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 Abbreviations used in notes:

DOSB	(US) <i>Department of State Bulletin</i>
FRUS	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i> (year, volume number, page number)
IO	<i>Indonesian Observer</i> (Jakarta)
JFKNSF	<i>John F. Kennedy National Security Files</i> (reel, page number)
NYT	<i>New York Times</i>
OR	<i>Official Records</i> (of the United Nations General Assembly)
PIM	<i>Pacific Islands Monthly</i> (Sydney)
ROI	<i>Report on Indonesia</i> (Washington)
YUN	<i>Yearbook of the United Nations</i>

<sup>1</sup> Even to name the territory in question is to reveal a bias. The Dutch called it Netherlands New Guinea, the Indonesians Irian Barat (West Irian) and later Irian Jaya (Victorious Irian), the indigenous nationalist movement eventually declared their country to be Papua Barat (West Papua), while some later preferred West Melanesia. West New Guinea, while favouring the Dutch terminology somewhat, is the most common choice of those seeking a neutral term. This paper uses the terms interchangeably, depending on the viewpoint being examined, while using West New Guinea at first as the most recognizable term. The people of the territory are referred to with their own preferred term, Papuans. For more on the power of names, see below & appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> Benedict Anderson, "Cracking Myths of Nationness: Indonesia After the Fall of Suharto," Talk at University of British Columbia, Sept. 27, 1999. Territorial borders as a basis of nationalism are described in Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). Constructed histories have been highlighted in Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

<sup>3</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Revised Edition (London: Verso, 1991).

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p. 175-8.

<sup>5</sup> The question of language will not be addressed here, save to note that the same language, called Bahasa Indonesia in one area and Malay in the other. In both, it served as a common second language that was beginning to unite linguistically diverse areas.

<sup>6</sup> "By nation-of-intent I mean a more or less precisely-defined idea of the form of a nation, i.e. its territory, population, language, culture, symbols and institutions. The idea must be shared by a number of people who perceive themselves as members of that nation, and who feel that it unites them.... In some aspects, conceptually, 'nation-of-intent' is not dissimilar to Anderson's concept of 'imagined political community.' ... However, nation-of-intent is a more open-ended concept. It is more positive, pro-active and forward looking. It has a programmatic programme of action articulated in realpolitik...." Shamsul A.B., "Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia," in Stein Tønnesson & Hans Antlöv, eds., *Asian Forms of the Nation* (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1996), p. 328-9.

<sup>7</sup> Scholte, *The International Construction of Indonesian Nationhood, 1930-1950*," in Hans Antlöv and Stein Tønnesson, eds., *Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian Nationalism, 1930-1957* (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1995).

<sup>8</sup> The concept of mental maps is taken from Alan K. Henrickson, "Mental Maps," in Michael J. Hogan & Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>9</sup> Arnold Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. ix-xi.

<sup>10</sup> Terence C. Markin, *The West Irian Dispute: How the Kennedy Administration Resolved that "Other" Southeast Asian Conflict* (Ph. D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1996).

<sup>11</sup> Speech of Aug. 17, 1948, cited in Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. xiii.

<sup>12</sup> Speech of Sept. 2, 1945, cited in Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 113.

<sup>13</sup> Hatta, "The Digoel Tragedy of Dutch Colonial Imperialism," (1929), *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings*

of Mohammad Hatta (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), P. 379-80.

<sup>14</sup> Sukarno interview with UPI, 28 Dec. 1957, ROI Nov. '57-Jan '58: 21

<sup>15</sup> Frances Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995), p. 173; Arend Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 11-2; Justus van der Kroef, "The Eurasians of West New Guinea," *United Asia* 14 (1962): 124. For an analysis downplaying the view of New Guinea as a Eurasian colonization zone, see Henri Warmenhoven, "West New Guinea's Settlers," *New Guinea* 2 #4 (Jan. 1968).

<sup>16</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 100-10.

<sup>17</sup> Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *From the Formation of the State of East Indonesia Towards the Establishment of the United States of Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1996), p. 45.

<sup>18</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 114-23; Anak Agung, *Formation*, p. 654.

<sup>19</sup> "The Birth of Pancasila," speech of June 1, 1945, in Sukarno, *Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man* (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961), p. 11.

<sup>20</sup> Yamin's speech is reprinted in *Background to Indonesia's Policy towards Malaysia: The Territory of the Indonesian State, Discussions of the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1964), pp. 1-14.

<sup>21</sup> Hatta's speech, *ibid*, p. 18.

<sup>22</sup> For instance, the Australian representative at the talks, T.K. Critchley, recalled: "Hatta was the one Indonesian I met who did not seem emotionally concerned about the issue. He agreed with me that postponement was better than a breakdown of the Conference and that it was an issue that could be more readily and realistically solved after the Dutch had taken the major step of transferring sovereignty." Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1987), p. 160-1. According to one account, Hatta forced his Federalist compatriots to compromise by offering to walk out over the issue as they wanted if they would agree in return to take up arms against the Dutch. Ali Sastroamijoyo, *Milestones on My Journey* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979), p. 208.

<sup>23</sup> Australia backed Indonesian independence strongly, but its own strategic plans wanted West New Guinea in reliable hands. Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 16-7, June Verrier, *Australia, Papua New Guinea and the West New Guinea Question 1949-1969* (Ph. D. Thesis, Monash University, 1975), p. 36, Allen Renouf, *Let Justice be Done: The Foreign Policy of Dr. H.V. Evatt* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 186, Henry S. Albinski, "Australia and the Dutch New Guinea Dispute," *International Journal* 16 (1961): 362.

<sup>24</sup> Ali, *Milestones*, 206. "We do not intend to give one inch on the West Irian issue," their chief negotiator told Anak Agung." *Formation*, p. 646. A similar account of Dutch bluntness is given by the American representative. Embassy in The Hague to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, FRUS 1949, 7: 552.

<sup>25</sup> This approach had the active support of the American government, which dispatched an order to "support the Dutch position" on West New Guinea. Memo by Frederick E. Nolting Jr, office of West European Affairs, to Acheson, Oct. 20, 1949, FRUS 1949, 7: 543.

<sup>26</sup> This was firmed up by an Indonesian-Dutch exchange of letters containing the identical paragraph: "The clause in article 2 of the Draft Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty reading: 'the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained' means: 'through continuing under the Government of the Netherlands.'" Letters printed as annex to Netherlands memorandum to UN, Nov. 3/61, A/4954.

<sup>27</sup> Osborne 11; Peter Hastings, *New Guinea: Problems and Prospects* (Cheshire: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), p. 202. The 1942 declaration was the source of much later nationalist pride. One Papuan boasted in 1962: "We had our 1942 proclamation, issued not after the Japanese had surrendered [as in the Indonesian case] but while they were in active control." P.W. van der Veur, "Political Awakening in West New Guinea," *Pacific Affairs* 36 #1 (1963): 57.

<sup>28</sup> van der Veur, "Political," p. 59-60; Peter Savage, "The National Liberation Struggle in West Irian: From Millenarianism to Socialist Revolution," *Asian Survey* 18 #10 (1978): 982-3; *The Question of West Irian* (Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955), p. 31.

<sup>29</sup> *Jaren van Reconstructie: Nieuw Guinea van 1949 tot 1961* ('s-Hertogenbosch, 1962), p. 206, Klees Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1979), p. 67.

<sup>30</sup> van der Veur, "Political," p. 60.

<sup>31</sup> Osborne, p. 15; *Voice of the Negroids of the Pacific to the Negroids Throughout the World* (Hollandia, 1962), p. 20.

<sup>32</sup> citation taken from Jon M. Reinhardt, *Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1971), p. 68 & Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 157.

<sup>33</sup> *West Irian and the World* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1954); *The Question of West Irian*.

<sup>34</sup> The old PKI leadership had envisioned a two-state league grouping independent Indonesia and West Irian. Feith, *Decline*, p. 161 fn. Dutch Communists had also opposed handing West Irian to a state headed by Sukarno or Hatta. A younger leadership under D.N. Aidit reversed this policy, helped by a similar shift by the Dutch Communists and a Soviet Union that had reclassified Indonesia into the progressive camp.

<sup>35</sup> Willem Oltmans reported that Hatta felt "cheated" by his Dutch friends. "The agreement I made with the Dutch government in private and behind the scenes stipulated a transfer of the Residency of New Guinea, as soon as the shock of the transfer of the Netherlands East Indies as a whole would be digested by the Dutch people." Oltmans memo to Rostow, April 5, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 337ff.

<sup>36</sup> One Dutch New Guinea governor recalled his early wish for "a tie between West New Guinea and Indonesia.... The dissolution of the [federal states], though, left us with no choice but to keep the territory.... After letting down so many other groups, we had to show that at least this one people we would protect." van Baal, 1992 interview, Markin p. 26 fn.

<sup>37</sup> Mackie, "Australia and Indonesia 1945-60," in Gordon Greenwood & Norman Harper, eds., *Australia and World Affairs 1956-60* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1963), p. 283. Moves on the ground, like an attempt to establish air links to Australian New Guinea, also pointed toward separation from Indonesia. Paul Hasluck, *A Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951-1963* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1976), p. 359.

<sup>38</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 163-77.

<sup>39</sup> Memo of conversation by Homer M. Bynington Jr., Adviser to US delegation to UNGA, Oct. 31, 1952, on talk between Luns and Acheson. FRUS 1952-4, 12: 340.

<sup>40</sup> "The Republic of Indonesia did not want to be regarded as of no significance in the world," Ali wrote in his memoirs. "Our territories were extensive, our inhabitants numbered millions. We had natural resources in abundance and our country was situated very strategically in the Indian and Pacific Oceans." Ali, *Milestones*, p. 255.

