

CHAPTER NINE

MAY TO JULY 1969

Indonesian/UN Discussions on Rights, Freedoms and Preparations for Assembly Member Elections.

While rebellion continued in West Irian, in New York the UN tried to focus more on its concerns over Indonesian preparations for the Act. On 9 May, U Thant responded to a briefing on the subject from the Indonesian Ambassador by re-emphasising the importance he attached to the process of selecting the additional members for the assemblies:

Turning to the methods for the election of the enlarged councils, the Secretary-General emphasised the importance of electing the additional councillors in a way that would ensure that the new councillors would truly represent the people of their constituencies. This would be the touchstone in the judgement about the fairness and validity of the whole exercise which would be made by Member States of the United Nations.¹

At the same time in Jakarta, Ortiz Sanz and Sudjarwo continued to hold meetings and exchange letters through out May. On 9 May, Sudjarwo repeated his assertion that many Papuans “vigorously” opposed to the Act taking place. Nonetheless, he added that the government had to “guard” the people from “misinformation from certain quarters.” He also thanked Ortiz Sanz for his “constant”

advice about the Act, and for his suggestions regarding greater political freedoms. Sudjarwo reminded him that this issue was already covered by the Indonesian constitution:

If in your opinion the rights and freedoms in West Irian are 'limited', I must state that the rights and freedoms in West Irian are not less than those existing in other areas of Indonesia. We might have a slight difference in the interpretation of Democracy and especially what kind of democracy Indonesia pursues which is not a liberal (western) democracy but a kind of social democracy with an emphasis on social and national responsibilities.²

In the same letter, Sudjarwo also discussed the issue of Papuan nationalism, explaining that Indonesians considered such political activities as inseparable from their 'historical' background. By this he meant that Dutch colonial policies in the territory had 'incited' the Papuans against Indonesia, as part of a wider campaign against the Republic. As a consequence, Papuan nationalist aspirations could not only be dismissed as a cynical colonial creation, they were also a threat to genuine Indonesian nationalism. Therefore, they were not to be tolerated:

it is indeed impossible for the Indonesian Government or for that matter, for any Indonesian to look at this so called 'free Papua movement' innocently separated from its historical background. One should understand the political history regarding West Irian and the inherent Indonesian fight for freedom to understand this Indonesian attitude.³

Sudjarwo's argument is in many ways correct, but it needs some further consideration. It was true that the Dutch did encourage the growth of Papuan nationalism in the last years before their departure and, by definition, this nationalism was opposed to the idea of integration with Indonesia. However, as long as the Dutch

believed that they could one day grant independence to their colony, it would have been irresponsible not to have encouraged and assisted a political nationalist elite to form. This was a practice common, with varying degrees of success, in other European colonies being prepared at that time for independence. Where the Netherlands failed the Papuans most was in not encouraging this earlier.

These belated Dutch efforts to prepare West New Guinea for independence may indeed have been largely spurred on by their hostility to Sukarno. But Indonesia's dismissal of Papuan nationalism was arrogant and characteristically self-obsessed. To label one people's nationalism as legitimate and another's not is a common enough tactic whenever a state is threatened by separatism. West Irian's significance to Jakarta lay always in terms of how the issue affected Indonesia's own national interest. Whether it was their national pride, political stability or economic requirements, it was never anything to do with the interests of the Papuans themselves. This, then, is perhaps a more accurate 'historical background' against which the Papuan nationalist issue should be viewed.

The following day, Sudjarwo returned to the issue of the regional council consultations. In a letter dated 10 May, he rebuffed assertions by Ortiz Sanz that Government decrees for the determination of the method for the Act had been taken without the U.N.'s due participation. In support of this, Sudjarwo argued that a draft of these decrees was passed to senior UNRWI adviser Ali Nekunam well before the consultations commenced:

...so that your Mission was given ample opportunity to have a close look at these drafts for possible comments or advices, even if privately or unofficially. Such comments or advices were not submitted at that time.⁴

He then reminded Ortiz Sanz that UN officials had been present throughout all the consultations and had at no point questioned the proceedings. It was unfortunate, he added, that Ortiz Sanz himself had not been present. Turning to the next stage in the preparations, Sudjarwo assured the UNRWI that the organisers of the ad hoc committees had been told that the UN were entitled to “participate” in the arrangements for the election of representatives for the final Consultative Assemblies:

Due to specific circumstances in the region, these ad-hoc committees have to make their own schedule or plan of operation. So please inform your staff in Djajapura to contact the Bupatis if and when they wish to ‘participate’ in the arrangements of the projected elections...be assured again, Mr. Ambassador, that the Indonesian Government and the local administrators in West Irian - despite the inadequacies - are doing their utmost to implement properly what has been decided by the Government in consultations with the local councils in West Irian pursuant to the provisions of the New York Agreement.⁵

Their disagreements over the ad hoc committees became public after Sudjarwo, then Ortiz Sanz, leaked details to the press. In early May, Dutch newspaper reports on the issue caused some anxiety at the Hague. One official noted they were “by no means confident that Parliamentary pressures could not develop again” over the issue in the Netherlands.⁶ In Jakarta, Australian diplomats were concerned that Sudjarwo had “been letting his irritation become apparant to journalists.”⁷ This followed a series of confidential briefings which he gave to Indonesian journalists revealing that “bad feeling” existed between himself and Ortiz Sanz.⁸ They therefore

urged him to avoid giving “the impression publicly that there was any substantial differences between Indonesia and Ortiz Sanz.”⁹ But on 20 May, the UNRWI responded to Sudjarwo’s comments by giving a series of individual ‘off the record’ briefings to foreign journalists in which he revealed his concerns that the government’s selection of additional members for the assemblies would be “less than satisfactory.” He added, incorrectly, that under his mandate he had no authority to participate in the Act.¹⁰

Elections for the Assemblies and UN Protests

Meanwhile, the process for electing additional assembly members had already commenced the previous month, without any U.N. involvement.¹¹ From Jakarta, Ortiz Sanz informed Rolz-Bennett on 23 May that, in order to participate, he had asked Sudjarwo on 1 May to provide a detailed timetable for the elections. This had not yet been provided, “with the result that we find ourselves in a difficult position to perform our duties.”¹² Importantly, Ortiz Sanz also alleged to Rolz-Bennett that he had evidence of a deliberate policy by Indonesia to prevent UN involvement in this crucial stage of the Act:

...recently we had the occasion to read certain official instructions which indicated that the participation of the United Nations should be avoided with the explanation that the elections had already taken place.¹³

The Indonesians, however, informed U Thant that difficulties with obtaining timetables for the elections stemmed from their being decided by the various ad hoc committees themselves:

Due to the poor means of communications between the regencies in West Irian and Djakarta, it was not possible to have these time-tables in Djakarta soon. That's why it was not possible for Mr Sudjarwo to provide these time-tables to Mr Ortiz Sanz in Djakarta, when the former was asked for at the end of April and beginning of May.¹⁴

At a press conference in Jakarta on 20 May, Ortiz Sanz stated that he had informed the Indonesians again that the assemblies would only be democratic if they were sufficiently large, represented all sections of the population and were clearly elected by the people. He added that his staff were still waiting to observe and participate in these elections.¹⁵

In a letter to Ortiz Sanz on 23 May, Sudjarwo conceded that some elections were already being carried out without UN participation. He assured the UNRWI, though, that government officials had been instructed that it was their duty to cooperate fully and effectively with the UN in this process. He also stated that his representative in the territory, Joost Rotty, had been ordered to "discuss the problem with the local authorities and needless to say also with Mr. Nekunam in Djajapura."¹⁶

At this stage, Ortiz Sanz appeared to have serious concerns that if Indonesia by-passed the UN on this issue, his position and that of his mission would be in danger of becoming untenable. On 23 May he wrote to Rolz-Bennett:

The only means to ensure 'the eligibility of all adults, male and female...to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice,' is, as I have repeatedly urged the Indonesian Government, to have the representatives to the consultative assemblies clearly and

democratically elected by the people. To this effect the participation of the United Nations is of utmost importance. Therefore, I would like to suggest that the Secretary-General avail himself of this last opportunity given to him by the Agreement to express his views and comments in a personal memorandum addressed to Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, stressing the two points mentioned above.¹⁷

In his cable to Rolz-Bennett the same day he repeated this plea, urging U Thant personally to advise Jakarta that failure to elect the assembly members democratically in the presence of UNRWI officials, might result in the whole process being questioned in the future.¹⁸ U Thant had in fact already held a meeting with Indonesian Ambassador Abdulgani on 23 May, re-emphasising the importance of democratic elections witnessed by UNRWI staff.

Continuing the UN pressure on Jakarta, Ortiz Sanz met Sudjarwo in Jakarta on 24 May. In their discussion, he referred to a joint statement issued by Dutch Foreign Minister Luns and his Indonesian counterpart Malik, following a meeting held in Rome on 21 May. Although uncontroversial in its content, Ortiz Sanz seized upon one part which included a public re-affirmation by Malik that Jakarta would fully implement the provisions of the Agreement.¹⁹ This pledge, in such a public document would, Ortiz Sanz argued, be “very helpful in the proper implementation of the provisions of the Agreement.” Full implementation of the Agreement, he pointed out, meant democratic elections for the Assemblies in the presence of the UN.²⁰ It also meant guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of the population which, he informed Sudjarwo, still needed to be dealt with:

...because, I am sorry to say, up to now no concrete measures have been adopted by the Government in this respect. On the contrary, the situation with regard to rights and freedoms has deteriorated. There is a growing number of petitions and complaints of new arrests, and I will have to make an assessment of them. Should it be necessary I will seek an audience with his Excellency the President of the Republic.²¹

To conclude, Ortiz Sanz made a further appeal to the Indonesians at the meeting to re-consider their policy towards implementing the Act:

I stress the importance of a properly implemented Act of Free Choice because I believe Indonesia wishes a final, and not a temporary, solution to the problem of West Irian. The Indonesian Government should take a calculated risk and allow the opposition the opportunity to express its views. This is the moment for the Indonesian authorities to adopt courageous and generous measures.²²

This strong appeal was followed up the next day in New York by a similar confidential message from U Thant to Jakarta. U Thant's aide-memoire reminded the Indonesians of their previous assurances to him of democratic elections, and the crucial importance of this issue in assessing Jakarta's fulfilment of its responsibilities under the Agreement. The Secretary-General also urged Indonesia to give Ortiz Sanz sufficient warning of the election timetable, although by this time U Thant would have been aware that the elections were already well under way.²³

Ortiz Sanz eventually left for West Irian on 2 June. Before leaving Jakarta, he met Malik and emphasised once more the importance of democratic elections and political freedoms. Yet again he was given assurances on these issues.²⁴ In Canberra, Neilson of the British High Commission remarked, "there is a feeling abroad that

Indonesia is pulling a fast one in the Act of Free Choice and that Australia is leaning over backwards not to notice (and so it is!).”²⁵

Although the UN mission only received an election timetable on 30 May, on the same day, Wiesber Loeis, of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, told Brian May that the UN had already been informed that elections would begin on 7 May (in fact they began on 20 April) and end on 6 June. Loeis remarked that he did not know why the UN had not turned up to any, but he claimed that officials in Biak were still delaying the election in anticipation of their arrival.²⁶

According to May, the international release of this news story was a blow to the UN in Jakarta. He described them as being thrown ‘into confusion’ and claimed that the story precipitated Ortiz Sanz’s departure to West Irian. With Ortiz Sanz’s arrival, May comments that the UN then began a desperate search for air transport. They had none of their own, and despite Sudjarwo’s 23 May pledge of “full and effective cooperation,” Indonesia did not appear to be providing any:

Without planes the mission had no hope of observing this stage of the Act of Free Choice. Even if it had organized missionary transport well in advance, and it failed to take even this obvious precaution, it would not have been able to keep up with the elections improvised in remote and mountainous areas devoid of roads. Without interpreters, the observers, or whatever they were, could make little contact with villagers who might seize a chance for a few words with them. No real participation of any kind was possible in these circumstances and this must have been clear from the beginning.²⁷

Rotty, Sudjarwo's representative in Jayapura, maintained that the UN knew the elections were being held and added that there was nothing to stop them from going anywhere they wished. Any problems he said, had been merely the result of misunderstandings.²⁸ Sudjarwo described to May how the UN had tried and failed to charter a plane to observe elections fifteen minutes flight time from Jayapura: "It is very hard for them. To get to some of the elections would take a three-day walk and a boat trip. I don't think it's quite their line." May got the impression that some Indonesians were simply laughing at the "UN pantomime."²⁹

The UN finally witnessed an election on 4 June, six weeks after the process had commenced. The election took place in Biak. Also in attendance, were Stuart Harris of *The Times* and Watson, a diplomat at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. Afterwards, Harris visited the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta (but not the British) and spoke to a diplomat there called La Porta. During the conversation, Harris gave a "glowing picture" of the meeting at Biak in which he described the freedom of the people to decide who to represent them.³⁰ Harris' positive assessment was welcomed by Western officials who were quick to refer to it as evidence that some form of genuine Papuan participation was being permitted.

