

CHAPTER EIGHT

1969 JANUARY TO MAY

UN/Indonesian Talks Continue: Jakarta Rejects the ‘Mixed Method.’

The year 1969 began well for Indonesia. Following the surrender of the Papuan rebel leaders Lodewijk and Barens Mandatjan on 1 January, the security situation in the Bird’s Head Peninsula appeared under control. On the island of Biak, which had been “troubled by terrorists,” the situation had also improved, although there was still local resentment at the recent burning down of houses by the army, during its Operation “Sadar.”¹ As a goodwill gesture, Suharto sent the Biak tribal leaders a New Year’s gift of 250 pigs and 200 fowl.²

On 7 January, the Mandatjan brothers were flown to Jakarta, with Lodewijk arriving dressed in an Indonesian major’s uniform. Accompanying them was West Irian’s former Governor, Eliezer Bonay, who had recently been released after serving two years in prison as a political dissident. On arrival, the brothers pledged allegiance to the Indonesian Republic before being driven away in a jeep.³ A week later Suharto announced that he regarded the Mandatjan brothers’ rebellion as a ‘misunderstanding’ rather than ‘treachery.’⁴

By mid-January, however, rebellion in the peninsula erupted again as around 2000 Arfak tribesmen rose up under the leadership of Frits Awom.⁵ Awom had received his military training as a sergeant in the Papuan Volunteer Corps before being dismissed by UNTEA for leading the anti-Indonesian mutiny of February 1963. In response to the new uprising, Jakarta was forced to transfer two

additional infantry battalions to the region from Makassar, South Sulawesi. According to their commander, the army's job was now to "win the forthcoming act of self-determination in West Irian."⁶

In an analysis of the situation in late January, the British Embassy in Jakarta noted:

Most independent observers are convinced that, given a free choice, the majority of the local inhabitants would not vote for continued incorporation in Indonesia. This is certainly the view of Mr. Peter Metcalfe, a British Programme Officer [with FUNDWI] who was in Djakarta last week. Mr. Metcalfe told us of a belief held by many of the Papuans that the UN would protect them against injustice and ensure, by force if necessary, that their rights are not overlooked...But it is clear that they are going to be disillusioned when the Act of Free Choice leaves the territory, as it inevitably will, an integral part of Indonesia.⁷

Ortiz Sanz began the year by flying to Jakarta with his wife on the same flight that had brought Bonay and the Mandatjan brothers. Once in Jakarta, he would not return to the territory for another two and a half months, spending his time instead exchanging letters with Sudjowo, and attending meetings with him, and other Government officials.

In Jakarta, Ortiz Sanz's concerns were UN staffing and the return of exiles. He reiterated that his total of eleven UN staff would need to be increased to twenty-one over the next five months. As he reminded Sudjarwo "I will be working at the peak of the operation with less than one half of the fifty personnel originally intended for my mission."⁸ In fact, six extra observers that he had requested for June were cancelled, due to "housing and budgetary restrictions,"⁹ and the total UN presence never exceeded sixteen.

On the issue of exiles, Ortiz Sanz acknowledged Sudjarwo's argument that Indonesia was not obliged under the Agreement to invite exiles to return for the Act. He suggested, though, that this would be "the best answer" to accusations by exile groups that Indonesia was suppressing the basic rights of the population.¹⁰

The two men also corresponded concerning the summaries prepared by the UNRWI of political communications from Papuans that he had forwarded to Sudjarwo. Sudjarwo dismissed the numerous allegations of military brutality, reiterating that Indonesia would take whatever measures it saw fit, "in the framework of law and order" to combat "terrorism and rebellion" and restore peace and order.¹¹ Ortiz Sanz responded by making clear that he only attached a "preliminary informative" value to the petitions and did not take them into account when submitting proposals to Jakarta.¹²

The conciliatory nature of Ortiz Sanz's approach was noted by Sudjarwo, who in late January told the Australians that the UNRWI had been "difficult but now had a better understanding."¹³

Throughout the rest of January, Ortiz Sanz wrote frequently to Sudjarwo, and on 28 January he sent him three letters on the issues of political prisoners, disseminating information and the methods to be adopted for the Act. At all times his tone was, as one would expect from an experienced diplomat, courteous and restrained. Nonetheless, there was now a growing sense of urgency in Ortiz Sanz's communications as he tried to persuade Sudjarwo to adopt at least some of his

proposals. On political prisoners he emphasised the importance of completing the release process before the Act, although he made clear “I am not at all suggesting the release of those detainees with background of anti-State activities.”¹⁴

On the central issue of the procedure for the Act itself, Ortiz Sanz wrote in his report to the UNGA that he had learned from Sudjarwo his “mixed system” proposal had been rejected on 10 February.¹⁵ In fact he received a letter from Rolz-Bennett dated 30 January, which made clear that Jakarta had already informed the Secretary-General of its decision the previous week.¹⁶ This letter also described a meeting between U Thant and Sudjarwo in which the latter seemed concerned about possible international reaction to Indonesia’s decision. Rolz-Bennett noted that it was clear that Sudjarwo wanted to obtain the Secretary-General’s concurrence with the method chosen by Jakarta for the Act. But U Thant, “made no repeat no commitment one way or the other.”¹⁷ U Thant’s reported reluctance on this may well have surprised Sudjarwo, since as previously mentioned, Jakarta had been privately told by the UN in 1964 and possibly earlier, that a decision solely by “representative” councils on behalf of the population was an acceptable method. In view of this, Indonesia’s seemed justified in asserting in its report to the UNGA, that U Thant had considered their proposals “not unreasonable in the light of conditions existing in the territory.”¹⁸

As well as seeking official UN support for the abandonment of any direct voting in the final Act, Sudjarwo was also anxious to prevent international discussion of the Secretary-General’s report on the matter. In his Government’s view, he explained, “the Assembly was not called upon to discuss or pass

judgement on the report but merely take note of it.” U Thant responded that member states could not be prevented from commenting if they so wished.¹⁹

Nonetheless, Indonesia’s concern over potential international reaction was, according to Sudjarwo, selective. In talks with the Australian mission to the UN in January he declared:

If the representative of Malta or, for example, one of the Caribbean countries wanted to raise the West Irian issue, Indonesia would take no notice of them. They were not important. On the other hand if the United States or Australia had queries to raise this would be important.²⁰

Discussions in Jakarta continued the following month. On 10 February, Ortiz Sanz and three of his officials met with Sudjarwo at the Foreign Ministry. Accompanying Sudjarwo were four senior officials from the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Information and the Armed Forces. Over the next three days, both sides discussed the method and timing of the Act, and Ortiz Sanz again returned to the issues of political prisoners, exiles, information, and general rights and freedoms. At the same time, Sudjarwo reminded the UN team of his continuing concerns at the proposal to increase their number.²¹

At the meetings, the UN team were informed that the Government intended to consult the nine “Representative” councils of West Irian in order to obtain their approval for implementing the Act through the method recommended by Jakarta. These councils had been set up in 1963 after UNTEA’s departure and replaced the Regional councils, originally established by the Dutch. Whereas the original councils had been partially, and in some cases wholly, elected by universal suffrage, the ‘Representative’ councils were appointed by the Indonesian authorities.