<sup>41</sup> Hansard, June 5, 1956, pp. 4778-80. While Indonesian case for West Irian as Indonesian territory continued to rest on legal arguments based on the territorial unity of the Indies, increased stress was also laid on anti-colonial arguments. An unreasonable Dutch government was stifling attempts at peaceful resolution, it was argued, most notably by incorporating Netherlands New Guinea into the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the 1953 revision of the Dutch constitution. Dutch arguments that this was simply an overdue recognition of fact, replacing the old reference to Indonesia as part of the Kingdom, cut no ice with outraged Indonesians who saw a *new* Dutch claim to part of their own national territory. More and more attention was paid to the repression of fighters for Indonesia inside West Irian, and to the role of war hero Silas Papare, founder of the pro-Indonesian political party PKII. United Asian and African support for Indonesia's anti-colonial claim also received increased stress. *The Question of West Irian; The Truth About West Irian* (Jakarta: Ministry of Information, 1956); *The Case of West Irian* (West New Guinea) (Cairo: Indonesian Embassy, n.d. [1955?]), 1954 memo to UN, A/2694.

<sup>42</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 29-30. The Indonesian case for a resolution is given in explanatory memo A/2694.

<sup>43</sup> Colin Brown, "Indonesia's West Irian Case in the United Nations General Assembly," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 7 #2 (1976); YUN 1954: 59. The same view is expressed by Guy Pauker, "Indonesia Today," p. 5. Paper in JFKNSF 4: 306ff.

<sup>44</sup> "The Secretary [John Foster Dulles] said he very strongly opposed Indonesia's getting control of New Guinea," according to the notes of one meeting. "This might not always be the case if a strong and stable government should emerge in Indonesia, but under present conditions for the territory to come under the control of Indonesia was neither in our interests nor in the interests of the inhabitants of New Guinea. He recognized, on the other hand, that an important political factor was the emergence of a slightly better government in Indonesia which he would not want to rebuff. The Secretary said that if a resolution failed of adoption in the Assembly, without our being tagged with its defeat, he would not mind at all." Memo

of conversation, Dulles with state department officials, Aug. 24, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 12: 183.

<sup>45</sup> YUN 1955: 61-2, Ganis Harsono, *Recollections of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), p. 118; Memo from Young to Robertson, Feb 17, 1956, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 229, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).

<sup>46</sup> YUN 1956: 125, YUN 1957: 77-80; A/3644.

<sup>47</sup> Hatta, "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs," *Foreign Affairs* 31 (April 1953): 487; "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 36 (April 1958).

<sup>48</sup> *West Irian Liberation Campaign #4* (Jakarta: Ministry of Information, n.d. [1957]), p. 29-31. This booklet is primarily concerned with demonstrating the united claim of all forces in Indonesian society to West Irian. Along the same lines, Sukarno said: "I am only expressing what is in the hearts of our society, what was in the hearts of our youth when, on October 28, 1928, they took the pledge of 'One Nation, One Country, One Language'; what was in the hearts of all of us when we made the Proclamation of August 17, 1945. At those times, there was no split – once again, there was no split in the inner self of the Indonesian Nation." Speech of Feb 21/57, Herbert Feith & Lance Castles, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-65* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 88.

<sup>49</sup> *West Irian Liberation Campaign #4*.

<sup>50</sup> Klaus H. Schreiner, "Rituals of Nationalism: Veneration of Political Heroes in Modern Indonesia," unpublished paper presented at 7th symposium on East Timor, Oporto University, 1997, p. 16.

<sup>51</sup> Sumitro Dyoyohadikusumo, "Irian, Indonesia and the Summit," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 18, 1960. The rebel government was led by Syafruddin Prawirenegara, the same man who led a Sumatra-based Emergency Government after Sukarno and Hatta were captured by the Dutch in 1948.

<sup>52</sup> YUN 1957: 77-80.

<sup>53</sup> Subandrio, *An opening address to the UN Political Committee, on November 20, 1957* (Jakarta: Ministry of Information, n.d. [1957]). See also *The Question of West Irian in the United Nations, 1954-1957* (Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d. [1958]).

<sup>54</sup> "I was informed that in private conversations in the UN corridors it was made clear that the United States would not be offended if the resolution should be defeated." John M. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairies, or Allison Wonderland* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 335. See also Department of State to UN mission, Nov. 15, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 502.

<sup>55</sup> Memo of conversation in Washington between Cochran and Indonesian Ambassador Ali Sastroamijoyo, Oct. 24, 1951, FRUS 1951, 6: 719; Allison to State, Nov. 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 485; Allison to State, Nov. 5, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 488.

<sup>56</sup> Brackman 92, "Answers to questions about Indonesia's actions on Dutch monopoly," ROI Nov. '57-Jan '58: 14, 11; Foreign Minister Luns, cited in memorandum of conversations with Dulles, Nov. 27, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 518; *Memorandum on Netherlands New Guinea*, vol. 3, Feb '58.

<sup>57</sup> *West Irian Liberation Campaign #4*: 9-10; "Indonesia's Bid for International Justice," *Indonesian Spectator*, Sept. 1, 1957: 17; "Some Questions & Answers concerning the Dispute over West Irian," ROI Jan/Feb 1957: 33; Justus van der Kroef, "Dutch Opinion on the West New Guinea Problem," *Australian Outlook* 14 #3 (Dec. 1960): 297. Dutch officers were quoted, for instance, making remarks like "as long as Irian is in our hands, it will be a pistol pointing at Indonesia's chest." *Subversive Activities in Indonesia: The Jungschleager and Schmidt Affairs* (Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d. [1957]), p. 76.

<sup>58</sup> Aidit saw take-overs as economic actions to decolonize Indonesian economy, not primarily due to Irian. Report to PKI national congress, Sept. 1959, Feith & Castles, p. 263. His history of the PKI in 1955 had said a lot about the common front, but there was no mention of Irian in party platform highlights. D.N. Aidit, *A Short History of the Communist Party of Indonesia* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1955). In 1959, he agreed with Sukarno that Dutch imperialism, not American, was the "enemy number one of the Indonesian people." Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 168.

<sup>59</sup> "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution," speech of Aug. 17, 1959, in *Toward Freedom*, p. 45, 61. This speech was retroactively declared the Political Manifesto of Indonesia.

<sup>60</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 167.

<sup>61</sup> Netherlands New Guinea Bureau for Native Affairs, *Anthropological Research in Netherlands New Guinea Since 1950* (Sydney: Australasian Medical Publishers, 1959), p. 7; Anton Ploeg, "A Colonial Governor in

Dutch New Guinea," *Journal of Pacific History* 26 #2 (1991); S.R. Jaarsma, "'Your Work is of No Use to Us...' Administrative Interest in Ethnographic Research (West New Guinea, 1950-1962)," *Journal of Pacific History* 29 #2 (1994).

<sup>62</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 97-8, 143.

<sup>63</sup> A Dutch government pamphlet produced for the 1954 UN debates argued for a Dutch "sacred mission" in West New Guinea: "The corresponding inner motive on the Netherlands side, in refusing to relinquish a task which holds out no hope of material gain — though it does offer prospects of a worthwhile contribution to general world improvement — is the natural self-respect of a guardian who has begun the upbringing of an infant and does not want to relinquish the responsibility until the child can stand on its own legs." *Western New Guinea and the Netherlands* (The Hague: State Printing Office, 1954), p. 19.

<sup>64</sup> A publication from the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce's New Guinea Institute spoke of the "magnificent task" of development. "In conformity with Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations the Netherlands have accepted 'as a sacred trust' the obligation to promote the development of the territory of New Guinea and to educate its people toward self-government." *Handbook on Netherlands New Guinea* (Rotterdam: New Guinea Institute, 1958), p. 5. See also *Netherlands New Guinea: A People on the Way to Self-Determination* (Rotterdam: New Guinea Institute, 1960).

<sup>65</sup> Justus van der Kroef, "West New Guinea in the Crucible," *Political Science Quarterly* 75 (1960): 528.

<sup>66</sup> One particularly effective Indonesian pamphlet skewered the Dutch developmentalist rhetoric, using Dutch figures to show that over half the budget went to providing facilities to government and Western private business, over a quarter to the administration itself, just over 20% to everything else. In short, it concluded, "the Irianese are to be 'inserted' into an export economy as the producers of export goods and as labour power in the Western sector." *Colonial Purposes in West Irian: A Exposé of Dutch Intentions* (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1962), p. 35-6.

<sup>67</sup> The United States and Britain first announced their neutrality in advance of December 1950 talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Robert Bone, *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1958), p. 110. The neutrality policy was affirmed by the Eisenhower administration on joint recommendation to the National Security Council of the secretaries of state and defence. "Both sides have solicited United States support. United States relations with either country would suffer seriously if the United States were to support the other's claim. President Sukarno and the preponderance of Indonesian political parties concentrate on the New Guinea issue the fervor of nationalism and the fear of resurgent colonialism. The United States has pursued a policy of avid neutrality in this issue." Memo by Secretary of State (Dulles) and Acting Secretary of Defense (Robert B Anderson) to NSC, Aug. 27, 1953, FRUS 1952-4, 12: 378. Neutrality on New Guinea was part of the administration's Indonesia policy outlined in NSC 171/1, FRUS 1952-4, 12: 395-400. NSC 5518 saw US influence in Indonesia limited by the neutrality policy but unable to move due to Dutch and Australian opposition: "Thus far the U.S. has maintained a position of neutrality between the conflicting claims. Any other U.S. approach would open us to violent condemnation and loss of influence with one side or the other." NSC 5518, May 3, 1955, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 155.

<sup>68</sup> This last suggestion was made by three state department branches in October 1957. Memorandum from Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Oct. 2, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 457-60. In 1955, American officials suggested to Australia that it seek a mandate. R.G. Casey, *Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60* (London: Collins, 1972), p. 226.

<sup>69</sup> Interview transcript, John Foster Dulles oral history project, cited in Paul F. Gardner, *Shared Hopes, Separate Fears: Fifty Years of U.S.-Indonesian Relations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 118.

<sup>70</sup> Memo of conversation, Rusk & Ambassador van Kleffens, Nov. 4, 1949, FRUS 1949: 564; Rusk to Dept. of Defense, March 22, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 985

<sup>71</sup> Gardner 140-1.

<sup>72</sup> Allison to State, Nov. 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 487.