Within days of speaking to Harris, La Porta, who had also visited West Irian, briefed the British Embassy in Jakarta. Despite not having witnessed the Biak vote himself, he described it as "reasonably democratic" and claimed that a secret ballot had been used. He also stated that reports of violence and rebellion were exaggerated. In

particular, he said Indonesian troops had acted with restraint during the recent unrest. Nonetheless, he had warned U.S. citizens living in West Irian (almost all missionaries) to “keep very quiet and to avoid any involvement” in the Act. In his report to London of the conversation, the British diplomat Mason noted that La Porta’s information “cleared up some of the points raised in the 1 June 1969 *Observer* article.” This referred to an anti-Indonesian piece by ‘Michael Donald’ under the heading “Tribes Wiped Out in Secret War.”

Finally, La Porta also revealed that the Dutch and Australians had been privately urging the U.S., as mediators in the 1962 talks on the territory, to “concern themselves rather more closely” in the on-going situation in West Irian. The Americans though, declined the offer.³¹ The US policy of non-involvement in the Act was also noted by the British Embassy in Washington. On 3 June it informed London that, despite some criticism in the Senate, the Americans saw little merit in getting involved in “the niceties of ascertainment” because they “might lose goodwill [in Jakarta] to no advantage.”³²

Two days later on 12 June, Goronwy Roberts, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, mentioned the description of the Biak vote in a meeting with sceptical members of the British United Nations Association. The UNA had asked for the meeting to discuss serious concerns that they were having about events in the territory. He informed them that, in at least some elections, “conventional democratic methods were used with a large proportion of the population taking part,” and made a specific

reference to the use of a secret ballot in Biak.³³ Four days after that, the M.P. Tam Dalyell asked Roberts in the House of Commons:

May we have an assurance that the Foreign Office will resist following the lead of the press in jumping to the conclusion that the West Irian rebels are in the right and that the Indonesian Government in Djakarta are necessarily wrong?³⁴

A week later, on 24 June, the British Embassy in Jakarta was finally able to hear a first hand account of the Biak vote when officials spoke to the Australian diplomat Watson. He gave a very different version of events, informing them that he was convinced that the vote:

...was 'rigged', and that this was the only selection that the U.N. team witnessed, and they were taken especially to see it! The team were not invited to witness any of the selection processes elsewhere... Difficulties were put in their way in every case except Biak.³⁵

As with many allegations concerning West Irian under Indonesian rule, it is difficult to determine their accuracy. Nonetheless, in contrast to Harris' version of events, Watson's account of Biak was, unsurprisingly, not publicised by Britain or Australia.

A few days after the Biak vote, Ortiz Sanz had to inform Rolz-Bennett that his team had witnessed barely thirty percent of the elections.³⁶ This must have been an embarrassment to the UNRWI, particularly after both he and U Thant had repeatedly made clear to the Indonesians the vital importance of UN involvement in this stage of

the process. Furthermore, it was hard not to conclude that Jakarta had made Ortiz Sanz appear foolish and outwitted, both to the international press and to U Thant.

This conclusion was also reached by Watson who told the British that Ortiz Sanz had been “out-manoeuvred” by the Indonesians, particularly Sudjarwo. Significantly, there was also evidence of the UNRWI’s growing isolation within his own mission. In their description of the Australian’s assessment, the Embassy relayed to London:

[Ortiz Sanz’s] weak position has come about mainly as a result of lack of support from U.N. H.Q. Sudjarwo went to The Hague in January. Convinced by what he heard there that the Dutch Government would not cause difficulties in West Irian, he went onto New York, where he found in the U.N. Secretariat a similar attitude. Armed with this knowledge he has managed to render Ortiz Sanz virtually impotent. This is borne out by what a British UNESCO/FUNDWI expert resident in Jayapura reported to us last week when he was in Jakarta namely that the rest of the political mission now have little faith in Ortiz Sanz.³⁷

Reports of other elections also suggest that the procedures had been far from democratic. One foreign diplomat informed an Indonesian official, in front of Brian May, that many Papuans had been terrorised by the authorities “to fall in line”:

He cited an incident at Mulia, in the Central Highlands: a council member asked what would happen to him if he opted for independence; the reply was that he would be shot.³⁸

The authorities appeared little concerned about reports of such intimidation. On 24 May, the officially-controlled Jayapura newspaper *Tjenderawasih* reported that a Major Soewondo addressed 200 village chiefs in the Lake Sentani area on the

subject of the representatives' elections. Before ordering them to bring back villagers who had fled during the ongoing uprising he warned:

I am drawing the line frankly and clearly. I say I will protect and guarantee the safety of everyone who is for Indonesia. I will shoot dead anyone who is against us - and all his followers.³⁹

May himself witnessed the election of assembly members in Jayapura town on 9 June. He described how only nine candidates were nominated for the nine seats. The nominations were chosen by approximately 100 elders who had been brought in by the authorities to approve them. There was no way of knowing, however, whether these men were genuine representatives of the 15,000 local inhabitants:

The UN men did not speak Indonesian and had no means of asking the delegates questions or of understanding anything they might have wanted to say. I asked one of them, Marshall Williams, if he had been able to find out previously if those voting in fact represented the townspeople. He replied: 'We came in at this point'.⁴⁰

Agreement to Hold Fresh Elections

In the meantime, Ortiz Sanz wrote to Sudjarwo requesting a meeting with President Suharto to discuss his concerns.⁴¹ In New York, as soon as the UN leadership learned of the situation from Ortiz Sanz, they immediately sent a cable back making clear that, on this issue at least, Jakarta's behaviour was unacceptable:

Failure of the Indonesian Government to inform you about the time-tables for elections to consultative assembly is most regrettable. The fact that about 70 per cent of the elections took place without the presence of Unations observers will cast a serious doubt about the validity of such elections and will damage the Indonesian Government and the United Nations as well...these elections were the corner-stone of the whole exercise and the account of what happened in your report to the Secretary-General will jeopardize the outcome of the Act of Free Choice when the matter is taken up by

the General Assembly. In the circumstances, we strongly suggest that you approach the appropriate Indonesian authorities and urge them to conduct fresh elections in all the places where no UN observers were present, for the purpose of these fresh elections being observed by members of your staff. We are prepared to make a similar demarche at this end through Ambassador Abdulgani. May we have your urgent comments please.⁴²

Like U Thant, Ortiz Sanz had consistently emphasised to the Indonesians the importance of these elections. But now that his advice had again been ignored by Sudjarwo, he appeared reluctant to pursue the issue, despite U Thant's clear directive. It was as if after ten months in the job, Ortiz Sanz had little confidence in his ability to deflect Jakarta from its chosen path. In his reply to Under Secretary-General Narasimhan, he wrote that he would ask Indonesia to conduct fresh elections "in at least some of the places where more numerous representatives were elected without our participation."⁴³ This though, contrasted with Rolz-Bennett's "strong suggestion" for fresh elections in all the relevant places. Ortiz Sanz then added:

There is no doubt that the answer of the Government will be in the negative because lack of time and the complexity of the operation a view that I cannot reasonably object to because of the enormous practical difficulties involved.⁴⁴

There is evidence that the decision by Ortiz Sanz to ask for fresh elections in only some, and not all, of the places where the UN had not been present, was viewed with some irritation by Narasimhan. At the side of the cable Ortiz Sanz sent to UN Head Quarters was hand-written "Why not request in all of the places?"