Jakarta’s recommended method was for these existing councils to be enlarged to form eight regional ‘Assemblies’ (merging two of the nine councils). These would then each reach a collective decision on the questions posed in the final Act. Sudjarwo did not elaborate at the meeting on how the additional members would be selected, but in his earlier talks with U Thant he had ‘intimated’ that universal suffrage might be allowed.²² The establishment of these assemblies was to be the responsibility of the corresponding ‘Representative’ Council chairman in each area. To assist them, the chairmen would appoint committees for the tasks of organising, confirming and installing the members of the Regional Assemblies.²³

In response, Ortiz Sanz stated that he did not have the authority to object, even less reject, the method proposed. At the same time, neither did he have the authority to express agreement or endorse Jakarta's decision. Consequently, he would participate in the procedure, but not share in the Government's responsibility for choosing this particular method.²⁴ This position was also made clear in his November 1969 report to the UNGA.²⁵ Privately, he also asked the Indonesians for the names of all existing 'Representative' council members, along with details of their background and the segment of population that they were supposed to represent. Sudjarwo agreed to this, but the information was never handed over.

On the other issues discussed in the February meetings, Sudjarwo informed Ortiz Sanz that Papuan exiles were to be given until 15 April to apply to return home for the Act. There was no mention of immunity and, in the end, only one Papuan family ever accepted the offer. Nonetheless, Ortiz Sanz later referred to it as one of the "concrete measures" adopted by Jakarta on his advice that would "provide the act of free choice with some essential democratic prerequisite."²⁶

Although the UNRWI emphasised the importance of releasing all political prisoners before the Act, he again accepted Indonesia's right to deal with those accused with "anti-state" activities separately. He even offered some advice on the subject. "It was better to move them out of the territory, if their retention was necessary, before the Act of Free Choice."²⁷ Presumably, removing these political prisoners to some other part of Indonesia would make their incarceration less of a threat to the smooth running of the Act.

Yet again, however, one must question whether it was in any way appropriate for the UN Representative to make such a suggestion. Although neither side defined the precise meaning of “anti-state” activities, open opposition to the Indonesian presence in West Irian was a freedom protected under the Agreement’s Article XXII, which guaranteed the right to free speech. By suggesting the removal of these prisoners from West Irian, he was not only condoning this breach of the Agreement, he was also advocating a policy which would result in the prisoners being held possibly thousands of miles away from their family and friends. It was a solution that would have been familiar to older Indonesian nationalists, many of whom had themselves been exiled by the Dutch colonial authorities in what was then Dutch New Guinea.

Ortiz Sanz’s final suggestion was for Jakarta to issue a special decree regulating the rights and freedoms of the Papuans so that this central feature of the Agreement could be fulfilled. Sudjarwo replied that his government might consider the suggestion, but no such decree was ever issued.²⁸

Apart from responding to the issues raised by Ortiz Sanz, Sudjarwo’s main concern in the February talks related to the number of UN officials planned for the UNRWI’s team, though, it is not clear why Indonesia was so uncomfortable with such a negligible UN presence. At this stage Ortiz Sanz resisted Sudjarwo’s pressure on the issue.²⁹

Soon after the meetings, Sudjarwo wrote to Ortiz Sanz to reaffirm his government's decision as to the method they would adopt for the Act. He also gave more details regarding the selection process for the additional members of the "consultative assemblies." One group would be chosen by existing officially-approved political, social and cultural organisations. A second group would consist of "traditional" tribal chiefs selected by the existing local councils, and a third group was to be elected by the people themselves in each district. Importantly, the percentage of members from each group would be decided by the local existing councils.³⁰

Consequently, the only potential opportunity for genuine popular participation lay in the election of the third group. In practice, this method of choosing additional members meant that the Indonesian authorities, and the existing appointed councils would have tight control of the whole selection process for the consultative assembly. They would choose which tribal chiefs could take part and only permitted the involvement of government-approved organisations. As Ortiz Sanz confirmed in his UNGA report, Sudjarwo informed him in May that "those few people - possibly existing - not in favour of retaining ties with the Republic of Indonesia, are...not organised in legally existing political groups or parties in West Irian."³¹

Papuan Petitions

If Ortiz Sanz needed confirmation of the political loyalties of these existing councils and official organisations, Sudjarwo's letter provided it:

...we have to take into account the many resolutions submitted to the Government up till now, both from the local councils as well as from organisations in West Irian which contest the holding of the act of free choice as being unnecessary or uncalled for, simply because West Irian is an integral part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and that in their opinion no opportunity for a separatist act should be given. The reasoning of these resolutions has the support of a great part of public opinion in this country. I believe you are not unaware of this situation.³²

This claim that the majority of Papuan resolutions and petitions favoured the pro-Indonesian position was an important part of Jakarta's campaign to legitimise the Act. In their November 1969 report to the UNGA they repeated this assertion, stating that while the "simple illiterate" people of the interior had little understanding of the issue, Papuan leaders in more advanced areas had informed Ortiz Sanz that the Act was unnecessary. Furthermore, they claimed:

Since 1963, the Indonesian Government had received hundreds of statements of this kind from all layers or groups of West Irian people. For the Indonesian Government the implementation of the act of free choice in West Irian was indeed a political proposition without much political support of the people, in West Irian as well as in the whole of Indonesia.³³

In private, however, Sudjarwo complained to the Secretary-General personally about the anti-Indonesia petitions which Ortiz Sanz was forwarding on to him. They were, it appeared, even beginning to upset the Indonesian army.³⁴

At the same meeting, Sudjarwo also seemed to complain, albeit indirectly, about the amount of time he was having to spend dealing with Ortiz Sanz. Rolz-Bennett noted how he informed U Thant, "half jokingly" about the intense correspondence between himself and the UNRWI, which he said, was keeping him very busy.³⁵

Despite passing on anti-Indonesian petitions to Sudjarwo, Ortiz Sanz seemed prepared to support the Indonesian position on the issue when it mattered most. In his report to the UNGA, he referred to the petitions, stating that in total he had received 179 during his time in the territory, and adding that:

Broadly speaking, the petitions may be divided into two groups: (a) those expressing views in favour of the retention of ties with Indonesia (a little more than half of the petitions received were in this group); and (b) those in favour of severing ties with Indonesia.³⁶

With regard to the first group, he recorded that most came from the Representative Councils and the various legal organisations including students. These petitioners he described as “politically minded and politically educated” and “better educated and aware of the issues.” At no point did he question the validity of their submissions. He also, rather curiously, reinforced these observations by stating them twice in two virtually identical paragraphs, one before and one after his comments on the second group.³⁷

In contrast, his description to the UNGA of the anti-Indonesian petitions was clearly designed to undermine their importance:

As regards the second group of petitions, it should be noted that some of them were unintelligible, some were anonymous or merely initialled, a few contained many alleged signatures all written by the same hand, and almost all had no return address other than the town or place from which they were sent.³⁸

It could be argued that he might have acknowledged that the anonymity and less than professional condition of the anti-Indonesian petitions may have been at least partly due to their authors’ fear of discovery by the authorities, and their need to prepare them clandestinely. As to their illegibility, surviving UN records

show that they were certainly all legible enough to be transcribed into a printed format by UNRWI staff.