<sup>73</sup> "[W]hatever the legal rights might be," Allison wrote in his memoirs, "the political realities were that if Indonesian desires were not, in some manner, recognized, Sukarno could, and probably would, lead his close to 100 million people into the Communist camp. At the same time I was sure that if the Indonesian demands were granted, the slightly more than 10 million Dutch would protest vigorously, threaten to leave NATO, castigate the United States — if we had helped Indonesia — and then accept the situation.

There was nothing else for them to do. They certainly did not wish to become Communists. In view of the strategic location of the Indonesian islands, lying as they did across the lines of communication between America's Philippine and ANZUS allies, and because of the all important Indonesian oil production, it seemed to me that our interest lay more in keeping the Indonesians out of the Communist camp than in worrying about ruffling the feelings of the Dutch." Allison 304. See also Allison to Robertson, Aug. 12, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 409; Allison to State, Aug. 27, 1956, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 426-9; Allison to State, Dec. 9, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 537. The same position was taken by the commander-in-chief Pacific (CINCPAC) Adm. Stump to Chief of naval operations Adm. Burke, Dec. 26, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 657; Audrey R. Kahin & George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debauch in Indonesia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), p. 109-11.

<sup>74</sup> Casey, *Foreign Minister*, p. 297-8, 309, 310, 324; Mackie, *World Affairs*, p. 303; Embassy in Australia to Rusk, Aug. 27, 1958, FRUS 1958: 271; Memorandum of conversation, Casey with Dulles, Sept. 8, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 17: 279.

<sup>75</sup> Rusk to DoD, FRUS 1950, 6: 986. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred that there was "no major United States strategic interests at this time in the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea so long as it remains in the hands of a nation friendly to the United States." FRUS 1950, 6: 1074. This estimate was confirmed regularly thereafter.

<sup>76</sup> Secretary of Defense to Acheson, Nov. 7, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 1092.

<sup>77</sup> Secretary of Defense to Acheson, April 14, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 780.

<sup>78</sup> Percy Spender, cited L. Metzemaekers, "The Western New Guinea Problem," *Pacific Affairs* 24 (1951): 139-40 fn.

<sup>79</sup> Hastings, *New Guinea*, p. 201.

<sup>80</sup> Mackie, *World Affairs*, p. 314.

<sup>81</sup> Bruce Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972), p. 38, 82.

<sup>82</sup> "The Australian and Netherlands Governments are therefore pursuing, and will continue to pursue, policies directed toward the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples in their territories in a manner which recognizes the ethnological and geographical affinity. At the same time, the two Governments will continue, and strengthen, the co-operation at present existing between their respective administrations in the territories. In so doing the two Governments are determined to promote an uninterrupted development of this process until such time as the inhabitants of the territories concerned will be in a position to determine their own future." *Memorandum on Netherlands New Guinea* vol. 2, p. 1. See also Verrier, p. 61-87.

<sup>83</sup> Verrier, p. 56, 103, Casey, *Foreign Minister*, p. 94, 307.

<sup>84</sup> Acheson to Cochran, March 2, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 980; Embassy in The Hague to Acheson, Aug. 30, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 1059; Rusk memorandum "Netherlands New Guinea," Dec. 29, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 1101; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to Acheson, Jan. 18, 1951, FRUS 1951, 6: 587; Memo of conversation, Dulles with state department officials, Aug. 24, 1955, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 183. Dulles promised "if it came to a real showdown about New Guinea, then the United States would back Australia 'right or wrong.'" Memo of conversation with Australian PM Robert Menzies, March 15, 1955, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 143. The US was not willing to go as far as Britain in refusing to take any actions objectionable to Australia, however. Memo of conversation with British chargé by Bonsal, director of office of Philippine & Southeast Asian affairs, Feb. 25, 1953, FRUS 1952-4, 12: 360.

<sup>85</sup> Casey, *Foreign Minister*, p. 314-5; Verrier, p. 127, Mackie, *World Affairs*, p. 304.

<sup>86</sup> "Dutch New Guinea Council 'This Year,'" PIM April 1960: 17; "Dutch New Guinea moves," PIM May 1960: 17, 149; "Dutch will spur Papuan self-rule," NYT April 6, 1960.

<sup>87</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 192-5, 200-7, 256-7, Amry Vandenbosch, "Indonesia, The Netherlands and the New Guinea Issue," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 7 #1 (1976): 114-5; Justus van der Kroef, "The West New Guinea Settlement: Its Origins and Implications," *Orbis* 7 #1 (Spring 1963): 132; van der Kroef, "Dutch Opinion."

<sup>88</sup> Peter Savage, "Irian Jaya: Reluctant Colony," in *Politics in Melanesia* (n.p.: University of the South Pacific, 1982), p. 5; Osborne, p. 22.

<sup>89</sup> Luns told John Foster Dulles in 1958 that pro-Indonesian infiltrators were present, but that Papuan natives "either apprehended and reported these agitators to the local administration or they ate the

agitators. He said there was only one variation to this latter practice and that existed among the more Christianized natives who would only eat fisherman on Fridays." FRUS 1958-60, 17: 122. Governor Rudy Plateel, while pursuing localization, never had any real faith in Papuans. His true attitude of Papuan government was expressed privately to an Australian colleague: "There is a large round table with a pile of money on it. Around it are seated a number of black men. Behind each is a white who tells him how much money to ask for." Hastings, *New Guinea*, 207 fn.

<sup>90</sup> van der Veur, "Political," p. 63; Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 264-9.

<sup>91</sup> van der Kroef, "Settlement," p. 133; Russell H. Fifield, *Southeast Asia in United States Policy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 352.

<sup>92</sup> One Australian district officer saw the plan as "deliberately designed to embarrass the Australian Government, or force its hand." Its announcement sent Hasluck (who thought 30 years was an appropriate time-frame) scurrying to the Hague to plead for a delay, and made prime minister Menzies announce for the first time that independence was the eventual Australian goal. Verrier, p. 85, 93; Albinski, p. 377; J.J. West, "The New Guinea Question: An Australian View," *Foreign Affairs* 39 #3 (April 1961): 504.

<sup>93</sup> Hasluck, *Time for Building*, 364; Justus van der Kroef, *The West New Guinea Dispute* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), p. 22; Verrier, 88.

<sup>94</sup> "During the liberal era," army chief Nasution said, "we have given opportunity to the Dutch to gradually and systematically suppress all pro-Indonesian elements in West Irian and to educate and indoctrinate West Irian intellectuals to hate Indonesia. We must stop it." A.H. Nasution, *To Safeguard the Banner of the Revolution* (Jakarta: Delegasi, 1964), p. 63.

<sup>95</sup> *Jaren van Reconstructie*, 210.

<sup>96</sup> GRIB pronouncements figure prominently in IO beginning in Sept. 1961. The autonomous province with its capital at Kota Baru (New City, i.e. Hollandia) was announced in January 1962. IO Jan. 5, 8, 19, 1962. Nasution declared that armed struggle by local people had begun in 1960. IO Aug. 1, 1961.

<sup>97</sup> Herlina, *The Golden Buckle* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1990), p. 10-6, 85. The offer of autonomy was repeated by Subandrio at the end of 1961. IO Dec. 29, 1961.

<sup>98</sup> "The March of Our Revolution", in *Toward Freedom*.

<sup>99</sup> Harsono, p. 216.

<sup>100</sup> van der Kroef, "Settlement," p. 129; Paul W. Van der Veur, "West Irian in the Indonesian Fold," *Asian Survey* 3 #7 (July 1963): 332.

<sup>101</sup> Mortimer, p. 190.

<sup>102</sup> Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, revised edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 45-7; Brackman, p. 96-7; Leifer, p. 61; Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1963), p. 353-4, 379-82.

<sup>103</sup> These included bands from the PRRI rebellion of 1958 and Acehese Darul Islam rebels, for instance. Herlina, 171; IO Feb. 9, 1962; "Jakarta reports New Guinea talks," NYT Dec. 31, 1961, April 5, 1962.

<sup>104</sup> Speech of 17 August 1961, in Sukarno, *Indonesia's Political Manifesto 1959-1964* (Jakarta: Prapantja, n.d. [1964?]), p. 166-8.

<sup>105</sup> Harsono; Soviet Ambassador Zhoukov, *Indonesian Spectator*, Feb 15, 1957: 15.

<sup>106</sup> Army attaché in Indonesia (Collier) to Dept. of Army, Dec. 21, 1957, FRUS 1955-7, 12: 558.

<sup>107</sup> *Indonesian Spectator*, Oct. 15, 1958: 12-3.

<sup>108</sup> Adam Malik, *In the Service of the Republic* (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1980), p. 240-1.

<sup>109</sup> Sukarno speech on occasion of fleet display marking first anniversary of the Navy, IO Jan. 17, 1961; "Indonesians sack Dutch legation," NYT May 7, 1960.

<sup>110</sup> IO Jan. 9, 1961; CIA Intelligence weekly summary, 16 Feb. 1961, JFKNSF 2: 282. Nasution recalled that he had originally sought arms from the United States but been refused. "Because of this, I went to the Soviet Union. When I arrived at the Kremlin, Krushchev embraced me. He said, 'You can have anything you want. I am not afraid of the Dutch.'" Interview conducted 1994, Gardner 178.

<sup>111</sup> C.L.M. Penders & Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985), p. 154-5; IO Feb. 3, 1961. Nasser promised to close Suez after naval clashes the next year. IO Jan. 18, 1962.

<sup>112</sup> Leifer 63; Fifield, p. 256; "Jakarta defends Soviet arms deal," NYT Jan. 17, 1961.

<sup>113</sup> Markin, p. 56-7.

<sup>114</sup> In 1958, Sukarno had asked whether “we wish to be a great and united nation with its own identity, in a strongly united State, procuring the equipment and building the bridge towards a just and prosperous society which will bring happiness to all the people? Or do we wish to become a nation which in fact is not a nation at all, but merely a conglomeration of numerous clans, devoid of a strong international identity?” *A Year of Challenge*, speech of Aug. 17, 1958, p. 5.

<sup>115</sup> Donald E. Weatherbee, *Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1966), p. 17; Harsono, p. 227; Feith, “Dynamics,” p. 386.