Eventually, Ortiz Sanz wrote to Sudjarwo on 13 June to suggest that “despite the difficulties involved,” his Government give “serious consideration to the possibility” of holding fresh elections “at least in some of the localities where the largest number of representatives were elected before 30 May.” By doing this, he added, Jakarta would demonstrate its “fairness in regard to this matter” to the international community.⁴⁵

At this point, Jakarta finally seemed to realise that holding these elections without any UN presence was considered an unacceptable departure from the terms of the Agreement by both Ortiz Sanz, and more importantly, U Thant. In retrospect, it is clear that this was the one occasion during the entire UNRWI mission in which the UN adopted a firm position. Since Indonesia’s veto of Ortiz Sanz’s suggestion for any direct voting in the Act, the UN had repeatedly emphasised that the elections of Assembly representatives would need to include some evidence of participation by ordinary Papuans, witnessed by UNRWI staff. By ignoring these appeals, Jakarta was making it virtually impossible for U Thant to bestow UN legitimacy on the final result, something which both sides wanted.

As on previous occasions, Indonesia was simply using its dominant position to push for as many concessions as it could. On the one hand, this was an understandable tactic because, in the majority of cases, the UN gave way. At the same time, Jakarta knew that U Thant had no more interest than itself in seeing a genuine exercise of Papuan self-determination. It seems probable, then, that their systematic efforts to

sideline the UNRWI simply reflected Indonesian resentment of the whole process which expressed itself in a sometimes illogical reluctance to assist the UN in delivering final international acceptance of West Irian as part of the Republic.

On 14 June, Sudjarwo replied to Ortiz Sanz saying that he himself would have no objection to fresh elections being held “in a few places - if that would still be feasible - only to meet your wishes.”⁴⁶ Since Ortiz Sanz had expected a wholly negative response, this must have been somewhat of a surprise. Nonetheless, Sudjarwo qualified his position by maintaining “this of course is a matter for the local ad hoc committees with whom one should discuss these possibilities. It can not be decided in Djakarta.”⁴⁷

Furthermore, Sudjarwo alleged that UNRWI’s Ali Nekunam had previously informed him that it would be sufficient for the UN to attend merely a sample of the elections for each part of the territory. Sudjarwo therefore questioned the need for fresh elections in regencies, such as Jayapura, where there had been a UN presence in some of the original elections. Whether Nekunam ever said this cannot be confirmed, but handwritten annotations in the margin of Rolz-Bennett’s copy indicate that he found such a concession surprising at the very least.⁴⁸ In his reply to Ortiz Sanz, Rolz-Bennett expressed some satisfaction with the Indonesian response, while at the same time returning to this issue:

[Sudjarwo] speaks of fresh elections ‘in a few places’ and also leaves the matter to discussions with local ad-hoc committees. Notwithstanding such limitations, we are sure you will make every

effort to have the largest possible number of elections repeated in presence of Unations observers.⁴⁹

Despite this appeal from Rolz-Bennett, Ortiz Sanz appeared to feel that Sudjarwo had already moved further than expected and he made no further appeals to the Indonesians on the issue.

On 23 June, the Indonesians sent the UNRWI a timetable for fresh elections. The choice had been made following “consultations with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the local authorities in the territory.” In all, Jakarta listed nine such elections which were spread throughout the territory, beginning on 26 June in Merauke and ending in Biak on 5 July. In the end, however, despite another Indonesian pledge to ensure that the UN could attend, UNRWI staff only managed to witness six fresh elections.⁵⁰ At the same time, they also attended a further four elections in Balim, Paniai and Manokwari, areas which had not previously voted. Nonetheless, in all, Ortiz Sanz reported that the UN only witnessed the election of 195 out of the 1026 Assembly Representatives who were eventually selected to take part in the Act.

In his final report to the UNGA, although he lists the number witnessed by UNRWI staff, Ortiz Sanz gives no description of the actual conduct of the original or fresh elections for the Assembly Representatives. However, a number were witnessed by foreign journalists, and their reports give some idea of the procedures employed. In Biak, Hugh Lunn described how, despite being followed everywhere by Indonesian security officials, locals still managed to pass him notes alleging that the Indonesians

were killing Papuans suspected of favouring independence. On 5 July, Lunn and Otto Kuyk, a Dutch colleague, visited the Biak village of Bosnik where they watched fresh elections of six Assembly Representatives in the presence of four UN observers and around 500 villagers. His account also gives further credence to suggestions of disquiet amongst the UNRWI's team:

A group of Indonesians walked into the crowd 'to ask who they want', and emerged with six men who stood and looked grimly at the ground. Then there was a huge cheer. From out of the bush came two men and a boy carrying a sign saying the candidates were 'not representative of the will of the people' and that a new wave of arrests was under way...The three sat in front of the crowd and stuck their little signs in the ground, catching unawares the Indonesian soldiers in civilian clothes. I rushed forward to get the names of the three...before they were marched off by men with guns...Kuyk appealed to...Ortiz Sanz...but he said the UN was there only as an observer...In the next three days, all three UN observers under Ortiz Sanz came to me individually, distraught. They said there would be no free choice. They'd received a constant stream of pleading letters. I asked each for an on-the-record interview. If a UN official spoke out, the World would listen. Jim [Lewis], an elderly American, said he would lose his pension. Michel [Pelletier], a young Frenchman, said he earned three times as much with the UN as back home and Peter [Jennings] a young Indonesian speaking American said his future was tied to Indonesia.⁵¹

This "election" was also witnessed by Link van Bruggen who confirms Lunn's description, although he estimated a much larger crowd of 2-3000.⁵²

Another election was witnessed by Bob Hawkins, editor of *Pacific Islands Monthly*. It took place on 24 June in a meeting hall in the highland town of Wamena in the Balim valley. Hawkins commented that his most vivid recollection of the process

was that of an Indonesian officer using a thick cane to prod the local Ndani people into position, so that they could vote unanimously for the Indonesian choice.⁵³

