political prisoners estimated by one individual to number up to 900 detained around the territory. They also called for exiled Papuans to be allowed back to take part in the Act. The anti-Indonesian communications dismissed the pro-Indonesian petitions as the result of Indonesian coercion of various tribal chiefs and councillors. Accusations of Indonesian brutality and oppression were another frequent feature. In addition, quite a few of the communications offered particularly detailed assessments of the situation and made suggestions concerning the Act and West Irian's future generally. One typical example from 'a civic group' proposed:

- 1) In order to achieve a climate of peace in West Irian before the 1969 'election,' most of Indonesia's military forces should be withdrawn and UN security forces should be sent to the territory.

- 2) The UN and the Indonesian Government should guarantee freedom of thought, assembly, press and the right of the people to organise political parties;
- 3) All political prisoners should be released, and those who are in exile in Java should be allowed to return to the territory so that they may participate in the elections.
- 4) The 'plebiscite' should be based on the principle of 'one-man-one-vote' and not on the vote of the representative councils because they do not represent the people but the Government of Indonesia and do not conform to the stipulations regarding the formation of the councils.²⁰

Other comments and suggestions received by Ortiz Sanz included one simply stating that the Papuans did not want to be part of Indonesia "with its chaotic economy which will only bring famine." There were also calls for proper information and radio broadcasts on the Act and the establishment of a "National Papuan Army," under the control of a UN administration. One organisation suggested that two political parties should be established, one for, and one against retaining ties with Indonesia. They would then be permitted to campaign freely in advance of a general election. There were also complaints that Indonesian immigrants came only to "steal the wealth" of the territory rather than develop it. One letter accepted the need for some indirect method of voting, but only in a few isolated areas, such as parts of the highlands. Another petitioner stated that Papuans were historically, ethnically and culturally different from the Indonesians, adding that the New York Agreement had bought peace for the signatories but made victims of the Papuans.²¹

No one would seriously argue that the wishes of the Papuan people could be accurately assessed from these 36 communications. But an experienced diplomat and politician like Ortiz Sanz would have been left in no doubt after his

first visit that significant sections of the more politically aware population were prepared to risk the displeasure of the authorities to offer him a variety of suggestions on how best to guarantee genuine self-determination.

Ortiz Sanz's visit was not the only opportunity that dissatisfied Papuans had during August to alert the international community to their grievances. On 10 August, a Reuters correspondent arrived and spent two weeks in the territory. On his return he informed an Australian diplomat that every one of the 30 or so Papuans to whom he spoke was discontented with Jakarta, with the administration in West Irian, and with the absence of Papuan participation in the political and administrative process in the territory.²²

Ten days later, Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik began a four-day visit to West Irian accompanied by Justice Minister Senoadji, Manpower Minister Mursalin and 62 journalists, 32 of whom were from foreign agencies or newspapers. The purpose of this visit, according to Malik, was to show the world that Indonesia had nothing to hide in West Irian. Official statements emphasised that the journalists were able to talk freely with West Irian community leaders.²³ According to the journalists, however, there was almost no time to seek contacts of their own, and that when they did they were accompanied or soon found by Indonesian soldiers.²⁴

Commenting upon Malik's dialogue with the West Irian 'leaders' and coverage of this in the official reports, the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia noted:

Malik also emphasised that the implementation of the act of free choice did not mean giving freedom to the West Irian people because the West Irian people had been set free together with their brothers in the other parts of Indonesia when independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945.²⁵

Official reports then went on to describe how the Foreign Minister was given two pro-Indonesian resolutions by the “Movement to Maintain the August 17 Proclamation of National Independence,” and the “Sukarnapura chapter of the 1945 Generation.” Both pledged loyalty to Indonesia and described the Act as unnecessary. These reports however, coincided with claims made by an Australian missionary that the army “with their rifles at the ready” had “persuaded” the Papuans to sign these petitions.²⁶

Also questioning Indonesia’s official statements on West Irian were the foreign journalists who were present at the meetings with Malik. They reported that he was subjected to some bitter complaints and hard questioning, especially at a meeting with West Irianese members of the Provincial Legislative Assembly (DPRD), religious heads and other community leaders. Despite being hand-picked by the Indonesians, these leaders seemed encouraged by the presence of the press:

The Indonesians were charged with actively discouraging, sometimes by force, discussion of the issue among West Irianese, and fears were expressed about the Army’s attitude at the time of the act and especially if the vote went against Indonesia. Complaints were made about arbitrary arrests, the attitude of the Indonesian local authorities to freedom of assembly by West Irianese, Indonesian civil servants..., and the absence of any Papuan representatives when the New York agreement was being negotiated...After giving general assurances about arrests and freedom of assembly [Malik] said that he was ‘responsible before God’ that West Irian remain part of Indonesia. It was God’s will that West Irian stay within the Republic and all had to work together to ensure that this was so.²⁷

One correspondent present at a meeting in Biak added that Papuans, “who tentatively sought contact” with the journalists present, stated that the vast majority of the population were in favour of independence, but claimed that it was impossible to express themselves freely.²⁸