<sup>116</sup> Sukarno, *An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1965), p. 279.

<sup>117</sup> Daniel Lev, *Transition to Guided Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966) p. 286; J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1972), p. 353-7. As his biographer wrote: “The *idea* of revolution could now be served by the struggle for West Irian, by confrontation with Malaysia, by the idea of a struggle between NEFOs and OLDEFOs in the world at large while domestic upheaval was carefully contained.” Legge, p. 383-4.

<sup>118</sup> Frederick Bunnell, “Guided Democracy Foreign Policy 1960-5,” *Indonesia* # 2 (Oct. 1966): 42. In Subandrio's words: “The path we have taken has been full of sacrifice, sometimes suffering. But this path that we have taken has also hardened and strengthened us, and this is an asset for our struggle. Every nation must go through this phase at one time or another.” “The Impact of the Indonesian Revolution on the World,” *Indonesia on the March*, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d. [1963]), p. 328.

<sup>119</sup> Reinhardt, p. 122.

<sup>120</sup> Sukarno, *The Indonesian Dawn is Approaching, It's the Dawn of the Victory of Man*, speech of May 15, 1962 (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1963), p. 3.

<sup>121</sup> Sanskrit for “five principles.” The principles were belief in one god, nationalism, internationalism, democracy through consensus of representatives (*mufakat* and *musyawarah*), and social justice. The five could be compressed into one, *gotong royong* or mutual cooperation. “The Birth of Pancasila,” speech of June 1, 1945, in *Toward Freedom*.

<sup>122</sup> “To Build the World Anew,” speech to United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 30, 1960, in *Toward Freedom*, p. 138-45.

<sup>123</sup> Legge, p. 373.

<sup>124</sup> “To Build the World Anew,” *Toward Freedom*, p. 133.

<sup>125</sup> For the use of weakness as a strength in gaining leverage with the United States, see Robert J. MacMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States in Southeast Asia Since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 59, 124. Michael Yahuda gives Taiwan, North Vietnam, North Korea and Indonesia as examples of this phenomenon. *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 106-7.

<sup>126</sup> “The Rediscovery of Our Revolution (Political Manifesto),” speech of Aug. 17, 1959; “The March of Our Revolution,” speech of Aug. 17, 1960, in *Toward Freedom*.

<sup>127</sup> “Revolutionary Diplomacy,” in Subandrio, *Indonesia on the March*, p. 268. Again: “Indonesia's foreign policy is correctly regarded as an instrument of the Indonesian Revolution, but at the same time the foreign policy must safeguard the Revolution, must carry out the objectives of the Revolution in the international sphere and must try to ensure that the Revolution is not obstructed from without.” Subandrio, *La Politique Etrangère d'Indonésie* (Jakarta: Government of Indonesia, n.d.[1964]). For Subandrio's view of the Indonesian revolution as a foundation of the world revolution, see “The Impact of the Indonesian Revolution on the World,” *Indonesia on the March*, p. 306-29.

<sup>128</sup> Subandrio's report to parliament on Irian, 1957, in *Indonesia on the March*, p. 32.

<sup>129</sup> Sukarno visit briefing book, JFKNSF 2: 428 ff. See also “A new approach in foreign policy,” *Indonesian Spectator*, May 1, 1957: 10.

<sup>130</sup> Sukarno, *The Era of Confrontation*, speech to Cairo non-aligned summit (Jakarta: Department of Information, n.d. [1964]).

<sup>131</sup> Sukarno speech at Jakarta airport, IO Sept. 21 & 22, 1961; G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p. 296, 302; Bunnell, “Guided,” p. 56-7.

<sup>132</sup> Joint communiqué on occasion of Premier Chen Yi's visit to Jakarta, IO, April 2, 1961. See also Sukarno's comments at a return visit to China, IO June 15, 1961.

<sup>133</sup> David Mazingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 145. Some reports say that China also offered volunteers to fight on the government side,

counterbalancing Taiwanese aid to the rebels (this in turn prompted an offer to the rebels by Syngman Rhee of South Korea). Mazingo, p. 146; Kahin, p. 185-6.

<sup>134</sup> Mazingo, p. 185; Lea E. Williams, "Sino-Indonesian Diplomacy: A Study of Revolutionary International Politics," *The China Quarterly* #11 (July-Sept. 1962); Yahuda, p. 199.

<sup>135</sup> Cindy Adams, *Sukarno My Friend* (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 293.

<sup>136</sup> Masashi Nishihara, *The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951-1966* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), p. 27-30, 155.

<sup>137</sup> Nishihara 158-60; Embassy in Tokyo to Rusk, Sept. 3, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 17: 531.

<sup>138</sup> Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 210.

<sup>139</sup> *Basic Information on Indonesia* (New York: Indonesian Mission to UN, n.d. [1971?]).

<sup>140</sup> The first reference in an Indonesian government pamphlet published internationally is in *The Truth About West Irian* (1956), which also invokes the Hindu epic Ramayana, equating its "snow-covered mountains" with West Irian (p. 7).

<sup>141</sup> Mohammad Yamin, *A Legal and Historical Review of Indonesia's Sovereignty over the Ages* (Manila: Indonesian Embassy, n.d. [1959]). See also Yamin's comments on the *Negarakertagama* in the 1945 debates over Indonesia's territorial extent, in *Background to Indonesia's Policy*.

<sup>142</sup> Control over Majapahit's tributaries was nominal at best, and the two areas identified with West Irian cover only short stretches of coast. G. Th. Pigeaud, *Java in the 14th Century, A Study in Cultural History: The Negara-Kertagama by Pakawi Parakanca of Majapahit, 1365 AD* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), vol. 4, p. 29. 34. See also G.J. Resink, *Indonesia's History Between the Myths: Essays in Legal History and Historical Theory* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1968), p. 21.

<sup>143</sup> Coen Holtzappel, "Nationalism and Cultural Identity," in Michael Hitcock & Victor T. King, eds., *Images of Malay-Indonesian Identity* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 103 fn 2.

<sup>144</sup> Arend Lijphart, "The Indonesian Image of West Irian," *Asian Survey* 1 #5 (July 1961): 11.

<sup>145</sup> Thongchai.

<sup>146</sup> Subandrio, *An opening address to the UN Political Committee*, p. 8.

<sup>147</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 175-8.

<sup>148</sup> Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

<sup>149</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 178.

<sup>150</sup> Hastings, "Double Dutch and Indons," in R.J. May & Hank Nelson, eds., *Melanesia: Beyond Diversity* (Canberra: ANU Research School of Pacific Studies, 1982), p. 159. "This is a great undeveloped, impenetrable area of towering mountains and vast swamps," Sukarno said. "The inhabitants are dark-skinned Papuans. Their tools are stone axes, shells, and sticks. Their weapons are bows and arrows. They exist in primitive Stone Age conditions." Sukarno, *Autobiography*, 286. Supporters sometimes attended his speeches on West Irian dressed in blackface to resemble their "Irianese brothers." van der Kroef, *Dispute*, 41 fn 116.

<sup>151</sup> This point has been made about the peripheral regions of Japan by Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "The Frontiers of Japanese Identity," in Tønnesson & Antlov, *Asian Forms of the Nation*, p. 62-4.

<sup>152</sup> *Nieuw-Guinea spricht zich uit* ([Hollandia:] Government of Netherlands New Guinea, n.d. [1956?]).

<sup>153</sup> Hastings, *New Guinea*, p. 200; van der Veur, "Political," p. 61.

<sup>154</sup> Metzemaekers 134; van der Veur, "Political," 60; van der Kroef, "Eurasians," 124-6. Nicolaas Jouwe in 1962 was still insisting that "we do not want European peasants in our country." *Voice of the Negroids*, p. 10.

<sup>155</sup> Hastings, "Double Dutch," 158.

<sup>156</sup> *A People on the way to Self-Determination*, p. 46. It has been pointed out that the anthropologist-driven picture of New Guinea as impossibly diverse overlooks many elements of commonality across the island. Gabriel Defert, *L'Indonésie et la Nouvelle Guinée Occidentale: Maintien des Frontières Coloniales ou Respect des Identités Communautaires* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996), p. 47-50.

<sup>157</sup> "Harvard Expedition Discovers a Warrior Tribe in New Guinea," NYT April 5, 1961.

<sup>158</sup> van der Kroef, "Nationalism and Politics in West New Guinea," *Pacific Affairs* 31 (1961/2): 42.

<sup>159</sup> "Dutch New Guinea has a political party," PIM Sept. 1960: 23; "They want a Republic," PIM April 1961: 20; IO Dec. 1, 1961.

<sup>160</sup> "Another Congo cannot happen here," said Parna leader Herman Wajoi. "The Congolese kicked out

European officials. We will not do that. We know we have to work together at first, and we want Dutch economic help." "Nationalist stir felt by Papuans," NYT April 3, 1961.

<sup>161</sup> Albinski, p. 379.

<sup>162</sup> Verrier, p. 203. Race was also the basis of unity for Seth Rumkorem's Republic of West Papua declared in 1983. Provisional Government of Republik Papua Barat, "Appeal to All Member States of the UN," cited in Justus van der Kroef, *Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1977), p. 5. The same themes are struck by the anti-Indonesian resistance to this day, which insists that the "natural environment" for Papuans is Melanesia, not Indonesia. Nicolaas Jouwe, "Conflict at the Meeting Point of Melanesia and Asia," PIM April 1978: 12.

<sup>163</sup> John Ryan, *The Hot Land: Focus on New Guinea* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1970), p. 191.

<sup>164</sup> Osborne 24, Verrier 225. Only fifteen councillors, twelve Papuans and three Dutchmen, were elected, the rest were appointed, "New Guinea vote hailed by Dutch," NYT March 6, 1961.

<sup>165</sup> "Everyone was there but America," PIM April 1961: 20.

<sup>166</sup> van der Veur, "Questionnaire Survey Among the Potential Papuan Elite in 1962 West New Guinea," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 120 (1964): 437.

