

CHAPTER TEN

THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE AND AFTERMATH

Final Indonesian Preparations for the ‘Act’

Indonesia’s final preparations for the assembly meetings have been described by several people, including assembly members. They allege that members were isolated beforehand in camps for several weeks. Forbidden to contact friends and relatives and often under armed guard, they were then subjected to a series of threats and bribes by the authorities to do exactly as they were told.¹ A few weeks after the Act, Reverend Hokujoku, one of the members for Jayapura described to a Dutch journalist how Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo, the commander of OPSUS (the special operations command with tasked with making “a success” of the Act) visited him and his colleagues during their period of isolation:

The man who totally destroyed my self-respect was Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo, publicly acknowledged as being the chief brain washer. For two hours, this special envoy of President Suharto spoke to us. He destroyed any will we may have had to vote against integrating with Indonesia. He began by pointing out that Indonesia, as the strongest military power in South-east Asia, is able to strike fear into any country. Jakarta was not interested in us as Papuans but in West Irian as a territory. If we want to be independent, he said, laughing scornfully, we had better ask God if He could find us an island in the Pacific where we could emigrate.²

Hokujoku also described how Murtopo jokingly suggested that they could ask America for a piece of the moon to move to. On a more serious note, Murtopo warned that after fighting for West Irian for so many years, Indonesia would not tolerate any Papuan vote against them. Those that did would have their “accursed tongues” torn out and be shot. To some historians such as Benedict Anderson, the Act was entirely an “Ali show.”³ Although this conclusion neglects and underestimates the role played by Sudjarwo and Sarwo Edhie, Murtopo’s power and influence over the Papuan representatives was clear. In a more recent interview, Hokujoku also claimed those members selected to speak at the Assembly were given a piece of paper with exact instructions on what to say. They were then made to rehearse their speech in front of officials. One who refused, was allegedly taken away and killed.⁴

With such overt manipulation of every detail of the process, an American journalist wrote on 7 July:

Jakarta’s diplomatic community insists and members of the Indonesian government frankly admit in private that the entire process is a meaningless formality.⁵

Stuart Harris, the *Times* journalist who had witnessed the Biak vote, reported that the army did not want foreign press in the territory, unlike Sudjarwo who believed that some must be there to witness the Act.⁶ Commenting on his brief visit, Harris added:

Sudjarwo is contemptuous of the Ortiz Sanz mission. Privately he has instructed his staff to cooperate with it as little as possible. The United Nations team is doing its best but their brief is a sham and they know it. Unhappily most of the people of West Irian do not understand this...No government in Jakarta would allow West Irian to secede and it is sad to see men dying in West Irian today because they cannot believe this proposition because they are encouraged by the useless presence of the United Nations observers and foreign

journalists and by sincere leading articles in the foreign press to believe that their people have a choice.⁷

Harris believed that, as the Papuans had no alternative to Jakarta's rule, the sooner they settled down under it the better. In the end, he predicted, all would be well for the Indonesian province of West Irian. It is true that, in 1969, the Papuans had not been given any choice but to remain with Indonesia, but his optimism for their future did not appear to be based upon any evidence. Furthermore, his criticism of other journalists was a little unfair since none of the 'sincere articles' claimed that the Papuans had any choice. On the contrary, it was the lack of choice, despite the UN's misleading presence, which provoked much of their ire. In one example, the *Sydney Morning Herald* editorial of 14 July 1969 declared:

Under the patronage of the United Nations, approved by the United States to the extent of a coincidental Presidential visit, warmly endorsed by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, acquiesced in without a murmur of protest by the Communist and Afro-Asian champions of colonial emancipation, the last stage in the betrayal of the people of West New Guinea is scheduled to begin today...Where else in today's world would the dictum be accepted that a people was too primitive to ever be free?⁸

In New York, as the first Assemblies gathered in West Irian, Tony Parsons of the United Kingdom's UN Mission gave an assessment to London on the attitudes of member states:

Our strong impression is that the great majority of United Nations members want to see this question cleared out of the way with the minimum of fuss as soon as possible. It is true that some of the Africans here are unhappy that the ascertainments should not be based on the principle of one man one vote, both in this particular case and also...because of possible precedent regarding Rhodesia.⁹ The Indonesians have been working hard on them...If Ortiz Sanz's report should prove critical there could well be difficulties, more we

gather from Tanzania and Zambia than from the francophone Africans, but assuming that it will not be, I think that the African Group as a whole will be content to acquiesce. The Group are anxious in any case for Asian support on southern African issues and would be very reluctant to see a confrontation with Indonesia. The other regional groups are most unlikely to want to upset the apple cart. The Arabs and the other Moslem states would certainly support Indonesia strongly.¹⁰

Parsons also informed London that the Dutch believed even the “moralistic Scandinavians” recognised that there was no practical alternative to Indonesian rule. “Finally the Secretariat, whose influence could be important, appear only too anxious to get shot of the problem as quickly and smoothly as possible.” As for the British position, the letter ended with the comment; “We take it that, unless there is some unexpected development between now and the presentation of Ortiz Sanz’s report, our own attitude will be on the lines of ‘least said, soonest mended.’”¹¹

The Act of Free Choice 14 July to 2 August 1969

The Act finally began on 14 July, starting with a meeting of the 175 ‘Consultative Assembly’ members for Merauke. In addition to Ortiz Sanz and his team, a large group of senior Indonesian politicians and soldiers were present. Also there, were the Ambassadors of Australia, the Netherlands and Thailand, accompanied by members of the Indonesian press and a small number of foreign journalists.¹²

In Merauke and elsewhere, the Assembly members were expected to arrive at some form of collective decision using the vaguely-defined Indonesian method for

reaching consensus, known as *musjawarah*. What this meant in practice was that a number of senior Indonesian officials addressed the members, telling them that, for a variety of reasons, they should remain with Indonesia. Then, Ortiz Sanz made a brief statement about the importance of their task, and reminded them that they were speaking not only for themselves, but for all Papuans. “Your answer,” he said, “must express the true desire of the population. Do not hesitate to speak the truth and be loyal to the wishes of your own people.”