In late September 1968, Ian Morgan, Third Secretary at the British Embassy in Jakarta, also paid a visit to the territory. It was the first recorded visit of a British diplomat to West Irian and Morgan wrote a detailed report of the trip. Although he did not consider the Papuan rebels to be a serious threat to Indonesian rule, he made clear that their aspirations were shared by the bulk of the politically aware population:

Speaking to exactly 100 working-class Papuans in Sukarnapura [Jayapura] and Biak it became evident that the indigenous population is overwhelmingly unaware of the issues at stake and overwhelmingly in favour of independence from Indonesia - probably in that order. We were approached by one or two Papuans, notably the mayor of Biak, Yappo (phon.) and his assistant who made it clear that they all wanted ‘freedom’. This was confirmed by every single Papuan who was questioned on the roads and in the market places. We understand from a Norwegian journalist, Mr. Eric Sandberg who writes for the Oslo magazine ‘Na’ and Picture Post and who has been allowed to travel around the Central Highlands that the feeling there is very much the same...The fact is that, as most of them see it, it would not matter if independence would mean a total collapse of such an economy as West Irian has since the vast majority of them live on a subsistence level anyway, and its benefits are largely reaped by the Indonesians. ‘Freedom’ for many of them just means no more Javanese to push them about and tell them what to do.²⁹

He also spoke to Stein Rooerd, the Norwegian FUNDWI official, Rooerd discussed investment opportunities in the territory and lamented the failure of British industry to involve itself in this. Significantly he also revealed that the huge American corporation Freeport Sulphur was deliberately underestimating the value

of the mineral wealth it was uncovering at Ertsberg mountain in the Western Highlands. In what appears on the face of it to be a description of insider dealing, Morgan writes:

In strictest confidence Mr. ROOERD told me that Freeport Sulphur have really 'struck it rich' in the Ertsberg. After investing [US]\$3 million in drilling operations, they disclosed samples of 2.5% copper omitting to mention that this was the mean content whereas the thick top level contains 4.6% copper. The same samples have 40% iron, 0.3% silver and 0.02 ounces of gold per ton. Over the past few months they have gloomily suspended operations which has caused their shares to drop on Wall Street. This is exactly what was expected and intended. These shares were then mysteriously bought by a person or persons unknown. Mr. ROOERD said that they are now ready to invest U.S.\$100,000,000 in one of the biggest operations this decade....The contract involves a complete tax holiday for 5 years, a further slightly penalised holiday for 15 years before paying full royalties. Profits are expected to be enormous and I have heard several stories and seen a sample which indicate that the gold content may be very much higher than has been stated in the Bechtel-Pomeroy Mining Consultants' Report.³⁰

Freeport Sulphur was the first foreign company to invest in Indonesia after Suharto lifted restrictions in 1967. In 1970 the company constructed a 110 kilometre pipeline from the coast to Tembagapura, a new town built to service the mine. By 1973 the mine was in full operation and in the first seven years alone, U.S. Japanese and West German investors were receiving returns of 12.9 per cent. By 1990 an estimated US\$125,000,000 in profits were leaving the territory every year, in addition to the five per cent in tax paid to Jakarta.³¹ As a FUNDWI official, Rooerd's complicity with Freeport's deceit was at the very least questionable. One can also deduce that Freeport's lucrative agreement with the Jakarta regime was a factor in the willingness of Western governments to accept whatever policy Indonesia chose to adopt with regard to Papuan self-determination.

Morgan believed that it was probably better that West Irian should remain with Indonesia which, with UN assistance, “may be able to make something of it.”

He also added:

We have after all only just finished fighting a very expensive war to prevent the same chauvinistic nation grabbing two or three other small and defenceless countries. Besides it is simply no business of ours.³²

To conclude, the British diplomat reflected:

It is regrettable, of course, that the Indonesians have already made it clear that they do not propose to honour Article 18 (D) stipulating the eligibility of all adults to take part in the deliberations and that they have already broken Article 22 (I) which stipulates freedom of assembly. But then both articles were absurd anyway and both parties to the agreement must have known that they could not possibly be carried out.

Naturally one sympathises with the natives but colonialism is not always such a bad thing, indeed it is often beneficial and it may be that in the fullness of time, many years hence, Indonesia will feel that West Irian is ready to go it alone supported by the wealth beneath and above her soil, perhaps in partnership with her eastern neighbour, and forget the delusions of grandeur which she can ill afford. It may be but I doubt it.³³

Accommodation Problems for the UN.