Furthermore, there is evidence that in May 1969, the military commander for Merauke sent instructions regarding the selection process to a senior governmental official in the area. Assembly members, he stated, had to be chosen on the basis of their loyalty to Indonesia. If a “delegate” was not loyal then “one has to have the courage to use improper methods to remove the delegates concerned.”⁵⁴

When one considers the importance attached by the UN to these elections, as the ‘touchstone’ on which the democratic credentials of whole Act would be judged, it is hard not to conclude that their efforts with Jakarta on this issue were completely unsuccessful. In the few elections witnessed by UNRWI observers, it was obvious that genuine democracy had no perceivable part to play in the exercise. Sutherland of the British Embassy in Jakarta dismissed them as “rather laughable” repeat performances with predictable results.⁵⁵

Faced with such an obvious failure, it was understandable that in his final report, Ortiz Sanz chose to emphasise his success in having some elections repeated, while omitting to give any description of the elections themselves. In the end, this isolated example of UN assertiveness in West Irian resulted in no more than a token, and ultimately meaningless, gesture by Jakarta. It did nothing to conceal the reality of the situation from those who chose to notice. With the failure of his final attempt to

create an appearance of democracy, Ortiz Sanz was to spend the remainder of his time in the territory collaborating with U Thant and Jakarta in their efforts to resolve the issue of West Irian with as little controversy as the situation allowed.

UN and Dutch Cooperation with Indonesia

The importance attached to this task, and the extent to which it, rather than the rights of the Papuans, guided UN policy, particularly in the last weeks of the UNRWI mission, is clearly illustrated in a 14 June letter from Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett. In this letter, Ortiz Sanz outlined a number of issues which he wanted the UN Secretariat to be aware of during a series of meetings planned with Sudjarwo in late June. Ortiz Sanz began by asking that it be made “crystal clear” again to Sudjarwo that he had never given his blessing to the chosen Indonesian method of holding the Act, “as it has been at times asserted by the Indonesian and Dutch sides and elsewhere.”

He also repeated that political rights and freedoms in West Irian had continued to deteriorate, and that the Government had yet to adopt any concrete measures to address the problem. In particular, he expressed regret that Jakarta had ignored his request for them to issue a special statute granting the people basic rights and freedoms in line with the 1962 Agreement:

The argument that the situation in West Irian is the same as in the rest of Indonesia is untenable. In the Territory there are still many political prisoners, the number of which has never been made known to the United Nations.⁵⁶

As evidence of these detainees, he referred to the peaceful Papuan demonstration which had occurred in front of his Jayapura residence on 11 April.⁵⁷ At the time, he had described to the Under Secretary-General how this incident had shown “for the first time” that peaceful demonstrations could take place in West Irian. He had also commented upon “the evident goodwill” of high-ranking Indonesian military officers with regard to this.⁵⁸ Now he informed Rolz-Bennett that on the day following the demonstration, 43 people had been arrested, and of these, 37 were finally released on 11 June, while the remaining six remained in detention.⁵⁹

This report by Ortiz Sanz illustrates how senior Indonesian military personnel lied to him on issues specifically covered by the Agreement such as political freedoms. It also illustrates Ortiz Sanz’s surprising willingness to believe them, despite receiving regular petitions and communications from Papuans alleging oppression. In a recent interview, he still holds to the position that while there were political prisoners, they were not subjected to the “sort of pressure and threatening of police action of which there are are so many examples in our civilized Europe. They [the Papuans] were treated civilly, not barbarically.”⁶⁰

Despite admitting that Indonesian treatment of the Papuans was actually getting worse, it is clear from the rest of his letter that such issues were only relevant insofar as they posed a threat to the efficient conclusion of the Act. Turning to recent discussions with Sudjarwo, Ortiz Sanz revealed that Indonesia was “not only concerned but worried” about two particular points. The first was the attitude of the

Netherlands Government towards Indonesia's chosen method and preparations for the Act. The second was the UNRWI's final report to the Secretary-General. With regard to the former, Ortiz Sanz declared:

I advised him privately though emphatically that his Government should try to obtain assurances that the Netherlands' Government would not cast any doubt on, or challenge, the Act of Free Choice. This would prevent a heated debate in the General Assembly. I would be most grateful for any information regarding the Indonesian-Netherlands relations in this respect.⁶¹

On the subject of his final report, Ortiz Sanz revealed that "as an expression of my continued cooperation" with the Indonesians "I offered to show him, on a personal basis, those parts of the report that might be controversial or create discrepancies with the Government's report."⁶²

Ortiz Sanz concluded by predicting that Sudjarwo would spend some time in New York attempting to assess the influence of the Free Papua lobby, and the attitude of UN Member States towards Indonesian policies in West Irian. It was also possible, he suggested, that Indonesia would seek U Thant's help in avoiding a discussion on the issue in the General Assembly.

This is a significant letter for two reasons. First of all, it reveals a level of Indonesian sensitivity to world opinion which seems surprising when compared to its open determination to strip the Act of any meaningful democratic content. It would have been a simple matter for Jakarta to permit some token expression of Papuan dissent, thereby demonstrating its "democratic credentials." But such a convenient

solution would perhaps have posed too great a threat to the Indonesian myth of Papuan loyalty to be an option.

More important, this letter provides further unambiguous evidence of Ortiz Sanz behaving, with U Thant's consent, in a manner totally incompatible with his official role. The situation in West Irian, as relayed by Ortiz Sanz to the UN leadership, was clearly one in which there could be no act of self-determination as laid down in the Agreement. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to argue that his responsibility should have been to highlight this fact, particularly in his final report. Instead, the letter shows his preoccupation was to ensure that Jakarta took measures to minimise the impact of any international protest at the fundamental breaches of the Agreement. While this may be the level of duplicity and cynicism expected of a State in pursuit of its perceived "national interest," for a Representative of the UN Secretary-General, it is indefensible.