<sup>167</sup> Justus van der Kroef, "Recent Developments in West New Guinea," *Pacific Affairs* 34 (1961/2): 281.

<sup>168</sup> Ryan, p. 194.

<sup>169</sup> "In Memoriam Eliezer Jan Bonay," *West Papua Observer* 10 #4 (Spring/summer 1990). Bonay's November 1961 open letter on the New Guinea Council is included Subandrio's speech to UNGA 20 Nov. 1961, *Indonesia on the March*, p. 253-4.

<sup>170</sup> *Voice of the Negroids*, p. 23-4; Osborne, p. 25; Savage, "National," p. 983; van der Veur, "Political," p. 64-5; van der Veur, "Questionnaire," p. 445.

<sup>171</sup> Hastings, *New Guinea*, p. 205.

<sup>172</sup> The flags had to be manufactured in Amsterdam, however. "Colony's name changed," NYT Dec. 1, 1961; IO Nov. 30, 1961.

<sup>173</sup> Rusk memo on West New Guinea, Dec. 29, 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 1102.

<sup>174</sup> Lijphart 224-7; Oltmans, "Stage by Stage Recapitulation of the Dispute," *United Asia* 14 (Feb. 1962): 111; Antara, Sept. 9, 1998 (via act.indonesia newsgroup); Rudy de Jongh, "West Irian Confrontation," in T.K. Tan, ed., *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia* (Jacaranda Press, 1967), p. 111; van der Kroef, "Settlement," p. 129; Jones to Rusk, May 24, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 399; IO Aug. 18 & Aug. 23, 1961. Oltmans, who was himself active as a go-between in these meetings, maintained that Rusk and Rijkens "know each other well" through a linked group, the Bilderberg group headed by Prince Bernhard, the husband of the Dutch Queen. Memo to Rostow, JFKNSF 2: 337ff.

<sup>175</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 84-5; Jack Shepherd, "Dutch Activity in New Guinea Intensified," *Far Eastern Survey* 8 (1939): 262; Hastings, *New Guinea*, p. 201. Japan had begun to develop cotton estates in the 1920s; by 1930 there were 1,299 Japanese settlers. Japanese business groups made similar proposals for a lease in 1954 and 1972. Nishihara, p. 217 fn 2.

<sup>176</sup> Bone, p. 8.

<sup>177</sup> van der Kroef, "Dutch Opinion," p. 284. Exports as a percentage of imports, however, were increasing. *A People on the way to Self-Determination*, p. 19-21, 32.

<sup>178</sup> "Indonesia's Bid for International Justice," *Indonesian Spectator*, Sept. 1, 1957: 17; *The Question of West Irian*, p. 6. Oil reserves are described as "quite useful" by at least one Australian geologist. G.A.V. Stanley, "Oil on the Netherlands Side of the New Guinea Border," PIM Jan. 1959: 41-7.

<sup>179</sup> William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and Its Settlement* (n.p.: Seton Hall University Press, 1973), p. 2.

<sup>180</sup> Nicolaas Jouwe formed a Japanese-financed timber company. PIM March 1960: 18. Herman Womsiwor later founded the Japan-Netherlands Salvage Company which put a 25 million guilder investment on hold after threat of Indonesian action against Japanese businesses, including a projected \$5 million investment in a nickel mine in Sulawesi. "How Womsiwor became a tycoon," PIM Aug. 1961: 26; "Reprisal threat by Indonesia," PIM Sept. 1961: 21; "Japanese Nickel Interests in Indonesia?" PIM Oct. 1961: 19; IO Oct. 26, 1961.

<sup>181</sup> H.G. Verhoeff, *Netherland New Guinea: A Bird's Eye View* (The Hague: n.p., 1958), p. 49; Lagerberg, p. 10, 120; Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian* (Malmsbury, Australia: Kibble Books, 1977), p. 34.

<sup>182</sup> Forbes K. Wilson, the first president of Freeport Indonesia, letter printed in Geoffrey S. Hope et al, eds., *The Equatorial Glaciers of New Guinea: Results of the 1971-1973 Australian Universities' Expedition to Irian Jaya* (Rotterdam: A.A. Balkema, 1976), p. 7. See also Forbes Wilson, *The Conquest of Copper Mountain* (New York: Atheneum, 1981) & Matt Richards, *Freeport in Indonesia: Reconciling Development and Indigenous Rights* (Canberra: Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 1996).

<sup>183</sup> Anti-Slavery Society, *Plunder in Paradise* (London, 1990), p. 72.

<sup>184</sup> "There is no intention that the territory shall be closed to the world as it certainly is today. All nationalities shall be freely given the opportunity of reasonable exploitation of the economic potentialities of the vast area for their own benefit and for the benefit of the people of West Irian.... It would be wrong to regard West Irian as being a 'reservation' for the Irian people. If this system is adopted, then the territory will be lost to the rest of the world. *The Case of West Irian*, p. 34-5.

<sup>185</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1967), p. 23.

<sup>186</sup> Fifield, p. 261-8.

<sup>187</sup> Hilsman, p. 362. See also Robert F. Kennedy, *Just Friends and Brave Enemies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 6; Averell Harriman, "What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia," *New York Times Magazine*, May 27, 1962, p. 7, 53-5; W.W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas," DOSB Aug. 7, 1961: 233-8.

<sup>188</sup> McMahon 105-8.

<sup>189</sup> Bruce Cumings, "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies during and after the Cold War," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 29 #1 (1997).

<sup>190</sup> Brackman, p. ix-xi, Fifield, p. 4-6.

<sup>191</sup> Kennedy, p. 4-5.

<sup>192</sup> Rusk memo to Kennedy, cited in Timothy P. Maga, "The New Frontier vs. Guided Democracy: JFK, Sukarno and Indonesia, 1961-1963," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 20 (1990): 98.

<sup>193</sup> Timothy P. Maga, *John F. Kennedy and the New Pacific Community, 1961-63* (London: Macmillan, 1990).

<sup>194</sup> The Jones strategy can be seen taking shape in FRUS 1958-60:101, 111, 157; and Howard P. Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (New York: Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, 1971), p. 118, 123, 126. It is worth noting that a larger proportion of the central army officers than of the 1958 rebel forces were American-trained. Gardner, p. 163.

<sup>195</sup> Johnson to Rostow, July 10, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 543; Sukarno, *Autobiography*. The writer of the autobiography was an anti-Communist American journalist who says she was often used as a back channel by the ambassador. Adams 13.

<sup>196</sup> Lansdale to Gilpatric, April 12, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 372, 3: 149; Gardner, p. 160; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (New York: Ballantine, 1978), p. 499.

<sup>197</sup> Gardner 198.

<sup>198</sup> Sukarno visit briefing book, April 1961, Tab F "US Mil Assistance to Indonesia," JFKNSF 2: 456; Bundy memo "Military Assistance to Indonesia," April 17, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 497ff, Johnson memo, "Military Assistance to Indonesia," Jan. 5, 1962, JFKNSF 2: 832.

<sup>199</sup> Frederick Bunnell, *The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963* (Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1969), p. 76.

<sup>200</sup> "The West New Guinea Dispute and United States Interests," Jones to Rusk, May 26, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 17: 382-9. State rejected any such shift on 21 Feb. 1960. FRUS 1958-60, 17: 467.

<sup>201</sup> Don Humphrey, head of economic survey team, to Rostow, Sept. 10, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 569ff.

<sup>202</sup> Jones 193.

<sup>203</sup> "Yet to permit West Irian to continue indefinitely as a bone of contention between Indonesia and the Netherlands is to afford Communism an opportunity to spread in Indonesia.... The West Irian question thus represents a tragedy. The United States, the Netherlands and Australia, all equally afraid of the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, are carrying out a policy which in fact strengthens Communism. For, so long as West Irian is in Dutch hands, that long will the Communist Party of Indonesia be able to carry on a violent agitation, using nationalism as an excuse, to oppose colonialism and thereby touch the soul of the newly-emancipated Indonesian people whose memories are still afresh with the struggle against colonialism." Hatta, "Between the Blocs," p. 487. The same argument was made frequently by Sukarno and Subandrio.

<sup>204</sup> Cabinet discussion cited Maga, *Pacific*, p. 56.

<sup>205</sup> In fact the Eisenhower state department policy planning staff had put forward a similar policy in Oct. 1960. Editorial note, FRUS 1958-60, 17: 564. The Kennedy PPS trusteeship plan appears in FRUS 1961-3, 23: 337-9; see also George McGhee's introduction to Christopher J. McMullen, *Mediation of the West New Guinea Dispute, 1962: A Case Study* (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981), p. v.

Indonesia rejected joint trusteeship by Malaya, India and Australia in March. IO March 16, 1961. Rusk was still recommending Malayan trusteeship to Kennedy in May. Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, May 23, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 395-8. The Tunku's mediation effort is summarized in Henderson, p. 70-3.

<sup>206</sup> There is no doubt in my mind," he argued, "that for President Sukarno West Irian (West New Guinea) is the test case by which he determines who his friends are. Contrary to often expressed views, this is to him not a diversionary move ... but a nationalist obsession." Pauker wanted any shift to support the Indonesian claim to be contingent on abandoning NASAKOM in favour of a national front that would abolish political parties, the elimination of the PKI from governing bodies, and curtailment of arms buys from USSR. "Indonesia Today," p. 1, 12-3, JFKNSF 4: 306ff. See also the following articles by Pauker: "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow," *Asian Survey* 1 #1 (March 1961); "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," *Foreign Affairs* 40 #4 (July 1962). This last paper was definitely given to Kennedy to read. Transmittal memorandum, Feb. 24, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 285. Pauker was summoned to White House meetings with Rostow and other twice in March 1961. A similar line was stressed by modernization theorist Lucian Pye, who also wanted an end to Sukarno's "childish behaviour" through a shift to economic development and a show of American determination in Southeast Asia, but who saw a deal on Irian as perhaps a pre-requisite to such a shift by Sukarno. Notes of Lucian Pye, March 23, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 289.