Following his return to Jakarta on 13 September, the UNRWI raised the subject of an acute shortage of accommodation and office space for himself and his team in Sukarnapura. Indonesia’s approach to providing accommodation in the territory contrasted sharply with the extravagance shown in Jakarta. In reply, Sudjarwo claimed that sufficient accommodation was very difficult to provide in Sukarnapura.³⁴

Ortiz Sanz wrote back to the Indonesians on 7 October and made clear the importance that he attached to the issue. Declaring that he needed three houses immediately, he dismissed an earlier Indonesian offer of two rooms for office space as, “not at all conducive to an efficient operation of even the present small number of the members of the mission.”³⁵ Outlining further housing and office space requirements over the coming three months, Ortiz Sanz concluded by emphasising the reasonableness of his requests, while at the same time reasserting his intentions to spend the majority of his time in West Irian. He also reminded Sudjarwo that accommodation had not been a problem for 130 UN staff and the Pakistani UNSF during the UNTEA administration.³⁶

Three weeks later Ortiz Sanz was again obliged to bring the subject up. Referring to the arrival in November of two more of his officials in West Irian, he informed Sudjarwo that the UN mission’s housing need had become even more acute.³⁷

In December, Ortiz Sanz also briefed Rolz-Bennett in New York on the ongoing housing problems. Commenting on the ample time that he had given Indonesia to solve this issue he stated:

...the difficulties in this regard are not due to a lack of co-ordination between the [Indonesian] Government and myself, but simply because the former has not taken either our needs, or my intention to establish myself in the territory, too seriously...thus putting tremendous strain on myself and the members of my staff.³⁸

In New York, the Indonesian Ambassador to the UN invited Rolz-Bennett to lunch in order to complain about Ortiz Sanz. He accused him of treating West

Irian as a “colonial matter” and protested at the “inconvenience” caused by his desire to spend time in the territory. Relaying the substance of the conversation to Ortiz Sanz, Rolz-Bennett wrote:

while the Indonesian Government understood your desire to be in West Irian as much as possible, it also felt that you should spend sufficient time in Djakarta for consultations with several high officials who were involved in the West Irian question. The method of discussing matters through Ambassador Sudjarwo who had to travel frequently for this purpose between West Irian and Djakarta, was not entirely satisfactory. While Sudjarwo, he said, was a very able man, he was only one of the many officials who dealt with the West Irian question and therefore the Indonesian Government very much hoped that you would find it possible to spend ‘sufficient time’ in Djakarta.³⁹

Finally, the Indonesians objected to the UN’s presence in the territory on the grounds that it served as a focus of attraction for those who were “dissatisfied” with the Indonesian Administration. This then created a “certain excitement” which obstructed the smooth running of the administration in West Irian.⁴⁰

Ortiz Sanz continued to defend his position on this, and the issue of UNRWI staff numbers, but on the latter in particular, Indonesia to a large extent succeeded in its aims. In his final UNGA report, he cited financial and accommodation problems as the reason for his final staff total being reduced from an intended figure of fifty, to twenty-five and finally sixteen.⁴¹

It seems incredible that the UN agreed to this token staff presence. By way of comparison, in June 1999 the UN and Indonesia agreed to the deployment of approximately 1000 UN officials to organise and oversee the East Timorese referendum of August that year. This included 270 police, 50 military liaison officers and hundreds of electoral officials and administrators.⁴² Although the

UNRWI team's role was more limited, the sixteen officials were still supposed to "advise, assist and participate," with the Act in a territory many times the size of East Timor. Both territories were engaged in an exercise of self-determination, but the comparison illustrates the immense difference between a genuine attempt and one that was not.

Ortiz Sanz's Suggestions for the Act of Free Choice

Apart from accommodation and staff numbers, Ortiz Sanz spent the last three months of 1968 dealing with two main issues. The first concerned the actual method to be adopted for the Act, and the second dealt with his efforts to persuade Jakarta to improve the political freedoms and the human rights situation in West Irian in the period leading up to the Act.

With regard to the first issue, Sudjarwo sent the UNRWI a working paper on 1 October entitled, "Some Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Method of the Act of Free Choice - 1969." This paper contained proposals for the implementation of the Act through a body of around 200 representatives, including 60 new members from the Provincial Council, 80 from the eight representative councils and 60 appointed tribal chiefs. In Ortiz Sanz's opinion, this method was a departure from the terms of the New York Agreement, in that it seemed to by-pass the requirement in Article XVIII (a) to hold consultations with the Representative Councils as to the appropriate methods to be followed for the Act.⁴³ Instead, it appeared as if Indonesia alone was making that decision. The UNRWI outlined his concerns in a rather delayed response to Sudjarwo on 4 November.

On 14 November the two men met to discuss the matter. At the meeting, Sudjarwo assured Ortiz Sanz that there had been a misunderstanding and that Indonesia intended to abide by Article XVIII (a). The UNRWI was pleased with this response and appeared to take a conciliatory stance when discussing other proposals for implementing the Act. He informed Sudjarwo that, in his capacity as UN representative, he could suggest no other process except “the democratic, orthodox and universally accepted method known as ‘one-man, one-vote.’” However, having observed the “geographical and human realities” of the territory, he conceded that this method would only be appropriate in urban areas. Other areas could rely on “collective consultations.”⁴⁴ In support of his argument, Ortiz Sanz stated that this ‘mixed’ system would have the merit of being nearest to perfection:

It would also have the practical value of enabling the Indonesian Government, as well as the United Nations, to declare unequivocally that the orthodox and perfect method ‘one-man, one-vote’ was used in the act of free choice to the maximum extent, compatible with reality...if we are in a practical position to say in the final report to the General Assembly that the perfect method was used where ever practicable, your Government would not only be shielding the final results from any future criticisms by the interested parties, but it would also be satisfying the demands of the newly independent nations for the use of the perfect system of ‘one-man, one-vote’.⁴⁵