Far more important, however, is Ortiz Sanz's assertion in his UNGA report that over half the petitions he received were pro-Indonesian. One has to question why he wrote this because it was simply untrue. In the UN archives, descriptions of 156 of the 179 petitions survive, recording all those received up until 30 April 1969. Of these, 95 can be described as anti-Indonesian, 59 are pro-Indonesian and two are neutral. Even if the missing 23 petitions were all pro-Indonesian, over half the total would still be in favour of severing ties with Jakarta. Realistically, however, one can conclude that a significant proportion of the missing 23 were anti-Indonesian, since Ortiz Sanz acknowledged in the same report that "nationalist feelings were expressed more forcibly" in the petitions received during the last weeks of his mission.³⁹ If one assumes therefore that even 10 of the 23 opposed Indonesia, then as a conservative estimate, just over sixty percent of the total 179 petitions received by Ortiz Sanz fell into this anti-Indonesian category.⁴⁰

It is possible that Ortiz Sanz simply miscalculated, but this is highly unlikely since the UN's own list summarising the petitions is both clearly typed and numbered. Furthermore, petitions on both sides are all unambiguous in their wording, leaving no room for misinterpretation of their particular positions. Consequently, either Ortiz Sanz himself chose to deliberately mislead the UNGA or he was told to by his superiors in New York. Whoever was responsible, it is a clear illustration of the UN leadership's collaboration with Indonesia to legitimise

their take-over of West Irian at the expense of the political rights of the Papuans, guaranteed in the Agreement.

East New Guinea, Australian and Dutch Reactions

While Ortiz Sanz continued his meetings with Indonesian officials, on 3 February Suharto told Peter Job, the departing Reuters correspondent, that he would regard any decision by the Papuans to leave the Republic as “treason.”⁴¹ According to Brian May, this statement caused some embarrassment for Western diplomats, and attempts were made to explain it away as an error in the translation into English. May also claimed that British and American diplomats “advised” and “warned” the new Reuters correspondent to “be more careful” than his predecessor who had reported Suharto’s threat.⁴²

Australian concerns at the disruption caused by the Act increased throughout 1969. Although numbers of Papuans fleeing into TPNG had grown in 1968, in 1969 official figures recorded a total 1695 crossing the border. This compared with a total of 2230 for the years 1963-1968.⁴³ In April and May, Indonesian troops in pursuit of fleeing Papuans crossed into Australian territory, killing two of them.⁴⁴ Furthermore, according to official Indonesian military accounts, in April two-thirds of the population of the Erambo/Kalimaro region, north-east of Merauke near the border, was found to have fled across into Australian territory. The account gives no reason for this, but states that army officers involved in “clean up operations” were attacked and killed.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, the opposition Australian Labor Party passed a resolution in 1969 supporting the Papuans' right to self-determination and condemning Indonesian actions to prevent this.⁴⁶ In TPNG, there was also support for the West Papuans. In April, John Guise, Speaker of the Territory's House of Assembly in Port Moresby revealed in an interview that:

...in his personal campaigns for the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly during the past decade he has advocated the political union of the island of New Guinea, and continues to support the idea.⁴⁷

Two months later, on 28 June, the TPNG Assembly adopted a resolution criticising both Indonesia and the UN for neglecting political and human rights in West Irian. Furthermore, Michael Somare, the future first Prime Minister of an independent PNG, accused Australia of running 'concentration camps' for refugees along the border, and in a statement to the Assembly said:

We often hear the UN condemning European colonialism but it never thinks of condemning Asiatic colonialism, and this is what is happening now on our border and it is colonialism on the part of Indonesians.⁴⁸

This resolution embarrassed the Australian Department for External Affairs. Unfortunately for them, although the Papuan Assembly was not supposed to deal with foreign affairs, a precedent had already been set in 1968 when Canberra passed on a TPNG Assembly resolution to the Soviets condemning their aggression in Czechoslovakia.⁴⁹ In the end Canberra did pass the resolution regarding West Irian on to U Thant, but added a note making clear that Australia did not agree with it. In addition, the Department of External Affairs instructed the Australian Mission to the UN to "add orally when handing the communication to

the United Nations Secretariat that you are not asking for the resolution to be circulated to members of the United Nations.”⁵⁰

The rising anger against Indonesia among the political elite of Australian New Guinea led Peter Hastings to suggest the following year that future contacts between East and West New Guineans “should be, so far as possible, limited.”⁵¹ Hastings, however, need not have been so concerned. As TPNG moved towards independence in the early 1970’s, its political elite would prove itself to be as eager to maintain good relations with Jakarta as Australia was. In early 1974, soon after self-government was granted, Albert Kiki, PNG’s Minister for Defence, Foreign Relations and Trade, wrote a confidential letter to Les Johnson, the Australian Administrator of the territory. In it, he expressed concern at the OPM’s influence in the border area and declared that he and Chief Minister Somare were determined to strengthen security and weed out officials “including police, who may in any way be sympathetic to the dissident movement.”⁵²

Somare himself would go on to become a firm supporter of Indonesian policy in Irian Jaya following PNG’s independence in 1975. As the historian Ian Downs wrote on the TPNG Assembly’s 1969 resolution:

While acknowledging the sincerity of the emotions and fears which this House of Assembly Resolution represented, it is doubtful if the same views would have been so forthrightly expressed if PNG had been independent of Australian protection.⁵³

Despite these protests, the Liberal Government in Canberra remained supportive of Indonesian policy in West Irian. In particular, in February 1969

during his first speech as External Affairs Minister, Gordon Freeth emphasised Australia's need to maintain close relations with Indonesia and stressed the difficulties Jakarta would face with a 'one-man-one-vote' plebiscite in West Irian. Furthermore, he indicated that Australia would accept polling of 1000 representatives as suggested by the Indonesians. In response, the *Sydney Morning Herald* commented that it was wrong for him to set himself up as an apologist for Indonesia, adding that "his plea for understanding leaves a very unpleasant taste of hypocrisy." The paper also criticised the UN, saying that it was directly responsible and had no excuse for not protesting.⁵⁴ Undeterred by such accusations, Freeth declared on another occasion that it was immoral for outsiders to incite the Papuans to resist when there would be no outside help available for them.⁵⁵

Commenting on the Australian position on West Irian, Neilson of the British High Commission in Canberra informed London in May:

As you know the Australians are very interested in maintaining their good relations with Indonesia and are quite willing to close their eyes to evidence which might cause them to doubt Indonesia's good faith. You may for example be interested to know that the Prime Minister's Department declined to read Alan Mason's letter of 3 April to Le Breton on the grounds that it 'might embarrass them' (this privately of course).⁵⁶

The letter referred to by Neilson was from the British Embassy in Jakarta. It gave a highly highly critical account of Indonesian rule in West Irian, describing military brutality, Papuan loathing for the Indonesians and their overwhelming desire for freedom.⁵⁷

In an effort to diffuse tensions, particularly over the issue of refugees and Indonesian military border incursions, Indonesian and Australian officials met in Jayapura on 10 and 11 June. They discussed recent incidents and 'misunderstandings,' and looked at ways of minimizing the likelihood of more occurring. As a result, it was agreed that liaison was to be maintained between border stations in the respective territories. In TPNG, the border stations of Wutung, Imonda and Weam were chosen to liaise with their Indonesian counterparts at Tami, Waris and Sotar. In addition, it was agreed that radio contact was to be maintained between Jayapura and Vanimo in Australian New Guinea. Furthermore, meetings were to be arranged between senior representatives of the two administrations when the need arose.⁵⁸

At the same time, contact was maintained between Australian and Indonesian survey authorities engaged in determining the position of the border. There was also cooperation from both sides on public health and animal quarantine matters.⁵⁹