<sup>207</sup> Kahin saw an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea as imminent unless the United States shifted to support the Indonesian claim. Of Pauker's conditions, he dismissed all but one (an end to large arms deals with the USSR) as counter-productive. Kahin insisted that Indonesia would lose any immediate plebiscite in West New Guinea, and wanted the money saved on arms to be supplemented by American funds and redirected to the development of both Indonesia and West New Guinea — a tactic that could help build support for Indonesia among Papuans. Johnson to Rostow covering Kahin paper, April 19, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 382 ff.

<sup>208</sup> Memoranda from Oltmans, April 1961, JFKNSF 2: 337ff. At least one Dutch newspaper saw Oltmans as Rostow's major source on West New Guinea. Bissell (CIA) to Rostow, Nov. 14, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 788.

<sup>209</sup> Transcript of Kennedy interview, Edwin O. Guthman & Jeffrey Schulman, eds., *Robert Kennedy in His Own Words* (Toronto: Bantam, 1988), p. 8.

<sup>210</sup> Memorandum "U.S. Policy toward Indonesia and the Sukarno Visit," JFKNSF 2: 378-81. Johnson in a memo to Rostow recommended that "our approach must be quite clearly directed toward an Indonesian take-over of WNG at a reasonably early date" on April 18. FRUS 1961-3, 23: 364.

<sup>211</sup> CINPAC to JCS, Jan. 12, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 17:463; Jones, p. 203; Hilsman, p. 377.

<sup>212</sup> Memo from JCS to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Oct. 13, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 443.

<sup>213</sup> Gregory Pemberton, *All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 88; David Marr, *Barwick* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 169. This also influenced the debate in Washington. Rostow informed Kennedy that the "position of the Australians is central in the Secretary of State's thinking." Cited in Pemberton, p. 95. Bundy and Robert Johnson made the same point. Memo from Bundy to Kennedy and attached background papers, Dec. 1, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 462-9.

<sup>214</sup> "Soviet cautions Dutch on A-bases," NYT Jan. 8, 1961.

<sup>215</sup> Hilsman, p. 50, 378; Bunnell, *Initiatives*, p. 85-90; Jones, p. 203.

<sup>216</sup> Jones, p. 199.

<sup>217</sup> "Like Hitler, he is an open book, there to be read. Those who refuse to draw the proper conclusions may not be victims of Sukarno's charm, but victims of self-delusion.... Only his removal from power would offer some hope that trends that now seem inexorable can still be reversed." Attachment A to CIA Indonesia paper, March 1961, JFKNSF 2: 299ff. Lifting an image from Pauker's "Indonesia Today," the paper also argued that a bloodless victory on Irian would weaken the army just as Hitler's win over Sudetenland had weakened the German general staff.

<sup>218</sup> "We consider it likely that Indonesia's success in this instance will set in train the launching of further

irredentist ventures already foreshadowed in lectures given by Professor Yamin, an avowed extremist. Success would be bound to cement relations between Indonesia and the USSR.... Even assuming that it were the weight of United States power and prestige which gained Indonesia a bloodless and prestigious victory, we would not gain that country's respect, let alone affection.... by backing Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over West Irian, we may inadvertently help to consolidate a regime which is innately antagonistic toward the United States." *ibid.*

<sup>219</sup> News conference, April 13, 1961, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (US Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 265. He also told Jones that the U.S. remained neutral. Jones, p. 196-8.

<sup>220</sup> "... like Laos, West New Guinea did not seem to him a part of the world in which great powers should be rationally engaged." Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 534.

<sup>221</sup> Delegation list, DOSB May 15, 1961: 714. For examples of the great hope placed in the new US government, see IO editorials Jan 20, April 15, April 26, 1961.

<sup>222</sup> Memorandum of conversation, April 24, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 382-90; IO Feb. 25, 1961.

<sup>223</sup> Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, p. 611, Harsono, p. 230; "Sukarno and U.S. Hit Imperialism," NYT April 26, 1961. The gift of a helicopter was particularly effective. Sukarno, *Autobiography*, p. 296, Jones, p. 194-5.

<sup>224</sup> Johnson memo, April 17, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 380; Memo from Assistant Secretary (Far East) Parsons to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Hare, Feb. 13, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 310; memoranda of discussions with Luns, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 345-63.

<sup>225</sup> Statements by Edward Heath and Robert Menzies, IO April 14, April 28, 1961.

<sup>226</sup> Ralph Craib, "Everyone was there but America," PIM April 1961; *The Guardian*, 4 April 1961 & Antara 29 March 1961, reprinted in *The West Irian Problem* (London: Indonesian Embassy, 1961), p. 13-5; "U.S. Declines Dutch Bid," NYT March 29, 1961, "U.S. Slight Irks Hollandia Dutch," NYT April 1, 1961.

<sup>227</sup> Johnson memorandum, April 17, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 377; Assistant Secretary (Europe) Kohler to Rusk, April 6, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 341. The opinion seems born out by an IO editorial of March 30: "We are satisfied with the firm attitude of the United States [sic] in rejecting the invitation to be represented at a Dutch colonial puppet show in West Irian.... [The boycott] is a major diplomatic defeat" for the Netherlands. See also "Worth our greatest appreciation," IO editorial, April 2, 1961.

<sup>228</sup> Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 276; "Most Dutch Back New Guinea Plan, NYT Oct. 4, 1961. The plan exactly met the demand of a group of 97 progressive Dutch intellectuals earlier in the year. Manifesto summary in *The West Irian Problem*, p. 17-8.

<sup>229</sup> Memoranda of conversation with Luns, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 345-63. The idea of a visiting UN mission to start the process, included in the eventual Dutch UN resolution, was in fact an American suggestion. Johnson to Rostow, July 10, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 405. The Dutch floated an early draft UN resolution with the state department in July 1961. Johnson to Rostow, July 10, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 543. American draft resolutions circulated over the summer and found their way into the Dutch version eventually presented - see drafts at FRUS 1961-3, 23: 409, 460; Memo from Assistant Secretary IO (Cleveland) to Rusk, Nov. 15, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 452.

<sup>230</sup> "Dutch bid to U.N. in Dispute Hinted," NYT Sept. 6, 1960.

<sup>231</sup> UN mission to Rusk, Sept. 16, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 433.

<sup>232</sup> Memo of conversation, van Roijen and Bowles, June 16, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 403; Markin, p. 60.

<sup>233</sup> Luns speech to UN General Assembly, Sept. 26, 1961, OR, A/PV.1016, p. 90-1; also explanatory memo, A/4915; YUN 1961: 52.

<sup>234</sup> Luns speech to UNGA, 8 Nov. 1961, OR, A/PV.1049, p. 589; explanatory memo A/4954.

<sup>235</sup> Rusk to UN mission, Oct. 11, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 438; Johnson to Bundy, Nov. 6, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 449; Cleveland to Rusk, Nov. 15, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 452-8. Only in mid-November did anyone in Washington begin to realize that although the Luns plan may have served Indonesia's ultimate goals, American support for it was alienating Indonesia. "However, from the Indonesian point of view we have now entered the lists against them.... Thus, the end results of all the months of work has been to put us in a worse position vis-à-vis the Indonesians than we have ever been in the past. In the past we have at least not actively opposed them in the UN." Johnson to Rostow, Nov. 16, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 458.

<sup>236</sup> IO Nov. 17 & 20, 1961; UNGA OR, 17 Nov. 1961, A/PV.1057, p. 691.

<sup>237</sup> Johnson to Rostow, Nov. 16, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 458.

<sup>238</sup> IO Oct. 12, 1961.

<sup>239</sup> Subandrio speech to UNGA, 9 Oct. 1961, *Indonesia on the March*, p. 165-206; speech in Jakarta submitted as memo to UN, A/4944; speech to UNGA, 9 Nov. 1961, *Indonesia on the March*, p. 206-32. Subandrio speech to UNGA, 15 Nov. 1961, OR, A/PV.1055, p. 670.

<sup>240</sup> Bingham speech to UNGA, 22 Nov. 1961, OR, A/PV.1061, p. 774.

<sup>241</sup> Djermakoye, Niger, speech to UNGA, 27 Nov. 1961, OR, A/PV.1065, p. 841; Zollner, Dahomey, 27 Nov. 1961, OR, A/PV.1065, p. 855; Bingham, United States, OR, A/PV.1066, p. 863; YUN 1961: 54. For early consideration of modifying the Dutch draft and the importance of the Brazzaville group, see Johnson to Rostow, Sept. 14, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 428; Cleveland to Rusk, Nov. 15, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 452-8.

<sup>242</sup> UNGA OR, 27 Nov. 1961, A/PV.1066, p. 875, 878; IO Nov. 30, 1961; "Dutch Again Urge New Guinea Talks," NYT Nov. 29, 1961.

<sup>243</sup> Sukarno, *The People's Command for the Liberation of West Irian*, speech of Dec. 19, 1961 (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1961), p. 5, 8-9.

<sup>244</sup> See, for instance, the order of the North Sulawesi regional commander, in M. Silaban, *Irian Barat* (Medan: Pustaka Sri, 1963), p. 54-6.

<sup>245</sup> Heroes' Day speech, IO Nov. 11, 1961; speech to army leadership, IO Dec. 1, 1961; speech to Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerwani), IO Dec. 16, 1961.

<sup>246</sup> Sukarno, *The People's Command*.

<sup>247</sup> Mortimer, p. 116, 191.

<sup>248</sup> Later president. Suharto named one of his sons after this period, Hutomo Mandela Putra (son of Mandala).

<sup>249</sup> Indonesia insisted that the clash had taken place in international waters, Admiral Sudomo and Indonesian diplomats admitted much later that they had "lied to the United Nations." Markin 74fn.

<sup>250</sup> His name is now part of the map of Irian: Jos Sudarso Island is part of the district of Merauke.

<sup>251</sup> "Sukarno Asserts Dutch Agents Tried to Kill Him With Grenade," NYT Jan. 9, 1962.