To conclude, Ortiz Sanz reminded Sudjarwo that he was prepared to take his share of responsibility for adopting a system which involved a “slight departure” from the Agreement’s stipulation that the Act should be conducted, “in accordance with international practice.” He went on to say that “It is then up to you to ‘meet me half way’ by agreeing that my preliminary suggestion represents the minimum requirement to satisfy world public opinion.”⁴⁶

Whether or not it was appropriate for a UN official to endorse a method which broke the terms of the Agreement, and by his own admission only satisfied the “minimum requirements of international opinion,” is a matter for debate. Furthermore, if Ortiz Sanz really believed that Jakarta was likely to “meet him half way” on his proposal, it was a clear expression of the political naivety which the Australian diplomat had noted in him seven months previously. Further evidence that he underestimated Indonesian determination to win the Act, comes from an Australian Embassy report of a reception given for Ortiz Sanz on 28 September by a government minister in Jakarta:

...on several occasions I heard [Ortiz Sanz] telling Indonesians and others that if it transpired, that the people of West Irian preferred to leave Indonesia it would be in Indonesia's own interest to let them go rather than trying to create a result that kept them in Indonesia. Understandably this fell very flat although no one took him on in my presence...In another conversation General Alaxjah [possibly correctly spelt Alamsyah], who is against any ascertainment [Act of Free Choice], commented to me that Ortiz Sanz had been very U.N.-ish when he arrived but ‘was coming around’.⁴⁷

It is also possible that, as the reception was attended by members of the diplomatic community in Jakarta, Ortiz Sanz simply wished to give the appearance of impartiality with regard to the Act. Whether he actually believed what he said is another matter.

More importantly, if Ortiz Sanz's ‘mixed method’ system was a serious proposal, it perhaps suggests that there was a lack of adequate communication between the Secretary-General and his West Irian representative. Otherwise, Ortiz Sanz would have been aware that Narasimhan, Rolz-Bennett and the Dutch had

already suggested to Jakarta five years previously that the Act could be decided by a small group of 'representatives' without any direct voting on the issue by the general population.⁴⁸ Alternatively, it is also feasible that the UNRWI did know about this, but felt, possibly with U Thant's backing, that it was in his and the UN's interests to be seen to be advocating a more democratic method, even if privately this had been rejected from the outset.

Either way, it is understandable that the Indonesians were unimpressed with the UNRWI's offer. There is also evidence that Sudjarwo was angered by it to the extent that it soured relations between the two. A letter from the British Embassy in Jakarta to London in July 1969 reports:

Relations between Ortiz Sanz and Mr. Sudjarwo...have been far from good, and the dispute has been aired in the local press. According to the Indonesian Observer the difference began when Sudjarwo learned that Ortiz Sanz's suggestion for a one man one vote plebiscite for the coastal areas was his own and had not originated in New York.⁴⁹

Following his meeting with Sudjarwo, Ortiz Sanz immediately dispatched a report to U Thant outlining the practical difficulties involved in implementing the Act in accordance with "international practices."⁵⁰ He also cabled Rolz-Bennett suggesting that both Indonesia and the Netherlands be requested to release statements, in the form of official UN documents, to the effect that they recognised that conditions in West Irian prevented the adoption of these "international practices." In support of this suggestion he ended by claiming:

was told by Sudjarwo that the Dutch were prepared to exchange reversal notes with Indonesia, expressing agreement re any realistic methods chosen to ascertain wishes of population. If this indeed is the case, I am confident that Sec Gen and parties would find my ideas worthy of consideration.⁵¹

This move by Ortiz Sanz was an understandable attempt to get the two signatories of the Agreement, particularly the Dutch, to condone officially his own position that this fundamental breach was both acceptable and the best practical solution. Again, it is reasonable to ask whether it was appropriate for the UNRWI to lobby, privately or otherwise, for a change to the Agreement which would inevitably undermine further, the Papuans right to genuine self-determination. One might, of course, argue that he was at least advocating a system which gave a far greater opportunity for genuine Papuan participation than the methods agreed to by his superiors five years previously. This prior private acceptance by the Secretariat to dispense with any direct voting suggests that the Secretary-General's November 1969 report to the UNGA on the Act gave a less than honest account of the UN's responsibility for the eventual method adopted. Today, Ortiz Sanz defends the system adopted as, "the most democratic possibility there was."⁵²

Political Freedoms and Human Rights

With regard to political freedoms and the human rights situation, Ortiz Sanz had concerns on a number of issues. The lack of information about the Act which he had noticed on his first tour led him to write to Sudjarwo on 11 October requesting that Indonesia produce an information paper outlining, in simple terms, what the Act would entail and what it would mean.⁵³ In Sudjarwo's response, which came just over a month later, he stated that Indonesia was also concerned about this issue, but needed to proceed with care because the Act was a source of conflict and controversy among politically minded-Papuans.⁵⁴ Ortiz Sanz reassured him that he was not suggesting anything which might endanger internal security.