Claims of a higher level of co-operation, never officially acknowledged by Australia, appeared in an Indonesian press report in June. According to this, Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik had claimed that Indonesia already had a border agreement with Australia, part of which included an Australian undertaking to return every border crosser to West Irian.⁶⁰ Although this report was inaccurate, Canberra's cooperation certainly went beyond the areas outlined by the Department of External Affairs at the time. Australia sent scores of refugees to Manus island, 300 kilometres north east of Australian New Guinea in order to

prevent them engaging in any political activity.⁶¹ In one case, two Papuans, one of whom, Willem Zonggonao, had been a member of the West Irian Assembly, crossed the border shortly before the Act took place and were arrested by the Australians, apparently at the request of the Indonesian authorities. The two men had smuggled out numerous testimonies from West Papuan leaders calling for independence and for the UN to abandon the Act. They had intended to present these to the UN in New York, instead, Australian officials sent them to Manus island.⁶²

Canberra also secretly worked closely with Indonesian security forces in combating the OPM. According to the journalist Anthony Balmain:

Australia maintained a secret military and intelligence relationship with Indonesia, aimed at eliminating armed pro-independence dissent. Telexes sharing information on the movement of the West Papuan armed resistance were sent over the border between Australian administered New Guinea and West Irian. The documents were dated before and during the act of self-determination. One cable sent on July 15, 1969, from Indonesian officers in Jayapura to Australian officers in Vanimo New Guinea, said, 'We inform you that some west Irianese have deserted to your country under the leadership of Bernadus Warry...armed with four weapons. Would you like to help us investigate?...The document indicated Australia assisted. 'Djajapura is being informed that the matter is being investigated'.⁶³

On 18 March, Ortiz Sanz issued a press release in which he referred to Indonesia's decision to rely solely on 'consultative assemblies' for the Act. For this to be acceptable, he made clear that three prerequisites should be taken into consideration:

- (1) The 'consultative assemblies' should have sufficiently large membership.
- (2) They should represent all sectors of the population.

(3) The new members should be clearly elected by the people. The United Nations Representative has, subsequently, received official assurances that these essential prerequisites will be complied with by the Government.⁶⁴

On the same day, he received a cable from Rolz-Bennett concerning a meeting between Dutch Ambassador Middelburg and U Thant. The Ambassador had informed the Secretary-General that there was growing concern in his country about the situation in West Irian, particularly as a result of recent Indonesian Government statements which, he claimed, seemed to indicate that Jakarta might “resort to methods and to pressures which would make a mockery of the whole exercise.”⁶⁵ For this reason, Middelburg relayed a request from Dutch Foreign Minister Luns:

Would the Secretary-General consider the sending of a United Nations ‘expeditionary force’ to West Irian for the purpose of guaranteeing that the Indonesian military would not threaten or otherwise coerce the West Irianese to vote in the sense desired by the Indonesian Government? Would the Secretary-General consider himself authorised to send such a force by the provision of Article XVII of the Agreement stating, inter alia, that ‘such additional staff as the United Nations Representative might feel necessary will be determined by the Secretary-General after consultations with Indonesia’.⁶⁶

In reply, U Thant had made clear that in his opinion, Article XVII did not confer on him the right to send such a force to West Irian. If the Dutch Government required a fuller response based on the interpretation of this article, the Secretary-General requested that they ask for it in writing. Middelburg said that they would, although there is no evidence in the UN documents that such a written request was ever made.⁶⁷

Ortiz Sanz replied to Rolz-Bennett that he fully agreed with the view that Article XVIII did not give U Thant the right to despatch an “expeditionary force,” and he added that such a proposal would be totally unacceptable to the Indonesians anyway. Furthermore, he suspected, correctly, that the Dutch were as aware of this as he was and concluded that “they are endeavouring to screen themselves from future responsibilities” by being able to claim if necessary that they had urged U Thant to protect the Papuans.⁶⁸

Papuan Acceptance and Dissent, and United Nations Concerns

On 26 March, four days after Indonesia initiated the first of the regional council consultations, Bakri Abdulgani Tianlean, Secretary of the pro-Indonesian “United West Irian Students and Youth organisation” gave a press conference in Jakarta. Surprisingly, Bakri announced that the general situation in West Irian was deteriorating with no freedom in the country. He added that a citizen risked arrest as an OPM agent if he talked about the need for economic improvement.⁶⁹

Such dissent was not reflected in official UN and Indonesian accounts of the eight regional councils’ meetings which took place between 22 March and 11 April to discuss Jakarta’s proposals for the Act.⁷⁰ The UNRWI’s report to the UNGA noted that during the UN monitored meetings, which were organised by a team led by Sudjarwo, one-third of the speakers rejected the whole exercise as a legacy of Dutch colonial policy. The majority of other speakers emphasised that the result of the Act should not favour separation from Indonesia. The only evidence of dissent Ortiz Sanz recorded was in the Jayapura regency where four

members supported a “one-man-vote” system and in the Paniai Council where one member, “expressed dissent from the Government’s proposal.”⁷¹

An eyewitness account, which contrasts sharply with the UN and Indonesian reports of the ‘consultations,’ was given to A. K. Mason of the British Embassy in April 1969 by Garth Alexander, a British journalist. Judged by Mason as being “reasonably objective,” Alexander described witnessing the first regional council meeting at Merauke on 22 March. He confirmed that there was strong opposition to the governments’s plans to hold the Act, but for reasons that were the complete opposite of those given in the UN and Indonesian accounts:

Alexander reports that Sudjarwo had a rather tough time with the assembly who are vigorously opposed to the Government’s plans and see in them no chance of revealing to the world the true wishes of the Papuans. It is for that reason that they oppose the Act of Free Choice - the Antara version is a rather neat reversal of motives.⁷²

It is possible that due to language difficulties, either Alexander or the U.N. had badly misunderstood the council’s deliberations. The other possibility is that Ortiz Sanz, members of his team, or the UN Secretariat, deliberately chose to remain silent about a significant incident of Papuan protest at Indonesian manipulation of the Act.

What is certain is that Ortiz Sanz’s report to the UNGA concluded that the councils adopted by *musjawarah* (reaching a consensus) resolutions stating that, although they believed the Act to be unnecessary, they accepted the Government’s proposal to implement the Act through *musjawarah* with consultative assemblies specifically established for the purpose.⁷³ These conclusions were then endorsed by

the Provincial Council of West Irian (DPRD - the Regional Assembly) on 24 April, which also expressed thanks to Sudjowo's team of organisers. Finally, they called on the authorities to take firm action against any disturbances which might jeopardise the Act or the recently announced five year development plan.⁷⁴ In a further measure to create the "right conditions" in the territory, the authorities also sent over in early April several hundred Indonesian "teachers of history, technical services and politics" to work among the Papuans. According to a Government spokesman their purpose was to "help make a success" of the Act. This campaign was the responsibility of Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo, in his capacity as Commander of the Army's OPSUS (Special Operations Section). Murtopo himself, described as Suharto's "trouble-shooter" by one British official, had arrived in the territory on 20 February 1969 to "speak to the West Irianese and their leaders about the Act."⁷⁵