<sup>252</sup> Syahrir, Indonesia's first prime minister and a friend of many Americans, former foreign minister Anak Agung, Masyumi leader and former minister Roem, and ex-federalist leader Sultan Hamid were arrested. Technically, the order was signed by Nasution and Subandrio. Surveillance of Hatta was stepped up. At another time, all this would have drawn sharp protests from overseas, but with war looming it received little attention. Rose, p. 199-200; Rudolf Mrázek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1994), p. 465; Arrests Alarm Indonesians," NYT, Jan. 18, 1962. IO reports on mobilizations included 19,000 in East Java (reported Dec. 29, 1961).

<sup>253</sup> IO Jan. 25, 1962.

<sup>254</sup> Sudomo interview, Markin 58.

<sup>255</sup> Julius Pour, *Benny Moerdani: Portrait of a Soldier Statesman* (Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993), p. 165-7.

<sup>256</sup> Nasution speech to the West Irian People Consultation in Sukarnopura, 9 May 1964; Bandung speech of 2 April 1962. Nasution, p. 10, 62.

<sup>257</sup> Memo to Rostow, Nov. 30, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 469-70.

<sup>258</sup> Telegram from Bundy to Kennedy in Palm Beach, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 473; State department executive secretary (Battle) to Bundy, undated (Dec.), FRUS 1961-3, 23: 489.

<sup>259</sup> Carl Kaysen, the new number two national security staffer, wrote: "I suspect that, while FE is perfectly clear on the point that our task is to facilitate the achievement of the inevitable outcome in a way which minimizes the Dutch defeat, the rest of the Department may not be. They are still concerned with the rightness or wrongness of Sukarno behavior...." Kaysen to Bundy, Jan., 12, 1962, JFKNSF 2: 838.

<sup>260</sup> Memo of phone conversation, Kennedy with Ball, Feb 12, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 518.

<sup>261</sup> "Until a solution satisfactory to Sukarno is reached with the Netherlands, the West New Guinea dispute will continue to overshadow and strongly influence all other foreign and domestic issues in Indonesia. Sukarno will probably draw even closer to the Bloc position on major international issues as Indonesia continues to rely heavily on Soviet military aid and political support for the prosecution of the West New Guinea campaign. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) will continue to exploit the issue and to obstruct a negotiated settlement. The diversion of army energies into the West New Guinea campaign will continue to hamper its efforts to reduce PKI strength and influence." National Intelligence

Estimate, "The Prospects for Indonesia," March 7, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 555-6.

<sup>262</sup> Guthman, p. 315-6. Jones also warned that there could be action against US oil interests. Pemberton, p. 97.

<sup>263</sup> Drfat letter to Sukarno, Dec. 8, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 795; Rusk to Jones, Dec. 9, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 477; "Kennedy sends plea to Nehru and Sukarno Not to Use Force," NYT Dec. 15, 1961.

<sup>264</sup> Rusk to Jones, Dec. 9, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 477.

<sup>265</sup> Letter from Sukarno to Kennedy, JFKNSF 2: 808-9.

<sup>266</sup> Marr. p. 170-1.

<sup>267</sup> Cited Harper, *World Affairs*, p. 61-5: 281-2. The opposition attacked his speech as an "Australian Munich line ... appeasement in its worst form." Verrier, p. 186.

<sup>268</sup> Verrier, p. 173, 194; Hanno Weisbrod, "Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea," *Australian Quarterly* 39 #2 (June 1967): 25-32; NYT Jan. 24, 1962.

<sup>269</sup> News conference of Jan. 15, 1962, *Public Papers of the Presidents* 1962: 17. Rusk, meanwhile, was continuing to insist that the US was not playing any sort of mediating role. Interview conducted Jan. 7, 1962, DOSB Jan. 22, 1962: 125.

<sup>270</sup> Harsono, p. 238.

<sup>271</sup> "Danes halt arms for Jakarta," NYT Jan. 3, 1962; "Britain Halts Sale of Arms," NYT Jan. 24, 1962; Verrier, p. 158-9; Markin, p. 102fn.

<sup>272</sup> Kennedy's letter "saved the day," Jones cabled. Jones to Rusk, Dec. 10, 1961, JFKNSF 2: 805.

<sup>273</sup> *Public Papers of the Presidents* 1962: 76-7; U Thant, *The View from the UN* (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 48; Deputy assistant secretary IO (Wallner) to Rusk, Jan 17, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 508.

<sup>274</sup> CINCPAC to JCS, Feb. 24, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 17: 351.

<sup>275</sup> Nishihara, p. 160-1; IO Feb. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 20, March 6, 1962.

<sup>276</sup> IO Feb. 6, March 16, 28, 1962; "U.S. Bars Fuelling for Dutch Aircraft," NYT Feb. 6, 1962; Markin, p. 113, 129.

<sup>277</sup> Hastings, *New Guinea*, p. 210

<sup>278</sup> The eventual corridor, once transit rights had been refused by the US, Britain and Japan, was via Peru, French Tahiti and New Caledonia. "Dutch Troops Arrive via French Airfields!" PIM April 1962: 24. A still-classified query from France to the US concerning Dutch overflights on Feb 8/62 is referred to in box contents list, JFKNSF.

<sup>279</sup> Memo of phone conversation, Bundy with Ball, Feb 15, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 527-30.

<sup>280</sup> Memo of conversation (van Roijen, Harriman & others), Dec. 22, 1961. FRUS 1961-3, 23: 495.

<sup>281</sup> Jones to Rusk, Dec. 27, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 500.

<sup>282</sup> Robert Kennedy to Rusk & John Kennedy, Feb 14, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 525-6; Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, p. 615.

<sup>283</sup> Sukarno, *Indonesia Wants Negotiations on the West Irian Problem Based on Transfer of Administration from Netherlands to Indonesia*, speech of Feb. 21, 1962 (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1962), p. 6-7. Despite Jones' optimism, this can also be seen in diplomatic cables. On Feb. 18 Jones reported that "Indonesians would drop requirement for preconditions provided agreement could be reached with Dutch on agenda before formal talks commenced." FRUS 1961-3, 23: 533fn. This seems likely to mean Indonesia would continue to insist that the agenda cover the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. In any event, Sukarno in their next meeting told Jones "I want a clear understanding that the purpose of the meeting is to negotiate the basis of transfer of administration to Indonesia. The Bob Kennedy proposal is not satisfactory." Jones to Rusk, Feb 20, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 535. Two days later Jones reported that Subandrio had agreed on Sukarno's behalf to drop preconditions. FRUS 1961-3, 23: 536fn.

<sup>284</sup> "Kennedys in Indonesia," ROI Feb. 1962: 12.

<sup>285</sup> "We protest strongly Robert Kennedy's humiliating statements on television concerning backwardness Papuan people and lack university trained workers, seemingly indicating advise to Indonesia to eradicate Papuan people.... Independence and democracy can be understood and practiced by common people even if they have not seen Harvard and we have an unalienable right to such practicing and we ask technical aid for it from the more advanced people of the world. Robert Kennedy should be ashamed if he tries to play poker with the fate of backward people for no other reason than to appease a dictator." Cable in *Voice of the Negroids*, p. 30.

<sup>286</sup> "It was quite clear that we wanted them to settle it, and we put a lot of pressure on the Dutch to get it

settled.... Mostly political pressure, telling them that they should sit down, that we didn't want to support this kind of a war, that we didn't want to get involved in it. They didn't want West New Guinea. They wanted to get out of West New Guinea, as I said. It was just a question of saving face.... So we made it quite clear to the Dutch that we thought, when it came that close, that they should settle it. I was quite frank about that with the Dutch when I was in Holland." Guthman, p. 319-20.

<sup>287</sup> Memo of conversation, March 2, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 549-51.

<sup>288</sup> Markin, p. 15-7.

<sup>289</sup> Markin, p. 144.

<sup>290</sup> Memorandum of conversation, van Roijen and Bunker, 27 March, 1962, cited Markin, p. 180. See also McMullen, p. 28-31.

<sup>291</sup> McMullen, p. 26. The text of the Bunker proposals is printed in DOSB June 25, 1962: 1039-40, and Rusk to US Embassy in The Hague, March 29, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 567.

<sup>292</sup> Kennedy letter to de Quay, 2 April 1962, from South Pacific Peoples Foundation files.

<sup>293</sup> News conference of April 11, 1962, *Public Papers of the Presidents* 1962: 320.

<sup>294</sup> Kennedy's letter to Sukarno, March 30, 1962, reprinted in Markin, p. 491-2; Jones to Rusk, March 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 568-9; Embassy in The Hague to Rusk, April 3, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 571.

<sup>295</sup> Jones, p. 210.

<sup>296</sup> IO March 23, June 25, 26, 28, 29, 1962; Pour, p. 171-4. For the most part, paratroopers were utterly ineffective. See the accounts in Herlina, p. 81, 120, 245-6.

<sup>297</sup> "Netherlands Protests to UN Over New Indonesian Landings," NYT Aug. 11, 1962; See also NYT reports on Aug. 13-16, 1962 on new paratroop drops. The sub landings were averted after the personal intervention of the newly-arrived UN military representative in Hollandia. Inderjit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1984), p. 43. However, Sukarno threatened to use "force of arms" against UN forces a year after the Trikora speech. "Sukarno Threatens to Oust U.N. in West New Guinea," NYT Dec. 19, 1961.

<sup>298</sup> Sukarno speech of Aug. 17, 1962, *Political Manifesto*, p. 216.

<sup>299</sup> IO April 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 25, May 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 20, 22, 29, June 1, 21, 29, 30, July 6, 9, 10, 11, 30, 31, 1962. In April volunteers were reported laying siege to the oil town Sorong on the western tip of New Guinea, in May to have claimed a beach-head on the Onin Peninsula (south coast), be engaged in heavy fighting near Fak Fak and Kaimana, and to have raised the Indonesian flag over the southwestern village of Teminabuan, the first liberated zone in West Irian. In June a second village, Sausapor in the northwest, was reported as liberated, Sorong and Manokwari as besieged, and paratroopers near Merauke and Kaimana as exchanging fire with Dutch forces. In July two villages near Merauke and one in the northwest were reported liberated, with Kota Baru (Hollandia) in danger and Merauke itself besieged.