He simply believed that, for the Act to be meaningful, the people needed to be given adequate information and sufficient time to consider it.⁵⁵

In his final report to the UNGA, the UNRWI gave a reasonably accurate account of these exchanges with Sudjarwo.⁵⁶ What was not included in the report, however, was the final section of his second letter which commented upon the numerous anti-Indonesian statements which he had received. In what appears to be an effort to persuade Jakarta that an information campaign would be in their interests, he exhorted them to make clear to the Papuans that the UN was in no position to deal with their appeals for help.⁵⁷

Efforts by the UNRWI to press Jakarta on the subject of basic rights and freedoms were initiated in a letter that he sent Sudjarwo on 5 November. In it, he reminded the Ambassador of Indonesia's obligations under the Agreement to "guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the inhabitants of the area."⁵⁸ Commenting upon the numerous complaints which he had received from Papuans on this subject, he reminded Sudjarwo that, without these rights and freedoms, the international community would not be satisfied that a "fair and truly democratic judgement" had been made by the people.⁵⁹ Nine days later, the two men met and Ortiz Sanz handed Sudjarwo a list of 49 'political communications' which he had received between 12 August and 12 November, with a summary of each. Of these, eight supported Jakarta's policies, one was neutral and the rest were anti-Indonesian, mostly calling for genuine self-determination and complaining about various human rights abuses. Writing to Sudjarwo shortly afterwards, Ortiz Sanz explained that,

having no authority to act on these petitions, he intended to forward a summary of each to him. In turn, he proposed that the authorities then inform him of their reaction which he would then forward to the petitioners:

This way they will know that the United Nations is doing all it can to remedy the situation and that the Indonesian Government, much to its credit, is acting in a democratic spirit towards establishing basic freedoms for the population of the territory.⁶⁰

In the same communication, Ortiz Sanz also broached the subject of political prisoners, suggesting that, because of the 10 December anniversary of the “Declaration of Human Rights” and because Christmas was approaching, Jakarta might consider releasing some as a personal favour to him. However, he was quick to point out, as he had already done in his 5 November letter, that he was not questioning Indonesia’s right to arrest such people “the sovereign Republic of Indonesia has the absolute right to take all the measures it deems necessary to maintain internal order.”⁶¹

Again, it is arguable that it was at the very least inappropriate for the UNRWI to make such a statement. Under the terms of the Agreement, Indonesia did not have the absolute right to take any measures it saw fit to maintain order, if by doing so, it undermined the rights and freedoms that it had agreed to guarantee. Jakarta must therefore have been gratified to receive the UNRWI’s acceptance that their security record in the territory since 1963 was in effect nobody’s business but their own. Sudjarwo specifically referred to this important point in his letters to the UNRWI of 21 and 22 November, commenting in the latter:

I am very appreciative of the fact that you don’t wish to question the sovereign rights of my Government to adopt whatever

measures it deems necessary for the maintenance of internal security and peace.⁶²

From the correspondence, it seems that while Ortiz Sanz recognised the realities of the situation, he was simply trying to use his diplomatic skills to extract whatever concessions he could from Sudjarwo. As in the case of UNTEA, the UNRWI was in a fundamentally weak position and relied upon Jakarta's willingness to co-operate. When it did not, his reaction echoed that of UNTEA. In the vast majority of cases he compromised, regardless of whether or not it broke the terms of the Agreement, or the UN's own declarations on human rights and political freedoms. While this reaction was conducive to the UN's priority of concluding its involvement in the territory with the minimum of international reaction, it also involved abandoning its responsibilities to the Papuans.

Sudjarwo's detailed response of 21 November defended Indonesia's record in these areas:

These rights and freedoms are not only guaranteed in the New York Agreement but for the whole country by the Indonesian State Constitution itself. It means that it applies also to the people in the West Irian Province.⁶³

Putting forward 'Asian values' arguments that would be echoed years later by politicians and analysts from the region, such as Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Sudjarwo then sought to deflect criticism of his country's record in these areas:

The applications of these 'rights and freedoms' are guided by the policy of the Government of the day, which may differ from country to country. As to Indonesia, our system of Government is not that of the Western democracies; no liberal (free-fight) democracy exists here...it is not the same as what is known as the liberal system of democracy in Western countries. This is due

to the specific condition, the internal social complexion and tradition of society, and the level of advancement added to the philosophy of life of our people, all of which are quite different from those in Western countries.⁶⁴

Outlining what was meant by these special conditions, Sudjarwo went on to describe how the turbulent recent history of his country had undoubtedly had an effect upon the “thoughts, psychology and conduct of our security forces and indeed on the mind and policy of our Government.”⁶⁵ Added to this, he referred to the propaganda material of the “so-called Free Papua movement” whose “falsehoods” and incitement to rebellion had been produced abroad, and then spread subversively within the territory through, vicious whispers, letters and little leaflets:

The difficult economic situation of the country is unfortunately a fertile ground for this kind of propaganda and agitation, especially for those whose capacity for intelligent judgement about many things is still very limited...Many simple-minded people get easily effected by this kind of cheap propaganda and incitement.⁶⁶

With regard to Papuan allegations of military brutality, Sudjarwo conceded that in suppressing the armed rebellions, “errors” may have been made, but these had subsequently been corrected, and he emphasised that a humane policy was applied in the territory. “This policy of clemency and leniency, wherever possible, will be continued.”⁶⁷