On 21 June, immediately following the New York meetings between an Indonesian team led by Sudjarwo and the UN leadership, Rolz-Bennett wrote to Ortiz Sanz outlining their content. The discussions concentrated on Indonesian concerns over the procedure to be followed in the General Assembly regarding the Act. Under the terms of the Agreement, Indonesia and the UNRWI had to submit final reports to the Secretary-General, who would then report to the UNGA on the conduct and results of the Act.⁶³ As in his earlier talks with the UNRWI, it was evident in the meetings that Sudjarwo was genuinely worried about what Ortiz Sanz might include in

his report. The Indonesians therefore “expressed the hope” that the final reports of Ortiz Sanz and Indonesia would not contain conflicting views. They also hoped that Ortiz Sanz’s report would not contain controversial statements “which may make the handling of the issue in the General Assembly more difficult.” U Thant tried to reassure Sudjarwo, commenting that, as both reports would be mainly factual and descriptive, the possibility of conflicting views was limited.⁶⁴

It was also clear from the meetings that Indonesia wanted U Thant to deal with the matter in such a way that member states would have little or no opportunity to comment. Firstly, Sudjarwo and Sani informed the Secretary-General that they did not feel it necessary to inscribe a special item in the agenda of the next session of the UNGA. Instead they felt that the requirement for him to report on the Act could be accommodated simply as an inclusion in his Annual Report to the Assembly. Secondly, they stated that this inclusion alone would be sufficient, and there would be no need to circulate either Ortiz Sanz’s or their own reports on the issue to the General Assembly. Finally, they impressed upon the Secretary-General their belief that the UNGA was not entitled to pass any substantial resolution on the conduct and results of the Act.⁶⁵

U Thant’s response to the Indonesians made clear that it would not be possible for him to manipulate the Assembly’s reaction in the way they wished. He pointed out that the terms of the Agreement obliged him to request inclusion of an item on the Act in the agenda of the Assembly. Furthermore, his latest Annual Report covered the

period June 1968 to June 1969, and therefore could not include a description of the planned events in West Irian for July and August. He also felt “duty bound” to circulate the UNRWI and Indonesian reports to member States who, he felt, could not be prevented from passing comment. Overt breaches of the Agreement in New York could not, it seems, be accepted by the Secretariat with the same degree of complacency as those committed in West Irian.

Echoing the advice of Ortiz Sanz, U Thant then made clear that the main responsibility for dissuading member states from speaking out on West Irian lay with Jakarta:

The Indonesian Government would have to consult very diligently with the Members of the General Assembly for the purpose of preventing the submission of a draft resolution touching on the substance of the West Irian matter.⁶⁶

Again one must question whether, being fully briefed on the widespread denial of political and human rights in West Irian, it was proper for the Secretary-General to apparently condone a policy of encouraging member states to remain silent on the issue.

Despite Jakarta’s anxieties over possible Dutch reaction to the Act, they must have been encouraged by the support they were now receiving from their old adversary on West Irian, Dutch Foreign Minister Luns. Following his May meeting with Malik, Luns publicly expressed support for Indonesian policies on several occasions. In early June, as uprisings continued and controversy over the council

elections grew, Luns informed the Dutch Parliament that press reports giving an unfavourable picture of Indonesian policy in the territory were greatly exaggerated.⁶⁷ A month later he addressed Parliament again, this time expressing his support for Jakarta's chosen method for the Act.⁶⁸

Luns' statements seemed to have been a direct reaction to articles on West Irian appearing in Dutch newspapers. On 11 July, Quarles of the Dutch Mission to the UN commented to Rolz-Bennett that there had been a renewal of press interest in the Netherlands as the climax of the Act approached. This, he said, was partly due to the presence in the territory of the Dutch journalist Otto Kuyk. Kuyk, who with Hugh Lunn had witnessed the Papuan protest at the council elections in Bosnik, was described by Quarles as "a balanced and calm journalist, but who writes for the largest mass circulation newspaper in the Netherlands [*De Telegraaf*]."⁶⁹ Kuyk's reports from West Irian had included one on the arrest of the Bosnik protesters which began by stating "I call them heroes."⁷⁰

Unsurprisingly, this criticism in the Dutch press did not go unnoticed by Jakarta. Generally uncomfortable with the small foreign media presence, Indonesia had banned them following the April rebellions, although some like Brian May had ignored the order and stayed.⁷¹ With the approach of the final stage of the Act, Jakarta began letting some back in, but not apparently those considered to be particularly hostile. In one example of this, Ortiz Sanz received a cable on 2 July from Vanbeek of the Dutch Press Association, complaining that Jakarta had officially refused to issue an entry

permit for West Irian to Henk Kolb, a widely read Dutch political correspondent. Vanbeek alleged that this was due to articles which Kolb had written a few months previously, critical of Indonesia. As evidence, he revealed that an Indonesian Embassy spokesman had told the Press Association that they were welcome to send any other journalist instead. This behaviour, Vanbeek declared, was contrary to the principles of the Agreement and was discrimination “based upon Indonesian effort to present Act of Free Choice as favourably as possible.”⁷²

Ortiz Sanz passed on the complaint to Sudjarwo, recommending that; “further consideration be given to the request...so that world opinion might be informed of the fairness with which the Act of Free Choice was carried out.”⁷³ Despite this, Kolb remained excluded.

In the end, faced with official restrictions, only a small number of non-Indonesian journalists was present during the last weeks of the exercise. Those that came required special entry permits to cover the Act and according to official figures, a total of twenty were issued to the foreign press.⁷⁴ But another factor may have been the presence in Jakarta of President Nixon, who was on a tour of Southeast Asian capitals in late July and early August. Nixon’s visit drew away many foreign correspondents who might otherwise have been in West Irian, something which must have pleased Indonesia. Hugh Lunn even suggests that the timing was deliberate to coincide with the Act.⁷⁵ Describing this absence of foreign coverage during the final ‘Consultative Assembly’ meetings he wrote:

There were no press photographers, so I took pictures. There was no television either: although once I bumped into a Japanese TV crew, it turned out to be making a documentary on Japanese war dead.⁷⁶

Indonesia's satisfaction at the small number of foreign journalists present was probably shared by Ortiz Sanz, despite his official encouragement of their presence. Overwhelmingly, they were highly critical of the Act, and their reports reflected this. Responding to a journalist who asked to interview him in Jayapura on 3 June he replied "I do not propose to meet the press. They have been very unkind lately."⁷⁷

Meanwhile, in the Indonesian press, government officials stressed Indonesia's peaceful intentions but warned that "if they [the Papuans] rebel against us with arms we have to meet them with arms." They also argued that democratic principles were a "violation of Papuan traditions."⁷⁸

'OPM Plot' Against Ortiz Sanz and Final Indonesian/UN Discussions on the 'Act'.

In mid-June, Indonesian officials claimed to have seized "certain documents" proving the existence of an OPM plot to assassinate Ortiz Sanz and Sarwo Edhie. Furthermore, they alleged that Reiff, a Dutch UNESCO official working on a FUNDWI educational project, was involved. Ortiz Sanz wrote to Foreign Minister Malik requesting details so that they could be passed on to U Thant, but it is not clear whether he obliged.⁷⁹ No more appears to have been said about the allegation,

although the foreign press were aware that Reiff was implicated by Jakarta in some way with the OPM. As a consequence, he was expelled from the Territory.