Following these speeches, twenty of the Assembly members stood up one after the other and made a series of almost identical statements, all strongly in favour of Indonesia.¹³ Describing the event, the official Indonesian report to the UN General Assembly declared:

Cheers went up when the speakers declared their adherence to the Republic of Indonesia...The first speaker, Mr John Somar, representing the Aghats [*sic*] area, in a moving statement asked why the question should have been put at all. He continued...Our beloved country is Indonesia, our sacred flag is the Red and White; we will defend and safeguard them till the end of time...These declarations were made to the cheers and applause of the members present, many even very enthusiastic. Towards the end of the speaker's list, the mood of the session became really jubilant and full of cheering.¹⁴

After these statements the Chairman, an Indonesian Government official, told the other 155 assembly members to stand up if they agreed with their colleagues' position. All of them then stood up. To sum up, the Chairman announced; “on behalf of the people of Merauke, we declare unanimously that West Irian is an integral part of Indonesia and do not want to be separated from the Republic of Indonesia

stretching from Sabang to Merauke.” The Indonesia Minister of Home Affairs then promised that West Irian would be given autonomy in organising, co-ordinating and carrying out this task.¹⁵ A Dutch journalist afterwards described the proceedings as an elaborately stage-managed affair with pressure from Indonesian officials and military much in evidence.¹⁶

According to the Indonesian report, the outcome of this first assembly provoked an impressive outburst of Papuan celebration:

Members of the consultative assembly, joined by the people and school children outside, sang joyous songs. Enthusiastic shouts like ‘Long live the Republic! Long live Indonesia!’ were heard...The town of Merauke, festively decorated, celebrated the happy occasion with parades, music and dance, and a people’s evening fair...A happy feast in a happy Merauke!¹⁷

Unfortunately for some of the Merauke members, there were reports that the celebrations were not as universal as Jakarta claimed. According to Brian May, the journalist Link van Bruggen later wrote that news reached Jayapura, “presumably through missionaries, that six of the unfortunate twenty had been killed by angry followers.”¹⁸

The following day, Ortiz Sanz gave a press conference in which he defended the Indonesian *musyawarah* system as “practical.” Shortly afterwards he also argued that the option of national independence for West Irian would not be feasible.¹⁹

Two days later, the next assembly went ahead in Wamena and followed a similar pattern to Merauke. Ortiz Sanz's report gives little description of the Wamena meeting, but the Indonesian version goes into some detail:

The spirit and mood of the consultative assembly session in Wamena, after the known success of Merauke, appeared to be hopeful and imbued with confidence of similar success. One speaker after the other, using his own language or dialect, declared in various fashion the desire of the people he represented, to remain within the Republic of Indonesia. As in Merauke, on the wall of the Assembly Hall, a big map of Indonesia was hanging, behind the seat of the chair, face to face with all members of the consultative assembly, showing clearly the vast territory of the Republic of Indonesia from Sabang to Merauke, and to Wamena. Many members spoke very eloquently and with a candid spirit (many West Irianese turned out to be eloquent orators in their own right and fashion of expression!).²⁰

If the assembly members needed reminding of the size and power of Indonesia, then the conspicuously large map of the Republic would have no doubt provided it. The report's account of the Wamena assembly ends by stating that various festivities followed the unanimous decision to remain with Indonesia. It has been alleged however, that, in Wamena at least, some of the assembly speakers were critical of Indonesian rule. But with four different dialects being used, the official interpreters made sure that none of these criticisms were expressed in their translations into the Indonesian language.²¹ After the Merauke and Wamena results were announced, the *Melbourne Herald* commented "even Hitler was satisfied with less than one hundred per cent in plebiscites."²²

The third assembly meeting took place on July 19th in Nabire in the Western Central Highlands region. This vote could have been problematic for Indonesia

because throughout July another major rebellion had erupted in the region with up to 50 Indonesian soldiers killed. Despite the fact that Jakarta banned foreign press from the area, reports were getting out that 60,000 people had abandoned their villages and moved into the mountains from where they launched attacks on the Government troops.²³ According to an official army report, thousands of tribesmen were involved in these attacks, which only subsided towards the end of the month following an Indonesian counter-attack.²⁴

Brian May has written that so few local people were left in the area that the Indonesians had to ship in Papuans from other regions to play the part of assembly members.²⁵ Even so, another journalist, Hugh Lunn, reported that one member managed to contact him to ask whether he could guarantee that there would be no reprisals if 100 members spoke out against Indonesia at the meeting. Lunn replied that he could not give such a pledge. Another member then slipped him a note to say that the assembly had all been bribed. At the same time, a third member attempted to pass a note to the UN team, but according to Lunn, they refused to accept it.²⁶ Despite all this, Ortiz Sanz's official report made no mention of the rebellions or allegations of bribery. Instead, he gave a short description that was almost identical to those of the previous two meetings.

The Indonesian report on Nabire stated that the "troubles" in the area a few months previously had had no effect on the spirit of the session. Nonetheless, in a rare hint of controversy, it noted that several members reminded the Government to

make greater endeavours to improve the economic and social welfare of the area. At the same time however, Papuan speakers were described dismissing the “troubles” as being “not a peoples rebellion.”²⁷ Again, the unanimous result was to remain with the Republic.²⁸ The same day, Jakarta declared that the results so far meant that West Irian had already chosen to stay with Indonesia. The remaining meetings would therefore be nothing more than a confirmation of this.²⁹

Following this, Ambassador Scheltema of the Netherlands returned to Jakarta and did not witness any of the remaining five assembly votes. While he conceded that there was “plenty of moral pressure”, he informed the Dutch Foreign Ministry that during his visit, he had seen no signs of violent pressure on the Papuans by the Indonesians.³⁰ This was apparently a view also shared by Australian Ambassador Jockell when he and Scheltema, met with the journalists Hugh Lunn and Otto Kuyk during their visit to West Irian. According to Lunn, in an informal discussion, Jockell questioned their allegations of Indonesian brutality remarking “You blokes are causing problems for us. Where are the petitions? Where are the bloodsoaked letters?”³¹

In Fak Fak, the proceedings at the assembly on 23 July mirrored those elsewhere. Seventeen members spoke, reaffirming their loyalty to Jakarta and questioning the necessity of the Act.³² Declaring unanimously that West Irian was an integral part of the Republic, the Fak Fak assembly added that the people of the

region “are determined to thwart every attempt - if there are any - aimed at separating the people and territory of West Irian from the unitary Republic of Indonesia”.³³

Three days later, the assembly at Sorong declared its unanimous support for Indonesia. One speaker, a clergyman, was quoted by the Indonesians as saying “We are convinced that our Indonesian State and Indonesian Government are a State and Government which have been blessed by the Lord and given to us.”³⁴

On 29 July, it was Manokwari’s turn. Indonesia reported the speeches of a number of Assembly members, including Miss Jockbeth Momogin, described as being a representative of women’s organisations. Interestingly, Lodewijk Mandatjan, the rebel leader who had surrendered seven months previously, also appeared as an assembly member. Since ending his rebellion, he had apparently radically reconsidered his position and declared:

the people in the interior do not want to be dissociated from the Indonesian Government. Do not try to separate us from Indonesia. In fact, this act of free choice is not necessary. Long live Indonesia.³⁵

One can assume that Indonesia was pleased with this public spectacle of Mandatjan’s prodigal return. But whether the international observers found it any more unconvincing than the rest of the exercise is debatable. In his official report, Ortiz Sanz merely said “it may be noted that Mr. L Mandatjan, one of the former leaders of the opposition to Indonesian rule in Manokwari...spoke in favour of maintaining ties with Indonesia.”³⁶