To conclude, the Ambassador returned to the issue of rights and freedoms, explaining that:

There is freedom of speech to the extent of immunity from prosecution in all the representative councils in West Irian for all deputies...Organisations, political or otherwise, have been allowed to be formed within the law of the

country...[but]...freedom should go hand in hand with responsibility. The question of rights and freedoms of the people in West Irian, and for that matter of whole Indonesia, should be looked upon in this context.⁶⁸

Continuing Security Problems

Meanwhile, the armed Papuan rebellions continued, despite continued Indonesian claims to the contrary. Van der Kroef writes that in September 1968, Jakarta had reported the surrender of thousands of rebels, while one of their leaders, Lodewijk Mandatjan, was attempting to negotiate an amnesty offer.⁶⁹ In December, however, with the rebellion continuing, General Sarwo Edhie ended a visit to Australian New Guinea by announcing a new drive against the rebels involving around 6000 Indonesian troops, supported by fighter planes. Faced with this, many rebels looked for an end to the conflict.

On 1 November, Sarwo Edhie released copies of a leaflet entitled, “To our Brothers of the Arfaks Tribe who are still in the Jungles,” which was distributed in the Manokwari region and other areas with rebel activity.⁷⁰ The leaflet was an appeal to the rebels to return to their villages in peace with a guarantee that they would not be punished. Specifically, it mentioned some of the rebel leaders, including the Awom and Mandatjan brothers, guaranteeing their safety once they returned, and claiming, in the case of the latter, that their children were in Manokwari waiting for news from them.⁷¹ Included in the leaflet, was a deadline:

...report to the nearest military post at the latest on the 30th November (the sooner the better)... THIS IS MY LAST APPEAL. Please keep the deadline of 30th November 1968 in mind when coming down.⁷²

Although no mention was made of what would happen after this date, it was linked with the launch of the December military offensive. In an attempt to get Ortiz Sanz directly involved in any negotiated end to the fighting, OPM activist Jacob Prai wrote to him on 22 November. In his letter he referred to Sarwo Edhie's leaflet, particularly the 30 November deadline, and mentioned a visit by General Nasution on 10 and 11 November during which he too had referred to a 30 November deadline. Prai also claimed to have information of Sarwo Edhie's intentions after this date:

If they [the rebels] do not obey this ultimatum of the 17th Military Commander the Indonesian Armed Forces are ready to launch an Offensive Attack by air using bombs with tear gas. This information we got from the Police Commander of Sukarnapura Regency, Mr. Karpono, on November 16.⁷³

Prai described rebel concerns that those who had already surrendered had been imprisoned in West Irian, or sent to concentration camps in Java where they were unable to take part in the forthcoming Act. To prevent this from re-occurring, he suggested that Ortiz Sanz should involve himself in any surrender process.⁷⁴

He concluded by making clear that the rebels were aware of the limitations of the UNRWI's responsibilities, and that his role was merely to advise and assist Jakarta, but "the presence of your Excellency among the Papuans in West Irian will make this sombre and gloomy situation a better and clearer one."⁷⁵

Although in his own words, this was just "one of the many" petitions that he had received in the past month, Ortiz Sanz asked for an urgent meeting with

Sudjarwo on the subject and also wrote him a “special unofficial letter,” in which he stated that:

...there are two elements which impel me to give this petition a special and urgent treatment. First, that it is in the interest of the Indonesian Government to put a quick end to the rebellion in the Manokwari area; and second, that it is everyone’s duty to do whatever is necessary to avoid the risk of bloodshed.⁷⁶

As a solution, Ortiz Sanz offered to go personally to the rebel areas to witness the surrender of the rebel leaders, provided that Jakarta made an official request to him in writing and reaffirmed Sarwo Edhie’s guarantees made in the leaflet of 1 November.⁷⁷ In his meeting with the UNRWI, Sudjarwo denied that the rebels had been threatened with bombing. He also denied that Papuans were interned in Javanese “concentration camps,” although he conceded that some had “been put to work” on plantations in Java. Ortiz Sanz warned him that people in Europe and elsewhere had “misconceptions” about events in Manokwari, and believed Papuan propaganda about bombings and suppression by the Indonesian military.⁷⁸

The next day, at the request of Sarwo Edhie, the UNRWI visited him at his residence where he found the general waiting with Sudjarwo. Sarwo Edhie briefed Ortiz Sanz on the military situation, stating that so far 1400 rebels had returned to their villages and denying that there were plans to bomb those that refused. He also informed Ortiz Sanz that total troop strength in the territory was 6000, which was 2000 more than the figure Ortiz Sanz had reported to U Thant. Sarwo Edhie assured the UNRWI that the rebellions were over and that there would be no more shooting. Instead, the army would begin a campaign of providing clothing, food

and transport for the returned rebels who, Sudjarwo added, would be allowed to keep their weapons. The general concluded by inviting Ortiz Sanz to visit the Manokwari area after 30 November, so he could witness that the area was peaceful. The UNRWI reiterated that he would not accept without an official invitation. Sudjarwo's response was not recorded, but no official invitation was ever given and Ortiz Sanz did not visit. In conclusion, Ortiz Sanz declared that a peaceful settlement was both "nicer and quieter" and that pacification was important for the Act. He also expressed confidence that the general, being a "good commander, a professional soldier and a man of wisdom and conscience," would ensure that the rebels were treated humanely.⁷⁹