Despite the undeniable efficiency of Indonesian control over the regional councils, they could not completely prevent unofficial expressions of dissent, even in the provincial capital. At 06:00 on the 11 April, the day when the last council consultation took place in Jayapura, a nationalist demonstration occurred in front of the residence of Ortiz Sanz. As might be expected, there are conflicting accounts of the event. Robin Osborne, in his book on nationalist resistance in Irian Jaya, claims that 2000 Papuans took part.⁷⁶ Moses Werror, an eye-witness and now an OPM leader based in PNG, gives a figure of around 5000.⁷⁷ Van der Kroef estimated 200⁷⁸ while Eliezer Bonay, the ex-Governor of West Irian described it as the largest demonstration which had ever taken place in the capital.⁷⁹ Ortiz Sanz

however, reported to Rolz-Bennett the next day that only around 150 people were involved.⁸⁰

According to D Kaffier, one of the organisers, the intention had been to march from Ortiz Sanz's residence to the Regional Assembly building and demand the adoption of 'one man one vote' for the Act. In the end, this never took place and the demonstrators were dispersed by troops and armoured vehicles shortly after delivering a petition to the UNRWI.⁸¹ In Ortiz Sanz's account to Rolz-Bennett he described how he gave a short talk to the peaceful demonstrators:

I told them briefly that I was aware of their sentiments which I would convey to the Sec-Gen, that to prevent bloodshed or other unpleasant developments for the population they should return to their homes and work places in an orderly and peaceful manner, and that UNATIONS would continue trying to insure the rights and freedoms to which they are entitled.⁸²

Twenty minutes after the demonstrators left, Ortiz Sanz was informed that they had been surrounded by police and troops in a nearby street. He told Rolz-Bennett that he immediately visited Sudjarwo and two senior military officers to ask for the troops to be withdrawn. Following his warnings that military reprisals would seriously damage Indonesia's international prestige, Ortiz Sanz described how a Brigadier General Brotosewojo promised to order the immediate withdrawal of the troops. The UNRWI's confidential conclusions on this incident could be described as, at the very least, over-optimistic:

The outcome of this incident has shown for the first time in West Irian the possibility of peaceful democratic demonstrations by the population and evident good-will on the part of high ranking Indonesian military commanders. Everything is now quiet.⁸³

Papuans involved in the event give very different accounts. Moses Werror claimed that the army started shooting and arresting the demonstrators, particularly the leaders including himself.⁸⁴ Kacier also spoke of the leaders being arrested.⁸⁵ Another of the organisers described his arrest at the demonstration and subsequent treatment:

I was arrested and held at the prison of the Navy Department in Hamadi. I was beaten and given electric shocks at night while I was being interrogated, and my lips were burnt with a lighted cigarette...I was released after a few months of this.⁸⁶

It is important to remember that the Papuans who gave these accounts were all OPM supporters when interviewed. Nonetheless, their accounts are not atypical of Indonesian military behaviour, either then or in the years since. Furthermore, although Werror later on became a senior figure in the OPM (which Western sources believed was involved in the march), at the time he had just returned to West Irian after spending five years as an Indonesian diplomat at the Canberra Embassy. His motive for joining the peaceful demonstration was, he said, simply to ask for a free vote.⁸⁷ In this context, Ortiz Sanz's conclusions on the incident appear naive, misleading or both.

An insight into how the Papuans were viewed by one of the key Indonesians in West Irian is revealed in a report from March 1969 of a discussion between a Jakarta-based British official and General Sarwo Edhie. The General, who was perhaps irritated by on-going Papuan resistance to Jakarta, replied to a query about his opinion of the local people by stating that:

they badly needed civilizing, half of them were completely naked (which seemed to shock him) and they were very lazy. He had a feeling that the Dutch had spoiled them...[but] properly treated

by an honourable administration, they should settle down happily.⁸⁸

It was an assessment that could have just as easily been made by a nineteenth century Dutch colonial officer about the Javanese, and it goes some way to explaining why the Indonesians were so resented.

Papuan concerns over the way the Act was to be organised were also shared to an extent by the UN leadership in New York. By mid-April, Rolz-Bennett had been informed by Ortiz Sanz that Jakarta was now planning to have the additional representatives of the assemblies “suggested” by ad hoc committees. It was an embarrassing situation for the UN, since Ortiz Sanz’s press release of 18 March had declared that these additional members should be clearly elected by the people if the Act was to be acceptable. It had also stated that Indonesia agreed to comply with this.⁸⁹ In response, Rolz-Bennett cabled Ortiz Sanz:

Our initial reaction is that Indonesia may be going too far particularly by decision to have the additional representatives ‘suggested’ (which means in fact appointed) by an ad hoc committee of each representative council. Our Indonesian friends should realise, as you have told them so many times, that the method for the act of free choice, while consonant with the realities of the territory, should not depart so radically from generally accepted norms of political representation. It is surely not beyond human ingenuity to devise a method whereby the additional representatives would be elected or selected by their respective communities, thus giving an opportunity to the general population to be involved in the act of free choice.⁹⁰

Ortiz Sanz’s response was to send Sudjarwo several notes, “expressing certain concern and observations regarding Ad Hoc Committees and in general the procedures for the democratic election of members of the Consultative Assemblies.” In reply, at the end of April, Sudjarwo merely informed the UNRWI

that his government would send him an official report “in the next few days” regarding the results of preliminary consultations with the councils about the method to be adopted.⁹¹

The UN leadership’s reaction to Indonesia’s change of position may be seen as further evidence that, while it was content to see Jakarta manipulate the whole exercise, it was increasingly concerned at the absence of some appearance of genuine Papuan participation. While both sides wished to avoid controversy, it was less of a priority for Indonesia than it was for the UN which, as the supposed defender of human and political rights, was potentially more vulnerable to international criticism.

Indonesia’s on-going opposition to involvement by the general population in the Act is understandable in the context of the journalist Alexander’s eye-witness account of his three week visit to the territory in March 1969. In his description of the journalist’s comments, Mason at the Jakarta British Embassy wrote:

...the majority of West Irianese...are very far from wishing to become integrated with the Republic of Indonesia. Of all the people he spoke to, and he met between 300 and 400, none was in favour of such a solution. The impression he has is that the Papuans loathe the Indonesians, perhaps in the same degree and as a direct consequence of the way in which the Indonesians have despised and belittled the Papuans.⁹²

Following the 11 April demonstration, Indonesian security forces were keen to prevent any more attempts by Papuans to contact the UNRWI at his residence. Five days later, five armed Indonesian soldiers forced their way into the residence and began shouting in Indonesian at Marshal Williams, the Mission’s

American Chief Administrative Officer. Eventually, through an interpreter, it was established that the soldiers thought that Williams, who was black, was a Papuan and they intended to remove him from the building. Once the soldiers were persuaded to leave, Williams attempted to inform Sudjarwo of the incident, but “had no opportunity to do so.”⁹³ The UNRWI had meanwhile already returned to Jakarta.