Also present at the Manokwari assembly was Hugh Lunn. He described witnessing Papuan demonstrations and subsequent arrests outside the assembly hall which were not mentioned in either the UNRWI's or the Indonesian official accounts:

In Manokwari, no less than eight security agents in sunglasses and pointy-toed shoes followed me. When I told them eight was ridiculous one said: 'We were expecting 17 foreign journalists but you are the only one who came.' Outside the voting hall young Papuans yelled 'sendiri, sendiri' (alone, alone) and Indonesians threw them into the back of trucks and took them away. As I snapped a photo, a plain-clothes man ripped open his jacket to show me his revolver. I ran into the hall and told Ortiz Sanz. But he said: 'Our job is to see what happens inside.' Later Ortiz Sanz told me he would love to see a US base in Manokwari harbour. Like the Americans, he feared a communist takeover. 'West Irian is like a cancerous growth on the side of the UN and my job is to surgically remove it,' he said.³⁷

If Lunn's allegations are correct, then the UNRWI's refusal to intervene in this violent public Indonesian attack on the protesters was an inexcusable decision, even by the standards of behaviour already set by his mission.

On 31 July, the penultimate assembly took place on the island of Biak. It differed little from previous meetings, except perhaps in some of the 'theatricals' allegedly adopted by the speakers. The Indonesian account describes how, Stephanus Rumbewas, one of the twenty-four chosen to speak pulled out:

...a small red and white flag from his pocket, requested a fellow member, the old veteran from Biak, Mr Lukas Rumkorem, to join him in sanctifying the flag, and while sprinkling the flag with perfumed water, he prayed, 'may this flag fly in Indonesia - from Sabang to Merauke - till the end of time! Halliluyah, Halliluyah in Heaven!³⁸

The result was a unanimous decision to remain with Indonesia, indicated by all 130 members standing up on command. At Biak, as in all other assembly venues, the result was followed, according to Jakarta by “festivities of the people.”

Finally, on Saturday 2 August 1969, the last assembly met in Jayapura, the province’s capital. In attendance, along with various senior Indonesian officials and UNRWI staff, were the Ambassadors of Australia, Burma and the Federal Republic of Germany. Of the 109 assembly members, twenty-six had been selected to speak. Again, all spoke passionately in favour of remaining with Indonesia. One, Jacob Daimoi, replied to allegations that the members had been bribed by Jakarta:

If the Government gives a shovel or a saw or an axe or any other agricultural tool to the people, that is because a father has to love his children, and moreover, such a useful gift is entirely commensurate with the present endeavour for development of this territory.³⁹

Ignoring allegations of bribery, Ortiz Sanz simply noted in his report of the meeting that all the speakers strongly expressed their desire to remain with Indonesia. Brian May however, alleges that other types of gifts were given to the members, including clothes, radios and promises of money.⁴⁰

Jacob Prai also makes similar allegations, although as a senior OPM activist and fugitive at the time, he was obviously not a direct witness. Commenting on the internment of all assembly members before the Act he says that, in addition to gifts, some were promoted to Kepala Desa (Head of Village) with a monthly salary of 150,000 rupiahs.⁴¹

Although Ortiz Sanz never received official information about the backgrounds of the assembly members, information on the appointed speakers in Jayapura was sent to him shortly after the final vote. This information was contained in a report on the Act supplied to the UN by the West Papuan nationalist Thomas Waingai. He alleged that Indonesian officials carried out interviews with all the 1026 assembly members during their ‘internment’ in the weeks before the Act. Having completed this task, Waingai claims that the authorities then decided that only 175 were deemed reliable enough to express pro-Indonesian views at the assemblies. As an example, he provided the UN with details of each of the twenty-six speakers at the Jayapura assembly. Of these, twelve were members of the Indonesian ‘Red-white’ flag movement. A further two were non-Papuan Indonesians, and the rest, like Hokujoku, were simply appointed members.⁴²

Once the Jayapura assembly had made its unanimous decision, the customary evening festivities were witnessed, by among others, Brian May:

The Indonesians, who are masters of anything theatrical, thoroughly rehearsed the Papuans in singing, dancing, cheering and voting. It was reported on the eve of the Act that the Papuans had practised carrying Indonesian leaders shoulder-high; and certainly, on the day, there were no slips when Sarwo Edhie, the weighty Major-General...Amir Machmud, Minister for the Interior, and Sudjarwo were jubilantly hoisted.⁴³

With the final result, Mahmud issued a statement that the wishes of the entire people of West Irian was to “remain united within the Republic of Indonesia and

reject separation.” He also thanked Ortiz Sanz and his mission for their “well done task” and declared the result official and legal.⁴⁴

Aftermath

On the day of the final result, General Edhie Sarwo publicly warned that there were still problems in West Irian which would have to be settled by military force.⁴⁵ Three days later at a specially convened meeting of the Provincial House of Representatives in Jayapura, Mahmud reiterated that the result was legal and final. He also appealed to “those few West Irianese” living abroad to “honour the peoples’ decision.”⁴⁶

In the conclusion to its UNGA report, Indonesia remarked that West Irian was one of the most primitive and undeveloped communities in the world. “To measure the method and conduct of the act of free choice in such a community against purely western democratic methods and procedures, would indeed be erroneous and unrealistic.” As to the “impressive” result, Jakarta explained those who knew about the political background of the West Irian dispute would understand why it would have been difficult “politically and psychologically.” for anyone to contradict the assemblies’ overwhelming decision.⁴⁷

Commenting upon the unanimous result, Ortiz Sanz stated in his official report:

As far as we were able to observe, the meetings of the consultative assemblies were conducted in an orderly manner. Members of the

assemblies were able to express their views and often signified vehemently their wish to remain with Indonesia. The meetings were open and in some places the general public gathered inside and outside the buildings where the meetings were being held and enthusiastically supported the decision reached.⁴⁸

He made no mention of any demonstrations against the assembly decisions. In his closing remarks however, Ortiz Sanz did concede that anti-Indonesian petitions, “cases of unrest,” the flight of some Papuans to Australian territory and the existence of political detainees, did:

show that without doubt certain elements of the population of West Irian held firm convictions in favour of independence. Nevertheless, the answer given by the consultative assemblies to the questions put to them was a unanimous consensus in favour of remaining with Indonesia.⁴⁹

An obvious conclusion to draw from this statement is that the unanimous consensus of the assemblies could not be seen to be representative, since it did not reflect the “certain elements of the population” who favoured independence. Nonetheless, Ortiz Sanz has recently reaffirmed his satisfaction with the legitimacy of the result saying, “Indonesian officials exerted pressure on one or two of these occasions, but apologies were offered for that. For the rest the procedure was absolutely clean.”⁵⁰

Jakarta could of course have permitted a token expression of dissent at the assemblies. It would not have threatened their possession of West Irian; indeed, it would have given the Act a modicum of reality. At one point, Rolz-Bennett had apparently confidentially urged Jakarta to record some negative votes, “to give the outcome the appearance of legitimacy.”⁵¹ But the myth created by Jakarta, of total

Papuan loyalty to the Republic, was not sophisticated enough to accommodate any expression of Papuan dissent. Consequently no such opposition was permitted.