Ortiz Sanz's decision not to visit Manokwari in December meant that he did not witness the new military campaign which succeeded, temporarily, in ending the rebellion. On 1 January, the Mandatjan brothers surrendered. The journalist Brian May described how the Indonesians gradually wore the rebels down "bombing them, cutting them into isolated groups and starving them from their hiding places...[Lodewijk] Mandatjan became ill and could scarcely walk."⁸⁰

Ortiz Sanz's Second Tour of West Irian

At the end of 1968, Ortiz Sanz reported to New York that he and members of his team had completed a second "extensive" tour of the territory, lasting from 18 November until 14 December. Splitting into three groups, they had visited different areas of the territory for several days at a time. The UNRWI seemed pleased with the tour noting "I believe that I have firmly established our presence

in West Irian which I consider to be an essential foundation for the activities ahead.”⁸¹

Nonetheless, he informed Rolz-Bennett that their presence was still viewed with suspicion and uneasiness by the Indonesian officials who “shadow us wherever we go. Consequently, the members of my staff and myself find it difficult to have free contacts with the population.”⁸² Despite this, he confirmed the existence of anti-Indonesian feelings among the population but qualified this by a rather dismissive comment:

Of course, when the moment arrives, it would be very difficult, indeed, to assess the real importance of such [anti-Indonesian] feelings since, as you are very well aware, only a very insignificant percentage of the population is capable of or has interest in engaging in any political actions or even thoughts.⁸³

This view may have been prompted by his desire to justify the UN’s acceptance of Jakarta’s intended manipulation of the Act. In conclusion he wrote:

The tour has confirmed my initial impressions which I reported to the Secretary-General in my report of 12 November, namely that the implementation of the provisions of the New York Agreement relating to self-determination ‘in accordance with international practice is, indeed, impossible.’⁸⁴

In his reply, Rolz-Bennett remarked that he was not surprised at this confirmation, “for the level of development of the population in the various areas of the territory - or the lack thereof - stands out all too clearly.” He also informed the UNRWA that he had requested an interpretation from the UN legal office of the phrase “in accordance with international practice.”⁸⁵

Conclusions on 1968

Jakarta would have been aware by this stage of the UN's position. To satisfy the Secretariat, it was only necessary for the Act to appear to include some element of genuine participation by the general population. This could then be presented to the international community to inspect, concur with and then forget.

Despite this, it was clear by the end of 1968 that this was not going to be a simple matter for Ortiz Sanz or his superiors in New York. While the rebellions appeared to have ended, human rights abuses and the denial of basic political freedoms continued. These fundamental breaches of the Agreement threatened to undermine the whole process.

Furthermore, the Indonesians did not share the UN's view of the importance of Jakarta maintaining the appearance of impartiality with regard to the Act. Rolz-Bennett had tried to address this issue in his 3 December meeting with Indonesian diplomats in New York. On being told by Ambassador Sani that Indonesia could not be impartial to the Act, the Under-Secretary suggested diplomatically that what he in fact meant was that Indonesia could not be 'disinterested,' but would remain impartial. In reply, the Indonesian, repeated that Indonesia could not be impartial.⁸⁶ When informed of this, Ortiz Sanz replied to Rolz-Bennett:

My views coincide with yours that Indonesia cannot be, understandably, 'disinterested' in or remain 'indifferent' to the act of free choice. Being aware of the stakes involved in this act as far as this Republic is concerned, we are trying to work out methods and procedures which will create respect for and confidence in the final exercise on the part of those nations who know so little about the territory and its problems and who will be watching the exercise with a critical eye. Indonesians must be able to see, in their own national interest, that while being

‘interested’ in the act of free choice might be understood and sympathised with, no-one would excuse their country for being ‘partial’ in that exercise.⁸⁷

Events would show that the UNRWI over-estimated the international community’s interest in West Irian. But in the following months, his attempts to maintain some appearance of legitimacy for the Act would be consistently undermined by overt Indonesian manipulation of the exercise. The eventual extent of this manipulation was such that one can question whether the UN should have remained associated with the result. That the UNRWI’s role would in reality bear little relation to that laid out in the Agreement was clearly understood by the international community. Writing in December 1968, a British diplomat observed:

Tactically, his aim is to contrive a formula whereby the Act of Free Choice will result in affirmation of Indonesia’s sovereignty but will also represent a fair reflection of the peoples’ wishes and stand the test of international opinion. This is clearly going to be no easy task.⁸⁸

The fact was, as the British and other UN member states knew only too well, any “fair reflection” of the peoples’ wishes would certainly not result in a decision to remain with Jakarta. But with no significant interest in the issue from the international community, this inconvenient reality would be simply ignored by Jakarta and the UN.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Notes