A week later Ortiz Sanz wrote to Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik complaining about the incident and reminding him that, under the terms of the Agreement, UN premises were inviolable. It was therefore a violation of the Agreement to enter them without the express permission of himself, or U Thant:

I do not wish, in view of the high regard I have for you and mindful of the delicate stage in our negotiations, to present on this occasion an official protest which might give rise to press comments unfavourable to Indonesia. On the other hand, I cannot ignore the offence committed against the Secretary-General...nor can I expose my Mission to the risk of a repetition of such a disagreeable incident. I have decided therefore, to address myself to you in a personal manner within the spirit of friendliness and co-operation which exists in our relations.⁹⁴

The matter was kept out of the press and not mentioned again. It is possible, however, that this intimidation was not accidental. According to Brian May, Indonesian Army intelligence had at one point “trumped up” a charge against Williams, and he was only saved from being declared *persona non grata* by “the good sense of the Foreign Ministry.”⁹⁵

After leaving the territory at the end of the mission, Williams himself seemed reasonably unconcerned about his treatment, although he remarked to

relatives that things “dragged along” at times, due to “small difficulties.” He also commented that the few Papuan leaders there were “yearned and hoped” for independence, and that generally, “self-determination was much desired by the West Irianese.”⁹⁶ These views though, were not unique to Williams. According to a 1969 document by the US Embassy in Jakarta; “Personal political views of the UN team are...95 per cent of Irianese support the independence movement and that the Act of Free Choice is a mockery.”⁹⁷ Therefore, if the Indonesians had particular objections to Williams, it was unlikely to be because he was any more sympathetic than his colleagues to the plight of the local people. Perhaps it was simply that the military felt uncomfortable having someone black like the Papuans in such a senior UN position.

Rebellion

Shortly before the first ad hoc committees began selecting additional members for the Assembly, Indonesia and the UN faced perhaps their most serious threat to the successful completion of the Act. In mid-April, large scale armed rebellions erupted in and around Enarotali in the Paniai region of the Western Central Highlands.

According to the Indonesian military, the catalyst for the unrest was local opposition to the appointment by the authorities in February of an Indonesian as district head of Paniai.⁹⁸ On 14 April, the missionary airstrip at the village of Moanemani was made unusable by locals erecting barricades. At the same time, non-Papuan government officials were advised by rebels to leave the area. The next day in Wagate, similar warnings were given to non-Papuans including

teachers, and a week later the local airstrip was “demolished.”⁹⁹ By 23 April, the unrest had escalated into an organised rebellion led by around 90 well-armed, Papuan policemen who mutined and joined up with the OPM.¹⁰⁰ As the rebellion rapidly spread among the 30,000 local Kapakau (Ekari) people, Franz Kaisiepo, the Governor of West Irian, issued a press statement acknowledging that the revolt was supported by all the Kapakau leadership. He also conceded that tribal groupings which had been enemies for years were united in their hostility to Indonesia.¹⁰¹

The rebels’ first move was to round up local Indonesian teachers and government officials and evacuate them unharmed from the area, mostly to the army headquarters at Nabire 100 kilometres to the northwest. Local Protestant and Catholic missionaries were also removed, as was a small detachment of fourteen Indonesian soldiers from the garrison at Waghete. Those Indonesians who were not forced to leave fled anyway.¹⁰²

On 26 April, the OPM took over a Catholic Mission wireless and broadcast a message to the army headquarters, and to General Sarwo Edhie personally. The message was a request for all Indonesian troops to leave the area so that the local people could exercise the “right of free choice” without pressure. They also asked for the UN to assist by despatching planes for the evacuation.¹⁰³ When it became clear that this request would be ignored, the rebels dug up the airstrips at Enarotali, Waghete, Epoty, Nononanie and Paniai making them unusable. On 27 April, a plane carrying police and soldiers, including General Sarwo Edhie, was shot at by the OPM as it flew over Enarotali, possibly trying to land. Two of the passengers

including a police inspector, were wounded and the plane returned to Nabire.¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile, with the Indonesian authorities gone, the Papuan 'Morning Star' flag was openly flown in Enarotali and other towns under rebel control.

General Sarwo Edhie's response was to order in aircraft to strafe areas of suspected rebel activity.¹⁰⁵ Following this, paratroopers were dropped into the area on 30 April, with others following on 4 May. Shortly before being dropped, the troops, who had been based in Bandung West Java, were addressed personally by President Suharto who told them:

The return of West Irian into the fold of the motherland is not at all a gift from outside, not just the result of cleverness at the negotiating table. It is supported by real military achievements and intensive preparations by the whole people of Indonesia.¹⁰⁶

As fighting broke out between Indonesian troops and Papuan rebels, around 14,000 people living in Enarotali and the surrounding area fled into the bush.¹⁰⁷ The Indonesian military soon re-occupied Enarotali, Wagete and other sub-district centres, but found stiff resistance in Muanemani "from large numbers of people." According to an official Indonesian military history of the rebellion:

More troops were drafted into the area and for a few weeks, it seemed that the army had re-established its authority, but in June, army units were again attacked by 'thousands of people.' The most serious attack, according to the Indonesian account, took place in Pasir Putih Kumopa when eleven soldiers were killed, dozens more wounded, many weapons captured, and surviving troops were forced to retreat.¹⁰⁸

With most of the population gone, incidents of looting by the military occurred and in one reported case, a Dutch missionary's house boy was shot dead by soldiers as he attempted to row his sister to safety across one of the lakes. The

missionary himself, Father Tetro, was assaulted by troops after he complained that looting Indonesian troops were as bad as the mutinying police. Sarwo Edhie later apologised to the missionary for the assault, but not apparently, for the killing of his house boy.¹⁰⁹

Unless the people returned, Indonesia and the UN were concerned that the Act could not take place in the area. To persuade them back, Sarwo Edhie had leaflets distributed in early May assuring the rebels that their families and property would be unharmed, if they accepted an amnesty and returned. Another reported tactic was to parachute a Papuan into the bush where the people had fled. Once there, this individual informed them that he had seen “large Dutch cargoes waiting to be shipped to them,” but not until the Act had been completed.¹¹⁰

The following month, another leaflet was distributed citing the New Testament to entice the rebel policemen back:

Through your love of merciful Jesus Christ you should remember what is written in St. Luke’s Gospel about the prodigal son...Have you not pity for your wives and children, who are suffering because you left them?¹¹¹

Brian May speculated that the military had had help in preparing the leaflets from American Protestant missionaries. According to him:

They had already co-operated by passing on information given in confidence by Papuans that there would be serious trouble over the Act of Free Choice in the Enarotali area, but the army assured them there was only a trifling, local problem. Dutch Catholics also knew of the Papuans’ plans to demand that all Indonesians leave, but they agreed to keep silent on obtaining a promise from tribal leaders that there would be no physical attack¹¹²

Elsewhere, incidents were reported in Arso, near the northern part of the border, where UN officials estimated that around 500 Papuans demonstrated on 1 May and raised the 'Morning Star' flag. In response, at least two of the demonstrators were shot.¹¹³ On 27 April, Muju tribesmen raided an Indonesian army camp near Merauke hacking three soldiers to death with axes.¹¹⁴ In May, in the northern region of Dubu/Ubrub, the military discovered that Papuan youths were being given military training by rebels. Troops sent to capture the organiser were trapped and killed. Another army unit was then sent in and found all the villages in the area deserted.¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, on the Bird's Head Peninsula, the Arfak rebellion led by Awom continued, with 2000 rebels reportedly tying down three to four Indonesian battalions.¹¹⁶

At the time though, Sarwo Edhie assured journalists that the situation was under control. In a statement in mid-May, he explained that the paratroopers had been dropped into the Enarotali area to "inspire confidence among the people" and that the soldiers were welcomed "by cheering crowds who helped to repair the damaged airstrips."¹¹⁷