Despite the indefensible unanimity of the Act's result, Ortiz Sanz's report avoided, where possible, passing comment upon anything which might have conflicted with the Indonesian report. One notable exception was his admission that Article XXII of the agreement, relating to the rights and freedoms of the population, was not fully implemented, despite his "constant efforts." Furthermore, "the Administration exercised at all times a tight political control over the population."⁵² It was a significant, if isolated, criticism, although it might have been more accurate to state that the article was not implemented at all.

Nonetheless, Ortiz Sanz chose to end his report by saying:

Finally, on the basis of the facts presented in this report and the documents referred to, it can be stated that, with the limitations imposed by the geographical characteristics of the territory and the general political situation in the area, an act of free choice has taken place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice, in which the representatives of the population have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia.⁵³

It was a carefully worded conclusion, which deliberately avoided addressing a fundamental issue. Article XVIII (d) of the agreement stipulates that the Act had to be carried out in "accordance with international practice." The UN's failure to persuade Jakarta to introduce any recognisable democratic content into the exercise meant that Ortiz Sanz could not claim that this had been fulfilled. Instead, he chose to

omit any mention of the requirement, referring only to an even vaguer term, “Indonesian practice.”

Soon after the end of the Act, Ortiz Sanz returned to Jakarta and, on 12 August, he was finally granted an audience with President Suharto. By this time, though, he saw little point in raising the issues of political and human rights. As the Indonesian report of the meeting perceptively stated, it was simply an opportunity for Suharto to thank Ortiz Sanz “for the valuable assistance he and his Mission had rendered to the Indonesian Government regarding the implementation of the last phase of the New York Agreement.”⁵⁴

On 16 August, Suharto spoke of the result of the Act in a speech to parliament:

This success of the act of free choice has really strengthened the unity of our country and our people...It was most important that the principle of territorial and sovereign integrity of a free independent nation had been duly recognised and appreciated.⁵⁵

The next day, Ortiz Sanz attended celebrations in Jakarta to mark the twenty-fourth anniversary of the 1945 proclamation of Indonesian independence. Then, with his mission over, he finally left Indonesia on 18 August.

The Western press generally agreed that the Papuans had not been allowed to exercise anything approaching genuine self-determination. The only matter for debate

was the motivation which had led various governments and the UN to collaborate with Indonesia on the matter. In London, *The Daily Telegraph* asked on 5 August

Where does United Nations idealism begin and end? What part should be given to the principles of the Charter and how much should hard political facts be taken into consideration...should a distinction be made between white and yellow colonialism?⁵⁶

Peter Agnew, writing a letter to *The Times* on 1 August, drew attention to the many differences between Asian Indonesians and Melanesian Papuans. He also reminded readers of the phrase “international practice” in the Agreement. In conclusion, he asked; “Who will face the greater condemnation at the bar of history: the perpetrators of this outrage, or those other Governments who will have done nothing to stop it?”⁵⁷

The U.S. magazine *Time* commented on 22 August:

Indonesia, once a bastion of noisy self-righteous anti-colonialism, last week formally took over a remote, primitive piece of real estate that can hardly be considered anything but a colony...‘Many of us didn’t agree to Indonesian control, but we were afraid,’ one of the delegates told *Time* correspondent David Greenway, who visited West Irian last week.⁵⁸

Berlin’s *Die Welt* on 5 August noted that “A chapter of Western colonial policy is coming to an end - a chapter of Asiatic colonial policy begins...the Papuans have the same relationship with the Indonesians as the Eskimos with the Basques.”⁵⁹

In the Swiss paper *Der Bund*, the 12 August edition remarked “An odd decision of the people without the people deciding.”⁶⁰ Amsterdam’s *Het Parool* echoed the Dutch press generally by describing the Act as a “humiliating show” with nothing to do with free choice.⁶¹ In *The Australian*, Peter Hastings also did not claim widespread Papuan enthusiasm for the result. But, almost uniquely among the foreign press, he

still managed to find evidence in some areas of strong Papuan support for Jakarta, while at the same time expressing surprise at anti-Indonesian sentiment elsewhere.⁶²

It was not just the press which condemned the Act. In Britain, the United Nations Association still had serious concerns, despite the assurances given to them in June by the Foreign Secretary. The July 1969 issue of the UNA news sheet included a piece by P. Szudek of the pro-Papuan “Anglo-Melanesian Aid Committee.” It was entitled “Crisis in West Papua” and described the Papuans’ desire for freedom “in the face of Indonesian intimidation and terror,” concluding that:

Ortiz Sanz’s reported acceptance of the Indonesian formula [for the Act] means a total abandonment and setting aside of the New York Agreement. An extraordinary situation is thus created: the U.N. mission originally sent to West Papua to ‘advise, assist and participate’ in carrying out the law of the U.N. has ended up by actively working against it...It may be better for the U.N. mission to withdraw rather than to sanction the illegal procedure...Otherwise an extremely dangerous precedent may be created by the U.N.⁶³

Meanwhile, Humphry Berkeley, the association’s chairman, wrote several letters to the Foreign Office during the summer expressing these reservations and urging the government to “investigate” whether or not genuine self-determination was taking place. Although the UNA was not directly linked with the UN, it had consultative status through its membership of the World Federation of UNA’s, and was generally considered to be a well respected non-governmental organisation with all three main British political party leaders as honorary presidents.

This criticism of the Act was not welcomed by the Foreign Office, and Aiers, an official in the South-West Pacific Department, expressed irritation at Berkeley's persistence. On 24 July, he recommended that in their response to his latest communication "it is perhaps time to point out to Mr. Berkeley the harm he may do by launching a campaign which must reflect badly on the Secretary-General and his representative."⁶⁴

On 29 July, Lord Shepherd replied to Berkeley on behalf of the Foreign Secretary suggesting "I am sure you do not intend any implication against the impartiality and integrity of the U.N. Secretariat." He also tried to persuade Berkeley that the Government was not unconcerned about the handling of the Act. It was simply, he explained, that the Foreign Office believed the best time to raise any concerns would be after U Thant had submitted his UNGA report. Shepherd concluded reassuringly, "it seems to me that the difference between us is largely one of timing."⁶⁵ In reality, numerous internal communications make plain that the Foreign Office had no intention whatsoever of raising any concerns about the Act, either before or after the Secretary-General's report.