1. Antara, quoted in Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.37.
2. Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.37.
3. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Letters from unidentified Papuans to Ortiz Sanz 19 and 21 August 1968. Summary contained in a list sent by Ortiz Sanz to the Indonesians entitled, "List of Political Communications Received by the UNRWI During the Period 12 August to 12 November". List No.1.
4. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.168
5. UN: DAG 1/223:9. UNRWI Mission "First Summary of Activities", 17 December 1968.
6. *ibid.*
7. *ibid.*
8. PRO: FCO 15/162 (DH1/7). Sutherland (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Dorman (Foreign Office, London), 13 August 1968.
9. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Ortiz Sanz letter to Dr Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), (AN/dj), 19 August 1968.
10. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File3. Ortiz Sanz to U Thant, 7 September 1968,
11. *ibid.*
12. Peter Hastings "West Irian After 1969", New Guinea, (September - October 1968), pp.15-16, quoted in Van der Kroef "Indonesia and West New Guinea", pp.386-385.
13. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Letter from unidentified civic group to Ortiz Sanz, 24 August 1968. Summary contained in a list sent by Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo.
14. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Ortiz Sanz to U Thant, 7 September 1968.
15. *ibid.*
16. *ibid*

17. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 5 September 1968.
18. *ibid.*
19. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Ortiz Sanz to U Thant, 7 September 1968.
20. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Letter from unidentified civic group to Ortiz Sanz, 29 August 1968.
21. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Political communications to Ortiz Sanz August - 6 September 1968.[Lists 1 and 2].
22. PRO: FCO 15/162 (DH1/7). Report by Max Loveday (Australian Ambassador, Jakarta, 27 August 1968, attached to a letter from Sutherland (British Embassy, Jakarta) to O'Keefe (SEAD, Foreign Office), 3 September 1968.
23. *ibid.*
24. *ibid.*
25. *ibid.*
26. "Natives Hate Irian Army", Sydney Sun, 16 August 1968.
27. PRO: FCO 15/162 (DH1/7). Report by Max Loveday, 27 August 1968.
28. "Criticism in West Irian of Jakarta's Plans", Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 24 August 1968.
29. PRO: FCO 24/447 (FWD 1/4). Report by Ian Morgan (British Embassy, Jakarta) on a visit to West Irian and Eastern Indonesia, 23 September to 2 October 1968.
30. *ibid.*
31. Anti-Slavery Society, West Papua: Plunder in Paradise. (Indigenous Peoples' and Development Series, Report No.6, 1990), p.72.
32. PRO: FCO 24/447 (FWD 1/4). Report by Morgan, 23 September to 2 October 1968.
33. *ibid.*
34. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 17 September.

35. UN:Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Bastaki Rachmat (Acting Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs), (AN/FoS/dj), 7 October 1968.
36. *ibid.*
37. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 26 October 1968.
38. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 17 December 1968..
39. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 5 December 1968.
40. *ibid*
41. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex I para 43. *op cit.*
42. BBC Online News (Asia Pacific). “UN Delays Timor Referendum”, 23 June 1999.
43. New York Agreement Article XVIII(a).
44. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 21 November 1968.
45. *ibid*
46. *ibid*
47. NAA: A452 T29, 68/2581. Australian Embassy, Jakarta, cablegram (2320) to Dept External Affairs, 28 September 1968.
48. See Chapter Five, notes 40 and 41 above.
49. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). Sutherland (British Embassy, Jakarta) to D Aiers (South West Pacific Dept henceforth SWPD, Foreign Office), 15 July 1969.
50. UN : DAG 1/2.2.3:9. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (UNRWI SKU13), 15 November 1968.
51. *ibid.*
52. Interview with Ortiz Sanz by Stephane Alonso Casale, Sucre, Bolivia 15 December 1999. Casale is a Dutch journalist who agreed to ask Ortiz Sanz a number of questions on behalf of the author.
53. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969) Annex I, para 50.

54. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969) Annex i, para 51.
55. UN: Series 100 Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 22 November.
56. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969) Annex i, paras. 49-52.
57. UN: DAG 1/2/3/3:9. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 15 November 1968.
58. New York Agreement Article XXII.
59. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969) Annex i, para. 57.
60. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 21 November 1968.
61. *ibid.*
62. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 22 November 1968.
63. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 4. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 21 November 1968. Series 100, Box 1, File 4.
64. *ibid.*
65. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 4. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 21 November 1968.
66. *ibid.*
67. *ibid.*
68. *ibid.*
69. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia and West New Guinea", p.386
70. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. English language copy of leaflet.
71. *ibid.*
72. *ibid.*
73. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Letter from Jacob Prai to Ortiz Sanz, 22 November 1968.

74. *ibid.*
75. *ibid.*
76. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 23 November 1968.
77. *ibid.*
78. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Extracts of conversation between Ortiz Sanz and Sudjarwo, 23 November 1968.
79. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Extracts of conversation between Ortiz Sanz, Sudjarwo and Sarwo Edhie, 24 November 1968.
80. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.172.
81. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 18 December 1968.
82. *ibid.*
83. *ibid.*
84. *ibid.*
85. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 2 January 1969.
86. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 5 December 1968.
87. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 3. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 17 December 1968.
88. PRO: FCO 24/447 (FWD 1/4). A. Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to D. Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign Office), 9 December 1968.