The accuracy of Indonesia's allegation is hard to assess, but it would have been an uncharacteristic operation by the OPM. May comments that it was an absurd accusation prompted by Indonesia's dislike of Reiff's overt sympathy for the Papuans.⁸⁰ Nonetheless, the American diplomat La Porta concluded that Reiff "had certainly had knowledge of a rebel training camp in the Sentani area," although he discounted other reports that the UNESCO official had misappropriated FUNDWI funds.⁸¹ More recently, a key OPM figure at the time has said that he was astonished by the allegation of a plot to kill Ortiz Sanz, and strongly denied it.⁸² True or not, it would have distracted Ortiz Sanz during this final part of his mission, and at the same time it gave Jakarta the excuse to remove an official they viewed as hostile. In contrast, it did nothing for the OPM cause.

At the end of June, Ortiz Sanz wrote to Sudjarwo on a number of issues he considered still pending. Sudjarwo had yet to respond to his request for details and background information on the Assembly members selected by the ad hoc committees. In particular, the UNRWI wished to know which segment of the population each member was supposed to represent. It was, he emphasised, very important for his mission to receive this information before the Act.⁸³ Despite this appeal, Ortiz Sanz has since confirmed that he never received any of these details.⁸⁴

The UNRWI also repeated his request of 10 June that Sudjarwo arrange for him to meet Suharto.⁸⁵ As he had informed Rolz-Bennett on 1 June, he wished to meet the President “in a last attempt at improving the democratic conditions in the territory before the act.”⁸⁶ Despite the importance which Ortiz Sanz attached to this request, in his report to the UNGA, he was forced to concede:

Owing to his heavy schedule of work, the President could not receive me before 12 August, ten days after the completion of the act of free choice, so I did not have the opportunity of making my appeal regarding the implementation of the basic rights and freedoms of the population of West Irian to the highest office of the Republic.⁸⁷

Unable to meet the President, Ortiz Sanz spent the last days before the Assemblies commenced in further correspondence with Sudjarwo. But it is hard to imagine he could have believed that his endeavours had any relevance to the unfolding situation.

On 28 June, Ortiz Sanz received from Sudjarwo a draft “Decision regarding the Standing Orders of the Session of the Consultative Assembly for the Act of Free Choice.” In his response to it on 2 July, he sought a few clarifications and made a number of suggestions. Sudjarwo was asked to confirm that the questions to be put to the Assemblies would conform with the stipulations of the Agreement.⁸⁸ The Ambassador duly assured Ortiz Sanz that the representatives would be asked to consider whether they wished to remain part of Indonesia, or to sever their ties with the Republic.⁸⁹ Ortiz Sanz also questioned Jakarta’s assertion that the Act was essentially a consultation between the Government of Indonesia and the “people of

West Irian.” As he correctly informed Sudjarwo, the Act was an opportunity for the Papuans to decide freely whether or not wished to remain with Indonesia. It was not a consultation between the Papuan people and Jakarta.⁹⁰

He then reminded Sudjarwo that the Agreement specified the right of every member of the Assembly to express their views actively and freely:

...in this connection, I am sure that the Government will apply the universal principles of parliamentary immunity for members of the assemblies regarding the views expressed in the performance of their functions.⁹¹

Finally, he requested that he be provided with a clarification of these points, bearing in mind the statutory UN participation in the Act which, he noted, had not been mentioned at all in Sudjarwo’s draft.⁹² There does not appear to be any mention in the UN records of the UNRWI receiving any such clarifications.

More Rebellions, Political Prisoners and Australian Cooperation with Indonesia.

While Ortiz Sanz sought clarifications, rebellion again erupted in a number of areas, but particularly in the Western Central Highlands around the village of Moanamani, close to where the Enarotali rebellion had occurred three months previously. On 1 July, local Ekari tribesmen armed with bows and arrows joined forces with mutinous Papuan policemen and attacked Indonesian troops, killing up to twenty.⁹³ Forty kilometres to the north east, other groups of Ekari reportedly wiped out an entire fifteen-strong Indonesian army patrol and killed eleven other soldiers during an attack on a motor-boat on the Ara river, close to where it flows into Lake

Paniai.⁹⁴ The seriousness of the rebellion is hard to estimate accurately due to the absence of UN or any other outside observers. However, reports reaching the foreign press seem to be corroborated by later official Indonesian military accounts. These describe how troops faced bitter opposition from thousands of armed locals as they tried to re-enter the area on 9 July, supported by additional forces airlifted from Biak. Five days later, the same military history describes how eight hundred Papuans attacked the neighbouring Indonesian held town of Wagete from three directions:

Repeated attacks were launched against our troops every day from 14 July 1969 and the numbers involved grew, reaching many thousands of people. It was not until 18 July, when their food had run out and they had suffered numerous casualties that the spirit to resist began to flag.⁹⁵

But, at the time, the authorities denied that another rebellion had broken out, claiming instead that reports of the fighting referred to the previous unrest in April. Furthermore, foreign correspondents were barred from visiting the area to investigate.⁹⁶

On the issue of political prisoners, Jakarta informed Ortiz Sanz of the release of thirty six on 1 July, bringing the official total since the previous December to 195. They also assured him that the remaining seventy-six would be put on trial. However, ten days later they told him that all the remaining Papuan political prisoners had been released “and put to work in agricultural estates in West Java.” This, they claimed, meant that there would be no political detainees in West Irian during the Act.⁹⁷

Jakarta, it seems, had taken the advice given by Ortiz Sanz six months previously, and transferred many “anti-state” Papuans to Java before the Act. Even if their claim that no political prisoners remained in West Irian was correct, removing them to a work camp in Java was a more serious breach of their human rights than keeping them in detention in their home territory. On this point, it is useful to re-emphasise that Ortiz Sanz’s private encouragement of this was an indefensible act for a senior UN official in his position.