Although he also met with officials at the Indonesian Embassy in London, Berkeley remained unconvinced. In his reply to Lord Shepherd on 4 August, he denied questioning the behaviour of the UN Secretariat, but stated:

...quite frankly we are not satisfied about the Act of Free Choice since there are so many representatives who are tribal chiefs who would certainly not be impartial in such an Act of self-determination in Rhodesia or any other former British territory that

I know of...We have come to the view rather reluctantly that it would be better for the U.N. to withdraw [from West Irian] rather than to be associated with an Act of Free Choice which we believe will be rigged.⁶⁶

Despite these criticisms, with the Act over, all that remained was for the Secretary-General to “report to the General Assembly on the conduct of the act of self-determination and the results thereof.”⁶⁷ In preparation, C. Stavropoulos, the UN legal Counsel, sent a memorandum to Rolz-Bennett on 17 July containing suggestions on how U Thant might present his report. Aware of the potential for controversy, he recommended that the Secretary-General present the two reports by Ortiz Sanz and Indonesia *in toto*, along with a brief note by himself. To only summarise, then he warned:

would not only be difficult, but also invidious, as it might give rise to complaints that the Secretary-General was seeking to suppress information, or to support one side or other in the act of self-determination, or to cover up the truth.⁶⁸

With regard to U Thant’s requirement to report on the conduct of the exercise, Stavropoulos asked “Does this, however, mean that the Secretary-General must submit his own comments on the conduct of the act? I believe that this question need not be answered in the affirmative.”⁶⁹ To bypass this politically awkward requirement, Stavropoulos suggested that merely presenting the two reports by Indonesia and the UNRWI would suffice:

...member States may then reach their own conclusions on how the act of self-determination was conducted, without the Secretary-General having to make comments of his own. As you are aware, whether justified or not, there have been wide-spread doubts as to whether a really genuine opportunity is being provided for a free expression of the popular will in the present case, and the Secretary-

General should therefore avoid the impression that any evidence or material provided to him is being suppressed or altered.⁷⁰

Stavropoulos did not, though, favour the inclusion of an item on the Act in the agenda of the UNGA since it would:

...imply that some form of action is called for from the General Assembly. However, there is no mention of any such action in the Agreement, which requires only the supplying of information to the Assembly...It is difficult, in any circumstances, to see what useful action the General Assembly could be called upon to take if an item were placed on the agenda. The Agreement is one between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and the United Nations is in no way party to it...Such an item might well result in sterile and acrimonious debate, leading to no useful conclusion.⁷¹

Stavropoulos' cynical advice contrasts with his own conclusions seven years previously that the Papuans had a strong case for genuine self-determination. In a report to U Thant in July 1962 he had written:

Our study has revealed that the subject of self-determination is a complex one, presenting many facets. However, at least since President Wilson enunciated the principle of self-determination in 1918, there appears to emerge a strong presumption in favour of self-determination in situations such as that of Western New Guinea on the basis of the wishes of the peoples of the territory concerned, irrespective of the legal stands or interests of other parties to the question. While other factors may also be taken into account, there seems to be a growing practice of recognising that the wishes of the local population should be paramount, and should thus be ascertained before a final disposition is made of any particular territory.⁷²

In the weeks before U Thant's report to the UNGA, senior UN officials and other interested parties expressed cautious optimism that their efforts to curtail the opportunity for debate on the issue would succeed. On 4 September, Australia's Ambassador to the UN, Sir Patrick Shaw cabled Canberra to report:

Netherlands Ambassador Middleburg hopes that the handling of the item in the Assembly will go quietly with only two statements, from the Netherlands and from the Indonesians. He expressed some apprehensions however about the effects of lobbying by West Irianese in New York...Under-Secretary General for special political affairs Rolz-Bennett continues to be cautiously optimistic that the item will not give rise to much discussion.⁷³

Meanwhile, Indonesia, backed by Australia and the Netherlands, continued to lobby countries, “including Malta and several West African nations not to question the legitimacy of the self-determination process.”⁷⁴ As part of this, Malik went on a tour of African countries to put Jakarta’s case and to rebut the arguments of Free Papua spokesman Nicolaas Jouwe. Jouwe had travelled widely in Africa, campaigning for black solidarity with the Papuans. Indonesia also sent an official ‘goodwill delegation’ to several Latin Americans to encourage support for its position.⁷⁵

In late October, Jouwe spoke to the Australian Mission at the UN in New York. He told them that some of the African representatives he had spoken to believed the Act to be fraudulent and could constitute a harmful precedent. The Australians promptly informed the Indonesians, who reassured them that they believed no African state held particularly strong views on the matter. Nonetheless, Maramis added that he, and the rest of the Indonesian UN Mission, “were carrying out as complete a canvass of delegations as they could in the period before the item came up for discussion.”⁷⁶

Although Communist countries had firmly supported Sukarno in his dispute with the Dutch over West Irian, the new pro-Western Suharto regime was certainly

not a natural ally. It did, though, remain formally non-aligned and Malik maintained notably close links with Moscow. Addressing the Eastern bloc reaction, Australia's UN Ambassador Sir Patrick Shaw wrote in September 1969:

We are not able to give a firm assessment of the likely attitude of Communist delegations. On the one hand they regard the Suharto regime as right-wing and as responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Indonesian Communists but on the other hand they have the chance of developing relations of a fairly satisfactory [nature?] with the Suharto regime. We would expect this prospect to inhibit Communist criticism of Indonesia on the West Irian question. The USSR moreover could not go too far in criticising the results of the 1962 Agreement when they themselves were at least partly responsible for that agreement because of the arms and support which they gave to Indonesia at that time.⁷⁷

Although Australia seemed confident that there would be little international reaction to the Act, domestic hostility to Canberra's position continued. With this in mind, Ambassador Gordon Jockell in Jakarta advised Canberra against requiring him to write a public report on the Act:

I doubt whether the Australian public would be much impressed by any report from an Australian Ambassador on this subject. It seems to me for Australia a matter of going through the present period without much to say and then starting to turn the focus of attention politically to positive and practical areas of what can be done for welfare and stability in West Irian. I think we can find a useful part to play which need not be too expensive nor get us too involved.⁷⁸

Furthermore, Australia had its own problems in East New Guinea during this period, specifically in Bougainville, one of the Solomon Islands administered from Port Moresby. On 5 August, police used tear gas and baton charged villagers protesting at the compulsory takeover of land for a big copper mining project at Rorovana.⁷⁹ Although not relevant to West Irian at the time, in the years to come, this dispute would develop into an armed separatist movement against the independent

PNG state, and would temper any support PNG politicians had for separatism generally.