<sup>300</sup> "Indonesians Promise to Support Interests of New Guinea People," NYT, Feb. 1, 1962.

<sup>301</sup> Rusk in Athens to Kennedy & Ball, May 6, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 587. McMullen, p. 41, Markin, p. 229.

<sup>302</sup> The proposals were expected to receive overwhelming support in the Dutch parliament if revealed. Markin, p. 248-9; Komer to Kaysen, May 22, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 594; Rusk to Kennedy, May 23, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 596; Kennedy news conference of May 24, 1962, *Public Papers of the Presidents* 1962: 437.

<sup>303</sup> De Quay had initially tried to make the acceptance conditional on UN support for his call for a cease-fire. Letter to U Thant, May 16, 1962, cited Osborne, p. 29. In reply, Thant wrote: "Your suggestion that I now approach the Government of Indonesia with an appeal would, if accepted by me, imply that I was taking sides in the controversy, which I believe would not be in the best interests of all concerned," and it was therefore "inappropriate" to appeal to both sides to refrain from aggression. Van der Kroef, "Settlement," p. 145 fn.

<sup>304</sup> Sukarno, *Dutch Public Acceptance Conditio Sine Qua Non*, speech of June 23, 1962 (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1962), p. 6-7; IO May 28, 1962.

<sup>305</sup> Cables in Andrew Cordier & Max Herrelson, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. VI: U Thant 1961-1964* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 126-31; see also Jones to Rusk, June 8, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 599-601; IO June 6, 9, 20, 21, 30, 1962.

<sup>306</sup> Verrier, p. 178.

<sup>307</sup> Malik, p. 242-3.

<sup>308</sup> IO July 25, 1962.

<sup>309</sup> Robert Kenendy to Bundy, July 24, 1962, JFKNSF 3: 11-2, Markin, p. 347, 373.

- <sup>310</sup> Markin, p. 357-9.
- <sup>311</sup> Rostow to John Kennedy, Sept. 10, 1961, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 423; Komer to Rostow, Feb. 17, 1961, cited in Pemberton, p. 86; van Roijen to *Haagse Post*, March 21, 1981, cited Osborne, p. 26.
- <sup>312</sup> "Dutch Will Talk with Indonesians," NYT March 13, 1962.
- <sup>313</sup> Schuurman, UNGA speech, OR, 15 Nov. 1961, A/PV.1055, p. 665.
- <sup>314</sup> Proposal on UN role by UN legal counsel Constantine Stavropoulos, reprinted in Markin, p. 515-8.
- <sup>315</sup> Markin, p. 365-6.
- <sup>316</sup> Rusk to Kennedy, July 26, 1962, JFKNSF 3: 16ff.
- <sup>317</sup> Markin, p. 381-4. A CIA Indonesia station report to White House referred to "the threat delivered by President Kennedy to Subandrio to the effect that the Seventh Fleet would intercede on the side of the Dutch if Indonesia attempted a full scale attack on West Irian." JFKNSF 3: 38. Subandrio told Jones that Kennedy had told him the United States was on Indonesia's side but would change sides if he left the talks. Jones to Rusk, Aug. 3, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 624-5.
- <sup>318</sup> CIA to White House, Aug. 2, 1962, JFKNSF 3: 37-9.
- <sup>319</sup> Hastings, *New Guinea*, p. 211; Hilsman, p. 379-80; "Premier Critical of Allies," NYT Aug. 17, 1962.
- <sup>320</sup> The agreement appears in a number of sources, including *The United Nations in West New Guinea: An Unprecedented Story* (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1963). It is also printed in NYT, Aug. 16, 1962.
- <sup>321</sup> Speech of Aug. 17, 1962, *Political Manifesto*, p. 196-225.
- <sup>322</sup> National Security Action memorandum to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Administrator of AID, Director of CIA, Director of US Information Agency, Aug. 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-3, 23: 627. See also Howard Jones, "Indonesian-American Relations Today, DOSB Nov. 19, 1962: 766-9.
- <sup>323</sup> McMullen, p. 65-70.
- <sup>324</sup> Nick Pete Apple, *The West New Guinea Settlement and Its Aftermath: Adequacy of News Media Coverage* (MA thesis, University of Southern California, 1969), p. 54-5.
- <sup>325</sup> Anti-Slavery Society, p. 31.
- <sup>326</sup> *Voice of the Negroids*, p. 5.
- <sup>327</sup> van der Kroef, "Settlement," p. 137.
- <sup>328</sup> The only exception was a short-lived plan for trusteeship floated by Tanganyika in April 1962. "Tanganyika offers plan," NYT April 8, 1962. The following month, the Brazzaville group refused to accept a report by the UN ambassadors of Dahomey and Upper Volta on their trip to West New Guinea, which asserted that the Papuans wanted independence. "African Group Bars Report on Papua," NYT May 6, 1962.
- <sup>329</sup> van der Veur, "Questionnaire," p. 447-9.
- <sup>330</sup> van der Kroef, "Nationalism," p. 39-40.
- <sup>331</sup> "Danger of a Red Indonesia on our Northwest Frontier," PIM Jan 1962: 15-6; IO Jan. 2, 9, 16, 1962; "West Irian Voice," ROI Feb 1962: 2.
- <sup>332</sup> IO Jan. 24, 1962. Parna also demanded new elections, the abolition of appointed members, and requested that the Dutch arm the people to "beat an Indonesian invasion," but the Dutch minister of state for New Guinea Affairs refused on all counts.
- <sup>333</sup> Apple, *West New Guinea Settlement*, p. 120.
- <sup>334</sup> Olabisi Ajala, "Inside West Irian," ROI June-July '62: 12; IO June 15, 16, 1962.
- <sup>335</sup> Herlina, p. 261-6.
- <sup>336</sup> IO July 14, 16, 1962.
- <sup>337</sup> IO July 21, 1962.
- <sup>338</sup> "Walk-out of the West," PIM Sept. 1962: 15-6; IO Aug. 4, 1962; Peter Hastings, "From Sabang to Merauke! or, from Sorong to Samarai?" *New Guinea*, Sept/Oct. 1965, p. 30fn. Similar comments were made by Jouwe, newly-elected as Council President, and others. "A Loaded Pistol: Emotional Debate in New Guinea Council," PIM Oct. 1962: 19-20.
- <sup>339</sup> Papuan members of the Dutch and Indonesian UN delegations, several related to each other, met at the 1961 UN debates on good terms. Herman Womsiwor of the Dutch delegation reportedly told J.A. Dimara of the Indonesian delegation "*jangan merah, kita sama*," (don't be angry, you and I are the same). IO Nov. 10, 1961. Warming up a crowd for Sukarno, Dimara insisted that Jouwe and Kaisiepo were nationalists who had been forced to join the New Guinea Council. IO Jan. 6, 1962.

<sup>340</sup> Bonay, named as governor to fulfill the promise that a Papuan would be the provincial leader, was removed in 1964 as unreliable, and arrested in 1965 for distributing pro-independence leaflets. Sharp, *Rule of the Sword*, 16. The first Papuan to become an officer in the Indonesian army, Seth Rumkorem, led a declaration of independence in 1970 as leader of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Movement. Even as an Indonesian soldier, he had remained in close contact with exiled nationalist leaders. Savage, "National," p. 990-1. Silas Papare, the most pro-Indonesian of all the Papuan elite, spoke out against rocket attacks and strafing of villages in 1967. Henderson, p. 223.

<sup>341</sup> van der Veur, "Political," p. 7.

<sup>342</sup> Osborne, p. 31-2; Savage, "Reluctant Colony," p. 90; IO Oct. 5, 6, 11, 12, 19, 1962. Papuan pro-independence actions were reported in the New York Times on Sept. 16, 18, 22 & 30, 1962.

<sup>343</sup> IO Oct. 29, Nov. 1, 6, 10, Dec. 10, 1962. This delegation travelled under the name *Dewan Papua Barat*, West Papua Council, the first time the word Papua had been used openly in Indonesia in years.

<sup>344</sup> *Buatlah Irian Barat: Sata Zamrudjang Indah* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1964), p. 272.

<sup>345</sup> van der Veur, "Political," p. 72.

<sup>346</sup> Ryan, p. 200.

<sup>347</sup> YUN 1962: 127; UNGA OR, A/PV.1127 & 1150.

<sup>348</sup> YUN 1962: 126. U Thant had initially asked Malaya to provide the troops. Pakistani forces were transported by an American ship, and the U.S. Air Force handled their transport within West New Guinea. NYT Aug. 17, Aug. 31, 1962; Nick P. Apple, "The United States Air Force in West New Guinea 1962-1963 – Help for the United Nations," *Aerospace Historian* 22 #4 (Spring 1975): 212-7. The UN's military advisor characterized the UNTEA period as "high in the order of merit on the list of United Nations achievements in the sphere of peacekeeping ... a model for the future." Inderjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle & Bjørn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 159. See also Thant's introduction to annual report of the United Nations 1962-3, Aug. 20/63, in U Thant, *Towards World Peace: Addresses and Public Statements 1957-1963* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1964), p. 315.

<sup>349</sup> "We often forgot that the administration here was still in the hands of UNTEA," one recalled. "We became quite good at playing hide and seek with this agency." Herlina, p. 312. For criticisms of UNTEA as pro-Indonesian, see van der Veur, "The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique," *International Organization* 18 #1 (1964). UNTEA after some debate banned the display of the West Papua flag. IO Dec. 11, 1962.

<sup>350</sup> Jan M. Pluvier, *Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 82.

<sup>351</sup> Sukarno speech of August 17, 1962, *Political Manifesto*, p. 209; OPM, *Aftermath of Colonialism* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1976). OPM is the guerrilla Free Papua Movement.

<sup>352</sup> Justus van der Kroef, "West Irian Redeemed?" *New Guinea* 4 #4 (Dec. 1969): 67. See also Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (London: Routledge, 1978), p. 163-99; Peter Savage, "The OPM in West Papua," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7 #2 (1977).

<sup>353</sup> Recollections of a delegate to the act of free choice, cited in Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, third edition (London: TAPOL, 1988), p. 25.