Back in Jakarta, Ortiz Sanz's initial reaction was to instruct his staff to "refrain from involvement." He was also concerned at growing international press interest over the unrest, and predicted that "certain sections" of it would start calling for some form of UN intervention. To counter this he cabled Rolz-Bennett on 6 May:

I suggest you be ready at UNations Headquarters to clarify the stand of the Unations in West Irian as exclusively related to the act of free choice underscoring the fact that this is a political

problem for Indonesia who has since one May 1963 ‘full administrative responsibility.’¹¹⁸

Rolz-Bennett’s reply suggests that he considered Ortiz Sanz was being too cautious in his dealings with the Indonesians:

While it is correct, as you have stated, that matters pertaining to the administration of the territory, including the maintenance of law and order, fall outside your mandate, we believe you are entitled to request full information from the Indonesian Government about these developments, insofar as they may have a relation to or may affect the act of free choice. We therefore suggest that you approach the appropriate Indonesian authorities and request an official account of the incidents in West Irian. It would be useful also to request the Indonesian authorities to keep you informed of any further developments concerning these incidents.¹¹⁹

But by the time this cable reached Ortiz Sanz, he had already issued a statement to the press that; “it is completely beyond the terms of reference of the United Nations Representative to make any investigation regarding matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative power.”¹²⁰

In New York, Indonesian Ambassador Abdulgani requested a meeting with U Thant on 9 May to discuss on-going preparations for the Act. At the same time, he also claimed that the unrest was simply the result of inter-tribal rivalry. He also denied any knowledge of the attack on Sarwo Edhie’s plane, or unrest elsewhere.¹²¹ This account differed radically from that given to Ortiz Sanz by Sudjarwo two weeks later. According to Sudjarwo, members of the “so-called Free Papua” movement had used economic/administrative “difficulties” to organise demonstrations against Indonesia and the Act. Preparations for this had begun the

previous December, and Sudjarwo referred to captured OPM “High Command” documents which he said spoke of plans to carry out:

...sabotage in every field to harm the Government, which should culminate on 1 May. As you may know, they have chosen their Victory-Day on 1 May. They have also ‘instructed’ their followers to kidnap West-Irianese who are loyal to the Indonesian Government and to make use of force whenever possible.¹²²

Sudjarwo also named a number of anti-Indonesian ringleaders including Louis Zonggonao, a local Council member, describing him as, “a brother of Wim Zonggonao, probably known to you too.”¹²³ Wim Zonggonao was the ex-West Irian Assembly member arrested by the Australians after crossing into PNG with a nationalist petition a few weeks before the Act.¹²⁴

On 12 May, in response to the unrest, Ortiz Sanz flew to West Irian from Jakarta for a seven day inspection of the territory. On his return to Jakarta on 19 May, he informed the waiting press that he had been assured by Sarwo Edhie that the army would continue to use restraint. He also claimed that everything was now quiet but tense, that the previous press reports had been grossly exaggerated, and that there was no cause for alarm about the future.¹²⁵ The actual death toll among the Papuans during this time will never be known, but large scale killings and abuse by Indonesian troops certainly took place while Ortiz Sanz’s mission was in the territory. Although information on such incidences was difficult to obtain, confidential Australian military information from late August 1969 reported:

Our previous information on rapes committed by Indonesian soldiers has been confirmed in a number of cases. The Bobol and Tamus people are quite definite on this score and...in particular one girl from Bobol, I think, was raped by a number of soldiers

when she was 11, several years later again and again when she was 16 and then married.¹²⁶

While some press reports may have been exaggerated, it is doubtful whether Ortiz Sanz was in a position to judge for himself. Although he visited Enarotali, Jayapura, Wagete, Nabire and Biak, Brian May claims that in Enarotali, he failed even to leave the airstrip.¹²⁷ Furthermore, he appears to have decided before he left Jakarta on what his assessment of the situation would be. On 12 May, just prior to departing for West Irian, he sent a cable to Rolz-Bennett which included a draft of a letter that he intended to send to Sudjarwo following his return from the territory:

I am pleased to inform you that, as far as I have been able to assess the situation, the occurrence of violence has ceased. The administrative and military authorities have been able to restore order acting with restraint...The general situation has improved; life of the population in the affected areas is being normalised and I have the impression that if all those concerned keep acting with restraint there is no cause for alarm.¹²⁸

The fact that this draft was essentially identical to his 19 May press statement, is clear evidence that he had no intention of acknowledging publicly anything which might have been damaging to Jakarta or the UN. As with the Papuan petitions, the UNRWI was quite prepared to give out misleading and incorrect information with the aim of concealing the extent of Papuan opposition to continued Indonesian rule.

Privately, though, Ortiz Sanz informed Rolz-Bennett that he wished to ask Indonesia to delay the Act “by three or four months in order to provide us with a last opportunity for improving the democratic conditions for the implementation of

the act of free choice.”¹²⁹ In support of this, Ortiz Sanz suggested to the Under Secretary-General that he would contact Sudjarwo to say that the recent arrests and restrictions on free movement and assembly made it:

...difficult to envisage a full and free participation of the people in the act of free choice. Therefore, our common efforts to provide the population of the territory with proper democratic guarantees and freedoms for the act of free choice have suffered a set back and I think that, under the present circumstances of restrictions, it should be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an act of free choice in accordance with the letter and spirit of the New York agreement.¹³⁰

Ortiz Sanz ended by urging Rolz-Bennett to permit him to transmit this request to the Indonesians. It is clear, however, that there was no support from the UN Secretariat for any plans to prolong the organisation’s involvement in West Irian. Where Ortiz Sanz had written about postponing the Act for “three to four months,” the copy of the cable received in New York had the word “?weeks?” handwritten over it, possibly because Rolz-Bennett doubted that Ortiz Sanz seriously meant to delay the Act for such a significant period.¹³¹ In his reply, he was diplomatic, but expressed no enthusiasm for Ortiz Sanz’s request:

We find it very difficult to comment on your intention to propose to the Indonesian Government the postponement of the act of free choice by three or four months until we have a personal evaluation from you as to the actual situation prevailing in West Irian. [Only in the light of this]...will we have a basis to decide whether a request for postponement...is the proper course of action. We are sure you will also give us your considered views as to whether it would in fact be possible to change significantly the conditions in the territory during the period of a suggested postponement.¹³²

Rolz-Bennett would have been well aware of the answer to his query. As long as Indonesia remained solely responsible for security and for organising the

Act, genuine Papuan self-determination could not take place. In these circumstances, a delay of any length would be largely irrelevant.