Meanwhile, on 1 September, in an indication of continuing unrest in West Irian, Army chief General Maraden Panggabean rejected a call by a pro-government Papuan politician for troops to be withdrawn, warning that they would “still have to stay for a long time to come.”⁸⁰ Further evidence of unrest came from Papuans fleeing to PNG in early September. According to Van der Kroef, these refugees “indicated that systematic and coordinated attacks on Indonesian civil and military posts were occurring on the island of Biak, as well as in the vicinity of Djayapura.”⁸¹ Although the Australian administration had little sympathy for these people, it would continue to rely on them to a certain extent for information on the situation in West Irian. Tom Unwin, head of the UN Development Programme in PNG from 1973 to 1981, states that in the early 1970’s, Australian Intelligence obtained information from OPM leader Seth Rumkorem during meetings that took place just over the border in PNG.⁸²

On 10 September, the UK delegation to the UNGA received a briefing from the Foreign Office in preparation for the General Assembly’s consideration of the Secretary-General’s report. The briefing reminded the delegation that the official British attitude was, first of all, to “steer clear of the problem, in which we have no involvement.” It also made clear that the British should stick firmly to the legal position that the Agreement was between the Dutch and the Indonesians and did not

confer any responsibility on any other Government. And finally, it was for the Secretary-General in the first instance to decide whether the Act had been properly fulfilled, and no action by member states was required, or would be appropriate, prior to the submission of his report to the UNGA. The briefing then added:

Privately, however, we recognise that the people of West Irian have no desire to be ruled by the Indonesians who are of an alien (Javanese) race, and that the process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free choice to be made. On the other hand, no country seems prepared to antagonise Indonesia by criticising the conduct of the Act, and it is impossible to see any practicable alternatives at the present time to West Irian remaining under Indonesian control, since the territory is not a viable unit and no other Government is prepared to accept any responsibility for it.⁸³

To conclude, the delegation was instructed to avoid taking part in any debate on the item. “We expect the Secretary-General’s report to put the best face on the completion of the Act, and to avoid criticism of Indonesia.”⁸⁴ In Jakarta, Mason at the British Embassy added, “I suspect that an indication by us that we would not be raising any awkward questions [over West Irian] would help to gain us Indonesian support over Ireland.”⁸⁵

The Report of the Secretary General and the UNGA Debate November 1969

Finally, on 6 November, the Secretary-General presented his report to the UNGA. As suggested by Stavropoulos, it consisted of a short summary by himself along with the two reports by Indonesia and the UNRWI. In his summary, U Thant noted Ortiz Sanz’s ‘reservations’ with regard to the rights and freedoms of the Papuans. He also reminded the UNGA that Article XVI of the Agreement concerning

the presence of UN 'experts' in the territory after 1963 had not been implemented.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, U Thant did not question his representative's conclusions that, "in accordance with Indonesian practice" the representatives of the population "have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia."⁸⁷ Following this, in a series of plenary meetings held between 13 and 19 November, the UNGA discussed the Secretary-General's report.

In the days before the final vote, Indonesia became increasingly concerned that it might face some hostile criticism, particularly from the African states. On 7 November, Malik asked the British whether they:

...could promote a better understanding of the result of the Act of Free Choice in Africa, particularly Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Malik said these were small countries which found it difficult to evaluate the position of West Irian.⁸⁸

In spite of its own instruction to "steer clear of the problem," the Foreign Office responded to Malik's request by informing the UK Mission at the UN that they had agreed with him:

...it might be possible for you to give delegations of countries mentioned some background information and advice about the Act and its outcome...If asked our advice would be that in our view Act could be taken as final, and that it was impossible to see any other viable future for West Irian except as part of Indonesia.⁸⁹

Jakarta's anxiety over the 'African vote' was well founded. On the eve of the final UNGA vote, the UK UN Mission telegraphed London:

Situation still confused. Indonesian Permanent Representative asked to address the African group this morning. However, after two or three hours of discussion amongst themselves, the Africans

decided not to receive him. Akwei (Ghana) has told us that the meeting of the group was fairly stormy, with much talk of the African origins of the West Irianese, of Moslem imperialism and Asian racialism and of the need to ensure full self-determination of the people...the Africans felt that they were being rail-roaded by the Indonesians and the Netherlands⁹⁰

The member states' discussion centred around the draft resolution sponsored by Belgium, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Thailand. This resolution took note of the report before the UNGA and noted "with appreciation the fulfilment by the Secretary-General and his Representative of the tasks entrusted to them under the 1962 Agreement."⁹¹ The draft resolution then expressed appreciation of any financial assistance to Indonesia "in its efforts to promote the economic and social development of West Irian."⁹² The draft was introduced to the UNGA on 19 November by Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik.⁹³

Luns, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, then added that "the interests of the people of West Irian had been the paramount concern of the Netherlands," and his country would continue to translate that concern into concrete action "that would reflect the modified circumstances." Although expressing reservations, Luns concluded that his government was prepared to "recognise and abide by the outcome of the act of self-determination."⁹⁴ (As the Minister who, seven years previously, had most fervently resisted Indonesia's demands for West New Guinea, this was an impressive shift of position).

In contrast, several African states ignored last minute appeals from Indonesia and spoke out against the Act. Part of their motivation was no doubt a fear that its acceptance by the UN might give encouragement to the remaining colonial rulers in Africa. If the UN allowed Indonesia to manipulate the exercise of Papuan self-determination so completely, then perhaps the European colonialists could attempt similar 'Acts' in Africa, thereby delaying or preventing de-colonialisation.

As previously discussed, other states such as India combated this argument by ignoring the terms of the Agreement and declaring the West Irian issue an affirmation of Indonesian national unity, rather than one of self-determination.⁹⁵ The African states were not convinced by this tenuous argument and the Zambian Ambassador declared:

My delegation has so far been unable to find out why it was considered acceptable to the Secretary-General's Representative in West Irian to agree to a formula of free choice on the basis of musyawarah...something that was not stipulated in the original agreement.⁹⁶

Rebuffing Jakarta's arguments regarding Papuan undevelopment, the Ambassador for Togo quoted from the UNGA's resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960. This, he reminded the Assembly, stated that the inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence in any country.⁹⁷ In support, Nicol of Sierra Leone added that no society in the modern world could be said to be so primitive and no terrain so geographically difficult that it would justify indefinitely denying its peoples the vital exercise of democratic government. He also deplored the fact that the UNRWI only

advised and assisted, but did not participate in the Act. “The methods used laid open the way for South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia to adopt similar tactics.”⁹⁸

The Ghanaian Ambassador then spoke:

We are not convinced by the argument that the principle of *musyawarah* was the only political method which could be understood by the people...Indeed, we are told that under the Netherlands Administration a type of democratic system known as the ‘whispering vote’ had been successfully used. Further, in Australian Papua New Guinea, which is characterised by the same so-called undeveloped peoples, the principle of ‘one man one vote’ is being successfully used, and a somewhat enlightened policy is being applied in leading the peoples towards eventual self-rule.⁹⁹

This comparison with the eastern half of the island is particularly poignant. Australian New Guinea was recognised in the UN as a non-self-governing territory and Canberra had an obligation to keep the UN briefed about its administration of the territory. In marked contrast with its attitude towards West Irian, UNGA’s resolutions regarding self-determination for the eastern half of the island were an impressive example of vigilance. In 1966 and 1967, the UNGA adopted resolutions accusing Australia of condoning discriminatory practices in TPNG and called for the holding of elections with a view to transferring power to the people, and for a fixed early date for independence.¹⁰⁰ In December 1968 the UNGA passed another resolution which included calls for Australia to:

- (a) fix an early date for self-determination and independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people of the territories;
- (b) hold free elections under United Nations supervision on the basis of universal suffrage in order to transfer effective power to the representatives of the people of the territories [of Papua and New Guinea].¹⁰¹

Jakarta though did not consider West Irian to be a non self-governing territory. But more importantly, it was not challenged on this in the UN, although West Irian was not a recognised part of Indonesia before the Act. As one official in the British Foreign Office UN (Political) Department noted in August 1969:

West Irian has been a plenary item since its inscription by Indonesia in 1954 although listed as a non-self governing territory until UNTEA took over in 1962. It is not clear why, when Indonesia took over the administration of West Irian in 1963 she was not required to submit transmissions under article 73e of the Charter or, for that matter, why West Irian did not, once again, appear on the list of non-self governing territories to be considered by the Committee of 24.¹⁰²

Eventually, on 19 November, the UNGA rejected an move by Dahomey for an adjournment for futher consultations (by 58 to 31 with 24 abstentions). Then it voted on a Ghanian amendment which stated:

Bearing in mind the interests and welfare of the people of West Irian as stated in the preamble of the Agreement. Further bearing in mind article VXIII of the Agreement which, *inter alia*, calls for an act of free choice in accordance with international practice... Takes note on the report of the Secretary-General and his representative on their efforts to fulfil their responsibilities under the Agreement... Decides that the people of West Irian should be given a further opportunity, by the end of 1975, to carry out the act of free choice envisaged in the Agreement.¹⁰³

The amendment was rejected by 60 to 15 with 39 abstentions. Interestingly, while Australia, Asia, the US and the Communist countries voted against this amendment, the Dutch abstained. This was despite informing the British beforehand that they were determined to keep in step with the Indonesians.¹⁰⁴ Possibly it was a token gesture aimed at domestic public opinion. The British, who also abstained on

the amendment (and the Dahomeian proposal), privately explained their motives as being determined:

...partly by a desire to stick with the Dutch, partly because the amendments were based on the right of peaceful self-determination of all peoples and it was necessary to be consistent with our position on Gibraltar, Apartheid etc.¹⁰⁵

In the end the Dutch, British and eighty-two other states voted to adopt the original resolution taking note of the Act's result and acknowledging the fulfilment by the UN of its responsibilities under the Agreement. There were thirty abstentions, but no votes against. This resolution was then recorded as Document A/L.576 in the official records of the UNGA.¹⁰⁶ The Assembly moved on to Agenda item 99 concerning the Korean question, and with that the UN ended its interest in the right of the people of West Irian to self-determination.

In a report by the British Embassy in Jakarta to Le Breton at the Foreign Office shortly afterwards, the mood of the Indonesian Government was described as one of great relief: "The number of abstentions disconcerted somewhat; but at least there were no votes against."¹⁰⁷ Thirty years later, Le Breton acknowledges that it was "shameful" that the West "didn't do more," but confirms that nothing was said because Suharto was seen as a "brave new upstanding general" who had defeated the PKI. Washington and London were therefore anxious to support and encourage stability for the new regime after so much chaos under Sukarno.¹⁰⁸

The reaction of the Indonesian press was interesting in that it focussed upon what it believed were criticisms of Indonesia in Ortiz Sanz's UNGA report.

Summarising the comments, the Embassy report stated:

Many of the old complaints about his manner of conducting his mission - his poor links with New York, his obvious sympathy with the dissident groups, his prolonged absences from West Irian - all these, justified or not, have been resurrected. Djakarta Times leader on 13 November talked of 'his peculiar attitude towards Indonesia, her government, her press and her people', condemned his lack of realism, and concluded with regrets for his having succumbed to the blandishments of the OPM in New York.¹⁰⁹

Accused of being an anti-Indonesian OPM sympathiser on the one hand, he was also criticised by Mason at the British Jakarta Embassy of being too cautious in carrying out his responsibilities. On the 'questionable' methods used by Jakarta for the Act, Mason commented that one might have expected the UNRWI to speak out against them more strongly:

The feeling remains...that it might have been possible for him to play a more active role in the proceedings, despite the fact that Sudjarwo...seems to have out-manoeuvred him on several occasions. And one does not know what degree of support he believed he could count on from the Secretary-General in the event of a major disagreement with the Indonesians.¹¹⁰

Referring to the "touching faith" which the Papuans had had in the UN, Mason added that impartial observers "feel that the United Nations' part has done nothing to enhance its standing."¹¹¹

In his defence, these criticisms could be described as examples of great ingratitude by Jakarta and the West. The desired solution was achieved, and this was made possible because the UN was prepared to expose itself to serious accusations

regarding its integrity and reputation as a defender of human and political rights. As the UNRWI, Ortiz Sanz's role in this was central and for that reason at least, his Indonesian and Foreign Office critics might have offered him some thanks.

Now in his late eighties, Fernando Ortiz Sanz is long-retired and living in Sucre, Bolivia. Recently interviewed on the Act, he defended the result but suggested that it need not be an irrevocable decision. "The Papuans [in 1969] did not have the level of civilization needed to determine their own fate." Nonetheless he asserted:

The final result was wise and sensible. I was able to acquire the greatest possible autonomy for them. But this does not make me rule out that, in the future, the population of West Irian should again have the opportunity to decide their own fate. I told them: be patient. The moment will come, do not fear. Go to school, learn everything there is to know about the principles of democracy and the road will be open to you. That was a healthy attitude, I think.¹¹²

CHAPTER TEN

Notes

1. Interview by Ben Saul with OPM revolutionary Council Chairman Moses Werror, 22 August 1996. For Honi Soit, Sydney University Student Newspaper; interview by author with Jacob Prai June 1997; Henk Joku, "West Papua: The Plea of the People of West Papua". IWGIA newsletter No.41, 1985 p.136.(International Work group for Indigenous Affairs. Fiolstraede 10, DK 1171 Copenhagen Denmark); UN: RAG 3/ 7 Box 173. Thomas Waingai, "The Act of Self-determination of the West Melanesian People".
2. De Tijd. (The Hague), 14 August 1969, quoted in Budiardjo & Liem, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, p.25; email to author from Benedict Anderson forwarded by Deborah Homsher (Managing Editor SEA Program Publications, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York), 1 February 2000.
3. De Tijd. (The Hague), 14 August 1969
4. Algemeen Dagblad, 12 December 1998.
5. Philip Shabecoff, "Irianese Begin 'Act of Free Choice' on Whether to Remain part of Indonesia", New York Times, 7 July 1969.
6. Stuart Harris, "Indonesia the Only Applicant to Look After West Irian", The Times, 8 July 1969.
7. *ibid.*
8. Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 14 July 1969.
9. The Rhodesian Government announced in October 1964 that it intended to determine African opinion on Rhodesian independence using the traditional 'Indaba' assembly of tribal chiefs. For a discussion arguing that it was an invalid method to adopt, see J.C. Mitchell, J Van Valson et al. "The Domboshawa Indaba: The Views of some Sociologists and Anthropologists in Rhodesia". University College Salisbury, Rhodesia, February 1965. Copy in PRO: DO 183/775. (SBY.104/415/2).
10. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). Parsons (UK Mission to the UN, New York) to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 17 July 1969..
11. *ibid.*
12. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex i

paras 189 to 200.