Papuan sources though, claim that there were in fact many more political prisoners than the official figure, and in Jayapura alone up to 250 were still being held during the Act. Many of these prisoners were apparently students who had been arrested shortly before as a precaution in case they attempted to disrupt the event.⁹⁸ Similar arrests also seemingly took place in Biak, but according to Robin Osborne, many detainees were then freed during a raid on Biak gaol by the OPM, just before the Act.⁹⁹ One of those who escaped during the raid, Mathew Meyer, would later allege that many prisoners had died during their incarceration due to the cramped conditions and ill-treatment.¹⁰⁰ Elsewhere in Biak, the Dutch journalist Link van Bruggen, reported that 200 political prisoners at a navy camp rioted on 30 July following the arrival of ten Ekari rebel prisoners, captured during the recent fighting in the Highlands.¹⁰¹

As rebellion and arrests continued within West Irian, Indonesia took steps to ensure that West Papuans outside the territory would not draw attention to this

instability and thereby create problems for Jakarta at in New York. On 24 June, Australian Ambassador Gordon Jockel reported to Canberra from Jakarta that Foreign Minister Adam Malik was concerned about two West Papuan nationalists who had recently arrived in PNG. The men, Zonggonao and Runawery, had been sent to Manus island by the authorities, but were still determined to travel on to New York to deliver a petition calling for independence. According to Jockel:

...immediate concern of Indonesia is that early arrival of these 2 West Irianese at UN could stimulate defiance and seriously upset the management of conduct of Act of Free Choice within West Irian...Malik said he hoped that we'd keep the 2 refugees on Manus island over next few weeks as a satisfactory way of dealing with the problem.¹⁰²

Canberra obliged and orders were sent to the authorities on Manus island to arrest the two men if they attempted to leave, since "we have information that they have [plane] tickets." As a consequence, the authorities ordered Zonggonao and Runawery off a plane just as they were about to depart on the next leg of their intended journey to New York. Detained by Australia, they were to remain on Manus island until after the Act had been completed, as Malik had requested.¹⁰³

CHAPTER NINE

Notes

1. UN: DAG 1/ 2.2.3:9. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 250), 9 May 1969.
2. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 9 May 1969.
3. *ibid.*
4. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 10 May 1969.
5. *ibid.*
6. NAA: From Balmain, SBS television. Australian Embassy, The Hague to Department of External Affairs, 7 May 1969.
7. NAA: From Balmain, SBS Television. Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Department of External Affairs, 14 May 1969.
8. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). Sutherland (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Aiers (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 15 July 1969.
9. NAA: From Balmain, SBS television. Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Department of External Affairs, 14 May 1969.
10. *ibid*, 22 May 1969.
11. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.187.
12. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 1. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No. UNRWI JKT-61), 23 May 1969.
13. *ibid.*
14. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Abdulgani, Indonesian Ambassador to the UN to U Thant (no 755/0217), 19 June 1969.
15. Brian May The Indonesian Tragedy, p.186.
16. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 23 May 1969..
17. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 23 May 1969.
18. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No. UNRWI JKT-61) 23 May 1969

19. Indonesian Information Service (No. 69/26), 11 June 1969.
20. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 27 May 1969.
21. *ibid.*
22. *ibid.*
23. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 2. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No.283), 28 May 1969.
24. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 1. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No. UNRWI JKT-65), 1 June 1969.
25. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). Neilson (British High Commission, Canberra) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 30 May 1969.
26. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.187.
27. *ibid*, p.188.
28. *ibid.*
29. *ibid.*
30. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 24 June 1969.
31. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 10 June 1969.
32. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). Spendlove (British Embassy, Washington) to K. Hamilton-Jones (SEAD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 3 June 1969.
33. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). "Report of UNA meeting with G Roberts, 12 June 1969," sent by Goronwy Roberts (Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs) to Hugh Walker (United Nations Association), 19 June 1969.
34. PRO: FCO 24/451 (FWD 1/4). Quoting Hansard, 16 June 1969.
35. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 24 June 1969.
36. UN: 100 Box 1 File 2. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No. UNRWI JKT-68). Quoted in Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No.313), 10 June 1969. (The final figure for the elections witnessed by the UNRWI team was nearer 20%).
37. PRO: FCO 24/448 (FWD 1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 24 June 1969

38. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.187.
39. *ibid*, p.179.
40. *ibid*, p.189.
41. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 10 June 1969. Referred to in Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 30 June 1969.
42. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 2. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 313), 10 June 1969.
43. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 4. Ortiz-Sanz to Narasimhan (Cable No. UNRWI JKT-72) 12 June 1969.
44. *ibid*.
45. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 13 June 1969.
46. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 14 June 1969.
47. *ibid*.
48. *ibid*.
49. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 2. Rolz Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 18 June 1969.
50. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. H Sharif (Indonesian Director of International Organisations) to Ortiz Sanz (No. D 0526/69/17).
51. Hugh Lunn, "How the West Was Lost", The Australian, 21 August 1999.
52. Quoted in Brian May The Indonesian Tragedy, p. 190.
53. Quoted in Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.46.
54. Stefan Alonso Casale, NRC Handelsblad, 4 March 2000.
55. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). Sutherland (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Aiers, (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 15 July 1969.
56. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett 14 June 1969.
57. *ibid*.
58. UN: DAG 1/ 2.2.3:9. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No.UNRWI SKU-24), 12 April 1969.

59. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 14 June 1969.
60. Interview with Ortiz Sanz by Casale, 15 December 1999.
61. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 4. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett 14 June 1969.
62. *ibid.*
63. New York Agreement Article XXI.
64. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 2. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 337), 21 June 1969.
65. *ibid.*
66. *ibid.*
67. Djakarta Times, 27 June 1969, quoted in Van der Kroef, "Indonesia and West New Guinea: The New Dimensions of Conflict", p.376.
68. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 2. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 174), 11 July 1969.
69. *ibid.*
70. Hugh Lunn, The Australian, 21 August 1999.
71. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.164.
72. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 2 July 1969.
73. *ibid.*
74. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). Sutherland (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Aiers, (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 15 July 1969.
75. Hugh Lunn, The Australian, 21 August 1999.
76. *ibid.*
77. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.189.
78. Djakarta Times, 18 and 23 June 1969. Quoted in Van der Kroef, "West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict", p.396.
79. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister, 18 June 1969.

80. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.174.
81. FCO 24/448 (FWD1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 10 June 1969.
82. E mail from Jacob Prai to author, 17 August 1999.
83. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 30 June 1969.
84. Interview with Ortiz Sanz by Casale, 15 December 1999.
85. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 30 June 1969.
86. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 1. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett (cable No. UNRWI JKT-65), 1 June 1969.
87. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex i para.182.
88. UN: Series 100 Box 1 File 5. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 2 July 1969.
89. *ibid.*
90. *ibid.*
91. *ibid.*
92. *ibid.*
93. Van der Kroef, "West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict", p.366.
94. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.192.
95. Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, p.22, quoting Praja Ghupta Vira: Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa (Cendrawasih: Sedjarah Militer Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, 1971).
96. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.192.
97. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii paras 67, 68, 69.
98. Interview with Fred Atuba, 20 November 1999. Atuba states that he was a political prisoner during the Act.
99. Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, p.44.
100. *ibid.*

101. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.192.
102. Quoted in television documentary by Mark Worth. "Act of No Choice," SBS Television, Dateline programme, broadcast in Australia, 25 August 1999.
103. *ibid.*