In his “personal evaluation” of the situation following his return from West Irian, Ortiz Sanz repeated his assertion to the Under Secretary-General that military operations had been “grossly exaggerated” by the press. Contradicting Brian May’s report, he also claimed to have walked round Enarotali “without incident”.¹³³

Nonetheless, he added :

These incidents can be attributed in part to the desire of the population to hold an act of free choice without interference from the military. Another contributing factor is the local discontent with the Javanese authorities. If the situation is not normalised it is difficult to envisage how further steps for the act of free choice can be taken in the deserted villages of the important and densely populated regency of Paniai.¹³⁴

He ended by saying that his intention was to release the information contained in the cable, to the press “with the exception of the political comments”.¹³⁵ In this context his definition of ‘political’ referred to those sections of the cable which referred to significant opposition to Indonesian rule.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Notes

1. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 8 January 1969.
2. Brian May; The Indonesian Tragedy, p.171.
3. *ibid.* p.172.
4. Djakarta Times, 13 January 1969.
5. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia and West New Guinea: The New Dimensions of Conflict", p.387.
6. *ibid.*
7. PRO: FCO 24/447 (FWD 1/4). Sutherland (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Donald Aiers, (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 20 January 1969.
8. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 15 January 1969.
9. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i, para 43.
10. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 15 January 1969.
11. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 8 January 1969.
12. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 21 January 1969.
13. NAA: A452/T291968, 2581. Australian Mission to the UN New York, to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 30 January 1969.
14. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 28 January 1969.
15. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i, para 84. Curiously, this contradicted the official Indonesian report which gave the date as 8 January 1969. (Annex ii, para. 33).
16. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 2. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 30 January 1969.
17. *ibid.*

18. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex ii, para 34.
19. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 2. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 30 January 1969.
20. NAA: A452/T291968, 2581. Australian Mission to the UN to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 30 January 1969.
21. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 14 February 1969.
22. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 2. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 30 January 1969.
23. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 4. Decree of the Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs, Chairman of the West Irian sector No. 31 1969, on the establishment of the Consultative Assembly for the Act of Free Choice: Regency Merauke.
24. UN: Series 100, File 1, Box 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 14 February 1969.
25. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i para 86.
26. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (Cable No JKT 33), 11 March 1969.
27. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 14 February 1969.
28. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (JKT 33), 11 March 1969.
29. *ibid.*
30. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 18 February 1969.
31. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i para 126.
32. UN: Series 100, Box 1, File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 18 February 1969
33. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex ii para 24.
34. UN: DAG 1/2.2.3:9. Rolz-Bennett. Note for the record of a meeting between U Thant, Rolz-Bennett and Indonesian Ambassadors Sudjarwo and Abdulgani in New York, 23 January 1969.

35. *ibid.*
36. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i para. 141.
37. *ibid*, para 142, 145.
38. *ibid*, para 144.
39. *ibid*, para 147.
40. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Summaries, contained in 6 lists, of 156 political communications from Papuans to Ortiz Sanz sent between August 1968 and the end of April 1969.
41. Antara dispatch, 3 February 1969, quoted in Van Der Kroef, “West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict”, p.374.
42. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p. 169.
43. Beverley Blaskett; “Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Relations: A New Perspective on the Border Conflict”, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, (February 1989), p.68
44. *ibid*, p. 77.
45. Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, p.21, quoting Praja Ghupta Vira: Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa (Cendrawasih: Sedjarah Militer Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, 1971).
46. “Problems in Australian Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. XVI (July-December 1969), p.1. By the time Labor came to power in Australia in 1972, this resolution had lapsed.
47. Van Der Kroef, “West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict”, p.395.
48. Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p. 44.
49. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). Neilson (British High Commission, Canberra) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 4 July 1969.

50. NAA: 1969 Australian documents released early to Antony Balmain, researcher for “Act of No Choice”, SBS Television (extracts kindly passed to author by Balmain). Department of External Affairs to Australian Mission to the UN New York, 5 September 1969
51. Peter Hastings, “West Irian to Papua and New Guinea”, New Guinea, (June-July 1970), p. 67, quoted in Van Der Kroef, “West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict”, p.395.
52. Kiki to Johnson, Contained in a cable from the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby to Canberra, in Richard Walsh and George Munster, Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1968-1975, 1980, quoted in Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.60.
53. Ian Downs, The Australian Trusteeship of Papua New Guinea 1944-1975 (Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service, 1990), p.232.
54. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 1. Cable to the UN in New York, 18 February 1969.
55. Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.108.
56. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). Neilson (British High Commission, Canberra) to I.K. Ellison (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 23 May 1969.
57. PRO: FCO 24/447 (FWD 1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 3 April 1969.
58. Commonwealth of Australia Department of External Affairs, Annual Report (June 1968-30 June 1969), p.90.
59. *ibid.*
60. Beverley Blaskett, “Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Relations: A New Perspective on the Border Conflict”, p.80.
61. Antony Balmain, “How Canberra helped Kill Freedom Dreams”, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1999. Referring to Australian Department of Foreign Affairs documents dating from 1969, which were released early to SBS television in 1999.
62. *ibid.*
63. *ibid.*

64. UN: DAG 1/2.2.3:9. Act of Free Choice cables, 18 March 1969.
65. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 2. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 125), 18 March 1969.
66. *ibid.*
67. *ibid.*
68. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No UNRWI SKU-22), 29 March 1969.
69. Van Der Kroef, “West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict”, p.379.
70. There is a minor discrepancy in the dates given by Ortiz Sanz and the Indonesians in their UNGA reports. Ortiz Sanz gives the date of the last consultation as 12 April while Indonesia says 11 April 1969. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i para. 93 and Annex ii para. 39 respectively.
71. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i para. 101.
72. PRO: FCO 24/447 (FWD 1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 3 April 1969.
73. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i para 105.
74. *ibid*, para’s 106 and 107.
75. South Pacific Post, 3 April 1969. Quoted in Van Der Kroef, “West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict”, p.382.
76. Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War. The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.45.
77. Interview with OPM Revolutionary Council Chairman Moses Werror (22 August 1996). Interview by Ben Saul for Honi Soit, Sydney University Student Newspaper, Australia.
78. Van der Kroef, “West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict”, p. 383.
79. Interview with Eliezer Bonay, D Kafiar and Chris Waney in a refugee hostel in Flen, Sweden (19 September 1981). Interview by Carmel Budiardjo and published in Tapol Bulletin No. 48, November 1981.

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94. *ibid.*
95. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p. 174.

96. Letter to the author from Mary Williams, widow of Marshall Williams, 28 July 1999.
97. Antony Balmain, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1999.
98. Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, p.21, quoting Praja Ghupta Vira: Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa (Cendrawasih: Sedjarah Militer Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, 1971).
99. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 23 May 1969.
100. Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.42.
101. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.175.
102. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i para. 159; UN: DAG 1/2.2.3:9. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No. UNRWI JKT 48), April 1969.
103. *ibid*.
104. *ibid*; Budiardjo & Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, p.21; Brian May The Indonesian Tragedy, p.173.
105. Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.42.
106. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.169.
107. *ibid*, p.175.
108. Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, p.22, quoting Praja Ghupta Vira: Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa (Cendrawasih: Sedjarah Militer Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, 1971).
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110. *ibid*, p.177.
111. *ibid*
112. *ibid*

113. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 1. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 5 May 1969.
114. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.179.
115. Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, p.21, quoting Praja Ghupta Vira: Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa (Cendrawasih: Sedjarah Militer Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, 1971).
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119. UN: DAG 1/2.2.3:9. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 244), 7 May 1969.
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121. UN: DAG 1/2.2.3:9. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 250), 9 May 1969.
122. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 23 May 1969
123. *ibid.*
124. Antony Balmain, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1999.
125. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November 1969), Annex i para.157.
126. Anthony Balmain, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1969. There is evidence that the practice, by Indonesian troops, of raping women and girls seems to have remained a feature of their security operations in the years since 1969. Numerous such incidents were reported in May 1999 by the Robert F Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy.
127. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.173.
128. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 1. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No. UNRWI JKT-55) 12 May 1969.
129. *ibid.*

130. *ibid.*

131. UN: DAG 1/2.2.3:9. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No.258), 16 May 1969.

132. *ibid.*

133. *ibid.*

134. *ibid.*

135. *ibid.*