13. *ibid.*

14. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 50.

15. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex i paras 197 to 200.

16. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). British Embassy, The Hague to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 23 July 1969.

17. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 50.

18. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.192.

19. Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol XVI, July to December 1969, p.9.

20. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 51.

21. Interview with Seth Rumkorem, Nieuwegein, The Netherlands, 20 November 1999.

22. Quoted in the Guardian, 19 July 1969.

23. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.192.

24. Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, p.22.

25. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.192.

26. Hugh Lunn, "How the West was Lost", Australian, 21 August 1999.

27. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 52.

28. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex i paras. 208-213.

29. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 52.

30. FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). British Embassy, The Hague to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 23 July 1969.

31. Hugh Lunn, quoted in “Act of No Choice”, SBS Television, 25 August 1999.
32. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 53.
33. *ibid.*
34. *ibid*, para 54.
35. *ibid*, para 55.
36. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex i para 227.
37. Hugh Lunn the Australian, 21 August 1999. He originally made these allegations in the Canberra Times, 1 August 1969.
38. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 56.
39. *ibid*, para 57.
40. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex i paras 239-244; Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.193.
41. Correspondence with Jacob Prai, June 1997.
42. UN: RAG 3/7 Box 173. Thomas Wainngai, “The Act of Self Determination of the West Melanesian People.” 1969.
43. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p.193.
44. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 58.
45. Brian May *op cit* p.194.
46. UNGA Official Records *op cit* Annex ii para 59.
47. *ibid*, para 65.
48. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex i para 246.
49. *ibid*, para 250.
50. Interview with Ortiz Sanz by Casale, 15 December 1999.

51. Interview with Johan B.P. Maramis (Indonesian Mission to UN New York 1969) by Terrence Markin, 3 December 1990. Markin, "The West New Guinea Dispute. How the Kennedy Administration resolved that 'other' Southeast Asian Conflict", p.480.
52. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex i para 251.
53. *ibid*, para 253.
54. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Annex ii para 64.
55. *ibid*, para 66.
56. Geoffrey Myers, "The UN and the Papuans", Daily Telegraph, 5 August 1969.
57. Letter to the Times, 1 August 1969.
58. "An Act of Free Choice", Time, 22 August 1969.
59. "Palaver in West Irian", Die Welt, 5 August 1969. English translation provided by Jacob Prai, Malmo, Sweden.
60. "How Indonesia Won West Irian", Der Bund, 12 August 1969. English translation provided by Jacob Prai, Malmo, Sweden.
61. "Humiliating Show", Het Parool, 24 July 1969. English translation provided by Jacob Prai, Malmo, Sweden.
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65. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). Letter from Lord Shepherd (Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Relations) to Humphrey Berkley (Chairman United Nations Association), 29 July 1969.
66. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD 1/4). Letter from Humphrey Berkley to Lord Shepherd, 4 August 1969.
67. New York Agreement Article XXI (i).
68. UN: Series 100 Box 2 File 7. Inter-office memo from C Stavropoulos UN Legal Counsel to Rolz-Bennett, 17 July 1969.

69. *ibid.*
70. *ibid.*
71. *ibid.*
72. UN: Series 100 Box 2 File 7. C Stavropoulos to U Thant, 29 June 1962. Attached to back of Stavropoulos memo to Rolz-Bennett, 17 July 1969.
73. Antony Balmain, "How Canberra Helped Kill Freedom's Dreams", Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1999; NAA: From Balmain, SBS Television. Shaw (Australian Ambassador to the UN) to Department of External Affairs, Canberra.
74. *ibid.*
75. PRO: FCO 24/450 (FWD 1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Stewart (Foreign Office), 9 September 1969.
76. NAA: From Balmain, SBS television. Australian Mission to the UN, New York to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 28 October 1969.
77. NAA: From Balmain, SBS television. Shaw (Australian Ambassador to the UN) to Department of External Affairs, 4 September 1969.
78. Anthony Balmain, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 August 1999.
79. "Tear Gas in Solomon Islands", Times, 6 August 1969.
80. Van der Kroef, "West New Guinea. New Dimensions of Conflict", p.367.
81. *ibid*, p.388.
82. Interview by phone with Tom Unwin, 4 February 2000; Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, pp.161, 165. Unwin's efforts to highlight the issue of West Papuan refugees made him unpopular with the Australian, and then PNG authorities.
83. PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD1/4). Foreign Office briefing on West Irian prepared for the UK delegation to the UNGA, 10 September 1969.
84. *ibid.*
85. PRO: FCO 24/450 (FWD1/4).. Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 September 1969.
86. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/7723 (6 November), Report of the Secretary-General, para. 7.
87. *ibid*, para 5.

88. PRO: FCO 24/450. (FWD1/4). Foreign and Commonwealth Office to UK Mission to the UN, New York, 7 November 1999.
89. *ibid.*
90. PRO: FCO 24/451. (FWD1/4). UK Mission to the UN, New York to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 18 November 1969.
91. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, Doc A/L574. Draft resolution on the Secretary General's Report, 12 November 1969 para 2.
92. *ibid.*
93. UNGA Official Records, Agenda item 98, 1812th plenary meeting of UNGA 24th session, 19 November 1969.
94. *ibid.*
95. *ibid.*
96. PRO: FCO 24/451 (FWD1/4). "Plenary Debates on 19 November 1969", telegram (No.296) from UK Mission to the UN, New York to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 November 1969.
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98. *ibid.*
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100. UNGA Official Records, 1747th plenary meeting of UNGA to adopt resolution 2427 (XXIII) on Papua and New Guinea, 18 December 1968.
101. *ibid.*
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104. PRO: FCO 24/451 (FWD1/4). UK Mission to UN, to Foreign Office, 20 November 1969.
105. *ibid.*

106. UNGA Official Records, 1812th plenary meeting of UNGA 24th session DOC A/L574.

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108. Interview by phone with David Le Breton CBE, 3 February 2000.

109. PRO: FCO 24/451 (FWD1/4). British Embassy, Jakarta to Le Breton (SWPD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 25 November 1969.

110. PRO: FCO 24/450 (FWD1/4). Mason (British Embassy, Jakarta) to Stewart (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 9 September 1969.

111. *ibid.*

112. Interview with Ortiz Sanz by Casale, 15 December 1999.